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ABSTRACT 
This study investigated the relationship between capital structure, performance and replacement 
of chief executive officer in firms listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE). Data was 
collected from a sample of 37 firms listed on the NSE over a period of 23 years, from 1990 to 
2012. The analysis was conducted at three stages. The canonical correlation technique was 
employed to investigate the bi-directional relationship between capital structure and performance 
and to select competing indicators of performance and capital structure. Second, the general 
linear model (GLM) procedure was used to test the effect of performance and ownership 
structure and to test the effect of capital structure and ownership structure. Lastly, the generalised 
estimating equation (GEE) was used to assess effects of performance, capital structure and 
ownership structure on change in CEO. 
 
The results revealed that a bidirectional relationship exists between capital structure and debt 
capital. The indicators found to be useful in examining the relationship between performance and 
capital structure are asset turnover ratio and total debt to the total asset ratio. The findings 
support the efficiency hypothesis but not the franchise hypothesis. The results also indicated that 
firms with a low asset turnover are 3.045 times likely to change CEO compared to firms with a 
high asset turnover. The results also indicated that firms with high leverage (debt) are 3.430 
times likely to change CEO compared to firms in low leverage, while the firms with medium 
leverage are 6.491 times likely to change CEO. 
 
Therefore managers should not be passive when it comes to choosing between equity and debt 
capital because debt capital played a disciplinary role on firms listed on the NSE.  
Keywords: Capital Structure; Performance; Corporate Governance;Efficiency Hypothesis; 
The Franchise Hypothesis,Canonical Correlation; CEO; GLM; GEE. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the Study 
 
The capital providers expect an acceptable return from their investment and that their 
investments are safe, while the users of capital expect to access finance at a reasonable cost. 
Reconciling the interest of users of finance and its suppliers is central to financial decision 
making. From a financial management perspective, the requirement is that managers make only 
capital structure choices that add value to the firm; that is, maximise the wealth of shareholders. 
It is not definite whether it is firm performance that guides capital structure decisions or capital 
structure that propels performance or whether both propel each other. Furthermore, the debate as 
to why and how much debt firms should use persists. Therefore, managers need guidance on the 
―why‖ and ―how much‖ debt should be used. The ―why‖ is about whether the values of firms 
that use debt differs from those that do not use debt, which is whether the capital structure 
decision is relevant or irrelevant? The ―how much‖ is about the optimum amount of debt 
required to maximise the wealth of the shareholders. 
An understanding of the relationship between performance and debt capital enables confirmation 
of the role debt capital play in corporate governance in firms and clarifies benefits associated 
with the use of debt, while examining the quality of financial decisions made by managers. In 
this study, the words' leverage, capital structure and usage of debt will be used interchangeably. 
The reality in modern firms is the separation of ownership and control, and the result is a 
situation where decision agents (managers) do not have a major share of the wealth gained or 
loss resulting from their decisions. In addition, due to competing interest, a conflict between 
owners and manager is imminent. Whether a decision is about asset acquisition, or asset 
financing or management of assets, or profit planning, managers can make optimal or suboptimal 
choices that impact adversely on both the value of the firm and shareholders. The advantage of 
2 
 
separation to the shareholders is that it allows firms to have access to specialized management 
contrary to relying on the owner cum managers that lack capacity to drive a firm to success.  
The separation of owners and managers translates into risk sharing games between managers and 
shareholders. In firms, managers take decisions, but don‘t fully bear the consequences. In 
businesses, the residual risk is borne by the residual claimants namely, the shareholders. The 
transfer of risk or lopsided risk sharing between managers and shareholders might encourage 
managers to be unnecessarily speculative and or involve in activities that are detrimental to 
investors (agency costs) as explained by Jensen and Meckling (1976).The agency problem or 
incentive problem is explained in terms of asymmetries in pay offs, horizon and information 
liability and summarised as separation of decision making by management from risk taking by 
shareholders and debt holders. The result of this arrangement is serious corporate governance 
issues if managers do not always behave in the best interest of the investors (Berk & DeMarzo, 
2011:523).Therefore, structures must be in place to moderate adverse activities by opportunistic 
managers. The use of debt capital to contain managerial excesses is a major subject in this study. 
1.1.1 Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance is the way firms are managed, specifically the set of mechanisms that 
control a manager‘s decisions and actions (Bushee, Carter & Gerakos, 2009). It is a mechanism 
through which investors in corporations assure themselves that their managers select worthwhile 
investments. 
A code of governance is fundamental for any emerging country as it provides a sound 
management framework and principles that add value to a firm (Young, 2010). Wealth creation 
by corporations and the sharing of that wealth depends on how productive and efficient 
management is, efficacious legal contractual arrangements, and the operation of various markets 
(Adams, Hermalin & Weisbach 2010; Bebchuk, &Weisbach, 2010; Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, 
2009).   
Studies on the relationships between agent (managers) and principal (shareholders) revealed the 
need for additional monitoring and control mechanisms (Bonazzi &Islam, 2007).As an example, 
awareness of corporate governance issues in South Africa, specifically intolerance for 
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mismanagement saw the need to strengthen corporate governance structures in South Africa 
(Young, 2010). In Kenya due to laxity in corporate governance, firms such as Uchumi Ltd and 
Cooper Motor Corporation (CMC)Ltd were suspended from the then Nairobi Stock 
Exchange(NSE) now Nairobi Securities Stock Exchange. The existence of firms that rate 
financial securities issued by firms and institutions (for example, Governance Metrics 
International, Standard and Poor) attests the importance of corporate governance in the sense that 
poorly rated firms, and institutions will not get capital. They need capital to support their 
investments (Larcker, Richardson & Tuna, 2005). 
Though there are competing corporate governance mechanisms, solutions to corporate woes are 
modeled around the monitoring role of independent board of directors (Faleye, Hoitash 
&Hoitash, 2011) and vary from country to country(Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz& Williamson, 2009; 
Allen, 2005).  There is a need for oversight body; when the principal (shareholders) for one 
reason or another cannot perfectly monitor the agent‘s (managers‘) actions (Harris & Raviv, 
2010). Effective monitoring is required to protect the interests of other stakeholders; 
nevertheless, intense monitoring compromises the invaluable director‘s strategic advising role 
and could impact adversely on the value of the firm (Faleye, Hoitash &Hoitash, 2011). At times, 
the board is too friendly to take corrective actions (Adams & Ferreira, 2007); and alternative 
monitoring mechanisms ought to be identified so that independent directors can spend less time 
on monitoring and more time on the advisory role. Monitoring is only sensible when wealth is 
being created, but wealth creation also depends on the quality of advice offered to top managers 
by independent directors. Mehran, Morrison and Shapiro (2011) and Jensen (1986) asserted that 
debt capital is good for corporate governance because it attracts lenders' disciplinary actions. 
 
Kenya has its share of corporate governance problems that needs to be addressed, and to 
safeguard the interest of those who invest in capital markets and firms, which need funds for 
worthwhile projects the Capital Markets Authority (CMA) developed guidelines on corporate 
governance practices by publicly listed firms in Kenya (CMA, 2002). To quote CMA, ‗Corporate 
governance has been an important topic of reform and discussion in Kenya for almost 15 years. 
The corporate Governance Guidelines issued by the Capital Markets Authority have been 
supported by private sector initiatives, including widespread director training which in turn led to 
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improved governance across listed companies. Kenya has a strong accounting and auditing 
culture and has made great strides in introducing international standards in these areas. However, 
major challenges remain. The country has lagged in many international comparative rankings of 
governance, anti-corruption, and competitiveness. A number of developments in the markets, in 
Kenya and abroad, shook investor confidence. Much of the legal framework (particularly the 
current Companies Act) is outdated and has significant gaps. Fully tapping the potential of 
capital markets and professionalizing boards and management will require that reform continues. 
For a number of reasons, it is now important to move corporate governance to the fore of the 
policy agenda.‘ An examination of CMA website shows evidence of corporate governance 
shortcomings in listed firms. For example, in March 2013, CMA further extended the suspension 
from trading of shares of CMC Holdings Limited shares for additional period of fifty three (53) 
trading days from 30 March 2013 to 14 June 2013 on request of the CMC (CMA, 2013). In In 
Kenya, Mulili and Wong (2012) explored the challenges encountered by developing countries 
during the process of adopting the corporate governance ideals and concluded that there is a need 
to strengthen corporate governance. 
This study addressed four related issues within the context of corporate governance, quality of 
managerial decisions and the role of debt in corporate governance using data from an emerging 
economy, Kenya. Firstly, it interrogates the relationship between leverage and performance; 
secondly, it interrogates the effect of leverage on change of Chief Executive Officer (CEO); 
thirdly, it interrogates the effect of performance on change of CEO; and finally it interrogates the 
combined effect of leverage and performance on change of CEO of firms listed at the Nairobi 
Securities Exchange.  
1.1.2 Capital Structure Theories 
Theories on capital structure are meant to managers identify the capital structure mixes that 
maximises both the wealth of shareholders and the market value of the firm. Capital structure 
theories started from the work of Modigliani and Miller (1958). Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
thesiswere that in a perfect market, a firm's value is independent of its capital structure, or else 
investors would gainfully sell the shares of the firm with the higher value and buy similar shares 
in the firm with lower value and earn a riskless return.  The action by investors of selling 
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securities in one firm and buying share in a similar firm to take advantage of price differences is 
based upon the law of one price and is known as arbitrage (Lumby & Jones,2011; Stulz, 2000). 
 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) model is unambiguous on conditions that must prevail for debt to 
be irrelevant. Stulz (2000: 121-122) remark that, ―The key assumptions of Modigliani and Miller 
have been used over and over in our field not because we think they hold, but because we think 
they allow us to make predictions and that our results ought to be judged not by leading 
assumptions but by the usefulness of the results in explaining empirical phenomena.‖ These 
assumptions opened a window for other researchers to challenge Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
irrelevancy theorem. The challenge is that in the real-world, friction exists (market 
imperfections) and those frictions make the capital structure relevant (Durand, 1959).  Sources of 
frictions are found in investor behavior that is shaped by contract law, taxes and regulations, and 
it is these frictions that require managers to make capital structure choices (Li, Whited &Wu, 
2014). 
 
Studies that contradicted Modigliani and Miller (1958) irrelevancy theorem mentioned the 
advantage of debt in a world where corporate taxes and other frictions as important in explaining 
the use of debt by corporations (Hugonnier, Malamud& Morellec, 2012; Berk, Stanton, & 
Zechner, 2008). Modigliani and Miller (1963:434) concurred that for even though one may have 
a probable return after taxes that is twice that of another firm in the same risk equivalent-class, it 
will not be the case that the actual return after taxes of the first firm will always be twice of the 
second, if the two firms have a different degree of leverage; and since the distribution of returns 
after tax of the two firms will not be proportionate, there can be no ‗arbitrage‘ process to force 
their values to be equivalent to their expected after tax returns." The importance of capital 
structure is modeled around a number of theories that include: the agency theory and agency 
costs (Berk &DeMarzo, 2011; Jensen &Meckling, 1976); the pecking order theory and 
information asymmetry (Leary & Roberts, 2008; Myers, 1984, 1977). There is also capital 
structure theory based on corporate control (Roberts& Sufi, 2009; Harris & Raviv, 1991); and 
product market interactions theory (Fosu, 2013; Campello, 2006). 
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The prediction is that in the presence of incentive conflicts, managers use debt if it fits into their 
strategy (Roberts& Sufi, 2009). Alternatively, managers should be forced to use debt capital if it 
is beneficial for the firm. Unfortunately forcing managers to use debt takes away their innovation 
and might unfairly penalises efficient managers. Managers left on their own can be rational thus 
choosing the optimum debt level to signal to the capital market the true value to the firm (Berk 
&DeMarzo, 2011; Loncarski, ter Horst&Veld, 2006; Myers & Majluf, 1984). 
 
1.1.3 Firm Performance 
Finance theorist and practitioners have agreed that the objective of the firm is to maximise the 
wealth of shareholders (Moyer, McGuigan, Rao & Kretlow, 2011; Van Horne & Wachowicz, 
2009). Firm efficiency lead indicators such  as the book to market value ratio, return on 
investments, at market and accounting levels, inform investors about whether a firm is achieving 
its objectives or not.  
 
Poor performance might be traced to earlier decisions made by management and or hostile 
economic environment. Financial distress, a product of unsatisfactory decisions by management 
is costly and justifies corrective action. Remedial measures include dismissing top management 
or sacking employees or reengineering strategy and structure (Chen& Hambrick, 2012), or debt 
restructuring (Damijan, 2014) instead of winding up the business. In particular, if the poor 
performance is traced to ineffectiveness of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and board of 
directors, then the CEO and board of directors are debriefed or replaced, and board members 
even lose seats in other boards (Wermers, Wu & Zechner, 2008: 26).  
 
1.1.4 The Control Rights in Firms 
The control right in firms belongs to owners and lenders to the business. This explains why 
decisions regarding reorganisation, in law and substance, begin by an examination of how 
control rights are allocated within a firm (Roberts & Sufi, 2009; Tung, 2009; Baird &Rasmussen, 
2006). Practically, if firms are to make informed choices on a timely basis, in addition to 
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motivating the employee's decision should be made where knowledge resides. Equity holders 
being ultimate bearers of risk enjoy ‗unlimited‘ control rights, compared to other stakeholders. 
However, from a risk perspective, the debt holders are more risk averse than equity holders. 
Managers, being the professional should retain operating decision rights. Therefore, debt holders 
might closely monitor firm risk, and managerial activities than equity holders. 
 
In capturing the capital invested by shareholders relative to capital invested by debt holders, 
capital structure captures the level of commitment of owners in their firm, and signal show 
control rights are distributed among investors of a firm. Not surprisingly, managers might issue 
debt securities to avoid surrendering the rights of existing shareholders (avoid diluting control) to 
new subscribers (Roberts & Sufi, 2009).  
Shareholders that are dispersed and isolated might be powerless in the face of managerial self-
interest because they cannot act in unanimity (Kang, 2011; Berle& Means, 1932). Dispersed 
shareholders find it difficult disciplining managers even when performance is poor. It is possible 
that when the value of a firm decline substantially due to pitiable performance, dispersed 
shareholders might become less interested in what management does and in the firm because the 
decline in the value of a firm instantly erodes their investment, and this is a serious challenge to 
corporate governance. Where shareholders find it difficult exerting their monitoring role, lenders 
might play that role. Lenders not only want rates of return commensurate to their risk exposure, 
but also the power to tilt borrower firm‘s risk exposure in their favor (Mohamed, 2010).  
1.1.5 Influence of capital structure on performance and the influence of 
 performance on capital structure 
Since Modigliani and Miller (1958), empirical work has uncovered some conventional facts on 
capital structure choice, nevertheless, this evidence is largely based on firms in the developed 
economies, and it is not at all clear how these facts relate to different theoretical models 
(Margaritis & Psilaki, 2010; Margaritis & Psillaki, 2007). To conclude whether these empirical 
regularities are merely spurious correlations, or whether they support any theory or not, it is 
important to test the robustness of these findings outside the environment in which they were 
uncovered (Margaritis & Psilaki, 2010; Margaritis & Psillaki, 2007; Rajan & Zengales, 1995). 
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The post Modigliani & Miller (1958) capital structure theories such as the static trade off model, 
pecking order model and market for corporate control model implies that the use of debt capital  
depends on performance of the borrowing firm (Graham & Leary, 2011). The static trade off 
theory suggests that optimum capital structure is determined by balancing corporate tax savings 
against cost of bankruptcy (Myers, 1984; Barclay & Smith, 1999). The static trade off theory 
prediction is that profitable firms will use more debt because it is only profitable firms that enjoy 
tax benefits. It follows those firms with tax savings resulting from good performance and low 
bankruptcy costs should use more debt and post better performance (Ferrão, 2011, Graham & 
Harvey, 2001). 
 
The pecking order hypothesis  predict that debt is used to finance new investments after 
exhausting  retained earnings and that firms will have no leverage targets (Ferrão, 2011; Mazur, 
2007; Myers & Majluf, 1984).The aggregate dynamics of capital structure in Bhamra, Kuehn and 
Strebulaev (2010)consider time-varying macroeconomic conditions as influencing capital 
structure choices,while the human capital theory of capital structure in Berk, Stanton and 
Zechner (2010) implies a potential relationship between capital structure and performance. 
 
The agency theory addresses the relationship between owners and managers and would imply a 
bidirectional relationship between firm performance and capital structure (Dobbin & Jung, 2010; 
Hannah, 2007: 404-406; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). These theories, are testable empirically, and 
predict that performance is a factor that explains the use of debt; and that, efficient and money-
making firms will use more debt; however, at the same time profitable firms might use less debt 
to minimize their exposure to financial distress or to avoid diluting control (Margaritis & Psilaki, 
2010). 
 
The counter hypothesis is that debt capital force managers to run their firms profitably, thus 
generating sufficient cash to meet their debt obligations (Kang, 2011). The assumption is that 
debt holders are risk averse, and that in the face of poor performance, they will control the firm 
to preserve their investment. Even when the firm is not in financial difficulties, debt holders 
might control the propensity of managers to select too risky projects that can adversely impact 
9 
 
onthe value to the firm, yet shareholders will be willing to take a bet on risky projects (La Rocca, 
La Rocca, & Gerace, 2008). 
 
The monitoring role of debt holders is enabled through debt covenants (Mustapha& Ahmad, 
2011). Debt covenants, allow debt holders the right to more detailed information useful in 
controlling manager‘s taste for risk that is not beneficial to shareholders. Bennett, Güntay and 
Unal (2014) presented finding that support monitoring role by debt holders when they assert that 
banks with higher inside debt ratios have superior supervisory ratings, that indicate, stronger 
capital positions, better management, stronger earnings, and the capacity to withstand market 
jolts in the future; they conclude that such ex ante evidence can explain the observed relationship 
between inside debt, default risk, and performance during the crisis. 
 
1.1.6 Firm Performance and Change of Chief Executive Officer 
In the face of poor performance, shareholders, bidders in takeover, nonexecutive directors and 
investors (shareholders and debt holders) can recommend a corrective. The corrective action 
might include a change in top management (Chen & Hambrick, 2012; Firth, Fung & Rui, 2006). 
The ability of the board of directors to change an incompetent CEO is an important mechanism 
for controlling conflicts between managers and shareholders (Blackwell, Dudney & Farrell, 
2007).The poor performance hypothesis states that CEO is replaced when performance is poor 
(Chen & Hambrick, 2012). 
Blackwell, Dudney and Farrell (2007) finding are that the probability of a CEO change is 
inversely related to the firm‘s performance; that is, managers of firms with poor performance are 
likely to be replaced. However, Fisman, Khurana, and Rhodes (2010) present a model in which 
weak governance protects mediocre CEOs from dismissal, while shielding the board. Critical to 
this study is an observation by BrookmanandThistle (2009:1) that ‗whether CEO tenure is 
determined by performance or by other, consideration is an important issue in corporate 
governance. If corporate governance structures function correctly, then CEOs will be retained 
when they perform well and replaced when they perform poorly. Conversely, if governance 
structures function poorly, CEOs will not be replaced even if firm performance is poor. One 
approach to examining whether governance functions well is to analyse the CEO's risk of 
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termination. Furthermore, previous studies have used CEO turnover to test effectiveness of 
corporate governance (Brookman & Thistle, 2009; Parrino, Sias, & Starks, 2004). 
 
1.1.7 Capital structure and change of chief executive officer 
CEOs have a say on capital structure decisions and are therefore held accountable. In addition, 
addition, default is very costly for the tenure of a CEO. A condition that makes firms efficient 
and effective is that the managers‘ actions are planned, organized, monitored and controlled to 
ensure coordination of human efforts to achieve organizational objectives (Taylor, 2013; Daft, 
2010; Mintzberg, 1988). 
 
Cao and Mauer (2010) concluded that the leverage of the replaced CEO‘s former company tends 
to be consistent in the direction of the debt policy change and that the frequency of CEO 
turnover is much less when the firm never changes its debt policy. In the US, Congress passed 
the U.S.A. Financial Services Modernization Act (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 1999) which 
requires the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and the Secretary of the Treasury to 
research on the potential use of subordinated debt to bring market forces to bear on the 
operations of large financial institutions and to protect the deposit insurance funds (Evanoff & 
Wall, 2000).  
 
The role of debt in disciplining managers is yet to be explored and is an unresolved issue. The 
nearest study on debt-based discipline is by Blum (2002), who asserted that benefits of market 
discipline associated with debt capital depend on the ability of banks to credibly commit to a 
given level of risk. Chen and Hassan (2011) recommend the use of debt capital by banks because 
by investing in debt capital, debt holders will receive favorable information useful in monitoring 
bank managers‘ investment decisions, thus minimizing banks moral hazard problems and this 
monitoring could be beneficial to shareholders. It is possible that firms with substantial debt 
capital; debt monitoring could discourage managers from practicing the bait and switch strategy, 
because, given that debt holders are technically residual claimants, they could be more intensive 
in their monitoring (Tirole, 2006). 
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The presence of debt in capital structure increases the risk of liquidation if a decline in a firm‘s 
performance hampers the profitability, and liquidity needed to pay interest and the principal 
amount on maturity (Anderson & Carverhill, 2012). It is likely that where managers fail to meet 
their obligations to debt holders, debt holders might attempt to replace such managers. The fact 
that debt capital plays a disciplinary role is a prediction that needs to be confronted with 
unknown or unused data to test a theory. If the data is consistent with the prediction, then a 
theory emerges. To quote Zwiebel(1996: 1197) ―Indeed, debt is useful precisely because it can 
ex-ante  restrict managerial decisions later when the discipliner is no longer in a position to exert 
pressure, ―while, Tung (2009:117 - 123), refer to leverage in the board room as the unsung 
influence of private lenders in corporate governance, ―The dearth (lack) of attention to lender 
governance is ironic given the dominance of the contractualist view of the corporation within the 
legal academy and the thick web of contractual commitments that bind the public company. 
Despite the ascendancy of the contractualist view of the corporation within the legal academy, 
legal scholars have not generally noticed the extent of lender governance or discussed its 
contours or potential effects‖ (Tung, 2009:117 - 123). 
 
1.1.8 Combined effect of capital structure and performance on change of chief 
executive officer 
From the arguments in sections 1.1.7 and 1.1.8, it is possible that performance on its own or 
leverage on its own might not explain changes in CEOs; however, there could be a joint effect. 
Therefore, interaction effect of leverage and performance on change of CEO is not unlikely. 
There is a case in establishing the joint effect of leverage and performance on change of CEO. 
The argument implied by the effect of interaction is more complex than that of a relation of 
dependency (Tacq, 1997). An effect of interaction is not merely the effect of performance in 
itself, or of capital structure, but it expresses the effect of combination of performance and 
capital structure that is, the product of performance and capital structure is used as the 
independent variable. The proposition is that capital structure and poor performance reinforce 
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each other to influence change in CEO; in which case multiplicative model and not weighted 
sum model is appropriate (Tacq, 1997). 
 
1.1.9 Capital structure and performance of firms after change in CEO 
The relationship between strategic change such as replacing CEO and post CEO change firm 
performance divulged ambivalent findings. Some studies report improvement in performance 
after such a major decisive change (Cornelli, Kominek & Ljungqvist, 2013; Huson, Malatesta & 
Parrino 2004). Other reported a decline in performance after change in CEOs (Chen&Thompson, 
2012). Kelly and Amburgey (1991) found no relationship between change in CEO and firm 
performance. In China, Pessarossi and Laurent (2012) found that CEO turnover typically 
produces a positive stock market reaction, but the reaction is significantly positive only for 
enterprises owned by the central government, and not significant for enterprises owned by local 
governments or privately owned enterprises.  
 
There are three competing hypothesis that predict post CEO change performance. These are 
strategy hypotheses, the ability hypothesis and scapegoat hypothesis (Pessarossi& Weill, 2012:3; 
Clayton, Hartzell & Rosenberg, 2005).The ability and strategy hypothesis are associated with 
change in operating and financial strategies that improve performance. The scapegoat hypothesis 
would predict no change in performance because there was no merit in replacing the manager. 
 
In the past models that predict use of debt tended to ignore CEO characteristics (Frank & Goyal, 
2007). Even Modigliani and Miller (1958) proposition would predict no cause and effect 
between change in CEO and change in leverage because capital structure decisions are irrelevant. 
This prediction will hold if fixed firm effect is independent of managerial fixed effect. Bertrand 
and Schoar (2003) found that managerial fixed effect matter for a wide range of corporate 
decisions.However, Adams and Sattar (2009) found that CEO turnover events while is value 
enhancing to stockholders, are values decreasing to bondholders, and overall have an 
insignificant impact on firm value, evidence, which is consistent with the wealth transfer 
hypothesis but inconsistent with the signaling hypothesis. 
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1.1.10 Nairobi securities exchange (NSE) 
The Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) on which this study focuses on is the largest stock 
exchange in East Africa and ranked fifth in Africa in terms of market capitalization (NSE, 2014). 
Corporate governance is a topical issue in Kenya largely because most firms listed on the 
Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE) fail to earn adequate returns for their shareholders. The NSE 20 
share index that stood at 4000 points in 1994, declined to 3000 points in 1997and then dropped 
to 1420 points in 2001. As in May 2011 the index stood at 3993, which is just a few points below 
the level of 4000 points in 1994, thus a negative growth. On 8
th
 November2011, the index stood 
at a low 3459.51 point. The average earnings, after tax, of firms listed on the NSE declined by 
almost 51 percent, even before adjusting for inflation, between 1994 and 1999. This is against an 
increase of 86 percent in average total assets of firms listed at the NSE. At the same time, more 
than one-half of the firms reduced or has been skipping dividends without realization of capital 
gains.  
There are firms in this market (for example, National Bank of Kenya) that has not either paid 
dividends or reported significant capital gains over the past 15 years, a period from 1994 to 2010. 
With such performance indicators, one would expect to see changes in both the board of 
directors and chief executive officer's (CEO‘s). These lackluster performances have an 
implication as to the effectiveness of corporate governance in Kenya. 
Firm‘s stakeholders are aware that continuous poor performance is a threat to a firm‘s very 
existence and, not surprisingly these poor performances has garnered considerable attention in 
public debates amongst investors, policy makers and investment advisors who seek redress. It is 
imperative that models that forestall and address poor performance and thus reduce firm failure 
are identified. 
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
Capital structure describes the mix of securities used by firms to finance real investments. 
Determining the right balance between debt and equity financing means weighing the costs and 
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benefits of debt and equity, to make sure that the firm does not have debt it cannot repay and at 
the same time, the combination of debt and equity must minimize the cost of capital. Choosing 
debt forces managers to manage cash flow to be able to meet the firm‘s debt obligations; 
therefore, debt holders have the potential to play a disciplinary role. 
 
The importance of debt capital to issuing firms is debatable from the time Modigliani and Miller 
(M&M) (1958) made it clear that in perfect markets, and based on the law of one price. Capital 
structure does not matter because it does not add value (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). The law of 
one price implies that a good must sell for the same price in all locations (Mankiw, 2011:685-
686; Lamont & Thaler, 2003; Kenneth & Kenneth, 1983) otherwise arbitrageurs will come into 
the market and eliminate differences in prices of identical assets. The finance manager's 
interpretation would be that in perfect capital markets, all financial decisions will not impact 
upon the value to the firm, and in finality irrelevant.  The then M&M proposition worked well 
with the proof that while leverage increases the risk and cost of equity, the firms weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC), and total value is not changed (Van Horne & Wachowicz, 
2009).  
 
However, the conclusion that a firm‘s choice of capital structure is inconsequential is 
inconsistent with the observation that firms invest significant resources both in terms of 
managerial time and effort, legal fee and investment banking fees, to manage their capital 
structures (Berk & DeMarzo, 2011).The main justification of the deployment of such resources 
is that the choice of leverage is of critical importance to a firm‘s value; and that individual firms 
have an optimum capital structure (Berk & DeMarzo, 2011). The proposition is that capital 
structure decisions are relevant and not irrelevant as stated in MM. On the NSE, there are large 
differences in leverage ratios (see Table 6.1 in chapter 6 specifically, the high standard 
deviations); and the question then is, if the capital structure decision is not important, how does 
one explain variations in leverage ratios?  
This study gravitates around the relevancy and irrelevancy of capital structure decisions; 
specifically   the effect of debt capital on the value of the firm. The argument by O‘Brien, 
Parthiban, Toru and Andrew (2014:1013) suggested that debt capital impacted on firm 
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performance and to quote them ‗While agency theory predicts that debt should lead to higher 
performance for diversifying firms, transaction cost economics (TCE) predicts that more debt 
will lead to lower performance for firms expanding to new markets.‘ 
Because firms do not operate in a perfect market, there are limits to arbitrage process; therefore, 
there is a need examining capital structure choices in imperfect markets.  In support of the 
relevancy of capital structure, the debate then progressed as presented by Myers (2001:81): 
―There is no universal theory of the debt-equity choice, and no reason to expect one. There are 
several useful conditional theories, however. For example, the tradeoff theory says that firms 
seek debt levels that balance the tax advantages of additional debt against the costs of possible 
financial distress. The tradeoff theory predicts moderate borrowing by tax-paying firms. The 
pecking order theory says that the firm will borrow, rather than issuing equity, when internal 
cash flow is not sufficient to fund capital expenditures. Thus the amount of debt will reflect the 
firm's cumulative need for external funds. Thefree cash flow theory states that dangerously high 
debt levels will increase the value to the firm, despite the threat of financial distress, when a 
firm's operating cash flow significantly exceeds its profitable investment opportunities. The free 
cash flow theory is designed for mature firms that are prone to over invest".  Myers (2001:82) 
adds that the tradeoff theory emphasizes taxes, the pecking order theory emphasizes differences 
in information, and the free cash flow theory emphasizes agency costs, and in this study, the 
disciplinary role of debt is examined. 
 
There are competing approaches that investors can choose from to avoid a decline in the value of 
their firms. The first approach is diversification (Elton & Gruber, 1997; Markowitz, 1952). The 
second is disposal of shares to force incompetent managers out to forget about how a firm is 
managed (McCahery, Sautner, & Starks, 2011; Bharath, Jayaraman& Nagar, 2010; Admati 
&Pfleiderer, 2009). The third option requires carefully thought-out corporate governance 
mechanisms that maximise the wealth of shareholders. In this study, this third option is examined 
to establish the role of debt as a noticeable aspect of corporate governance, specifically 
replacement of CEO‘s in poorly performing firms. 
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The hypothesis is that debt capital is an alternative corporate governance mechanism if 
shareholders fail to take action against non-performing managers.A survey by Bebchuk and 
Weisbach (2010) on shareholders and shareholder activism, confirms that corporate governance 
focus on the actions by shareholders and not by debt holders.  
First, debt capital, one would argue reduces agency costs; however, it can also induce agency 
benefits, if there are visible differences in performance across different levels of capital structure; 
and visible differences in capital structure across different levels of performance. Thus managers 
would look at performance in managing debt levels and vice versa; that is, look at debt levels in 
managing performance. However, researchers are not in consensus, whether it is the capital 
structure that influences performance or performance that influences capital structure or both 
(Margaritis & Psillaki, 2010; Margaritis & Psillaki, 2007). This study establishes which of these 
possibilities prevail on the NSE. 
Second debt capital becomes a relevant corporate governance mechanism, only if it has a 
noticeable effect on corporate governance, namely replacement of CEO‘s in poorly performing 
firms. This requires a close examination of changes of CEO to establish how much of the change 
is explained by poor performance; how much of the change is attributed to debt capital; and how 
much change is attributed to joint effect of capital structure and performance. This is to 
recognize the lack of consensus as to whether managers are replaced as a result of poor 
performance or not or as a result of sub optimal capital structure decisions. Studies that point out 
failure of shareholders to replace non performing CEOs, implies the need to strengthen corporate 
governance in firms. 
 
It is mentioned above that Kenya has its share of corporate governance problems that need 
solution. However, there is no study on the role of debt capital as a disciplinary mechanism.  
Furthermore, similar studies in Kenya have looked at determinants of capital structure but 
ignored the bidirectional relationship between capital structure and performance (Gwatidzo & 
Ojah, 2009, Ngungi 2008; Odinga, 2003; Omondi, 1996). The studies in Kenya equally ignored 
levels of performance and level's capital structure when contributing to capital structure debate. 
This study is an attempt to close such a gap. 
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Methodological issues arise in relation to studies on capital structure choices. Different 
methodologies result into different interpretation of factors that explain capital structure 
decisions. Some previous studies employed statistical techniques that make it difficult 
establishing whether, the effect of capital structure on performance responds to different capital 
choices or whether the effect of performance on capital structure responds to different 
performance levels.  In any case, most of the studies employed one statistical method ‗while 
more than one statistical method should be used as part of a validation process to help ensure that 
variance explained culminates from the underlying phenomena or trait and is not a function of 
method‘ (Onwuegbuzie, Johnson & Coluns, 2009: 115). 
 
Fisman, Khurana, and Rhodes (2010) and Firth, Fung and Rui (2006) are examples of studies 
that use ordinary least regression analysis to know whether performance explains the change in 
CEO. However, of equal significance to managers would be whether poor performance is 
explained in terms of sub optimal capital structure choices. Managers would want to know 
whether performance is a decision variable in making capital choices; and the extent to which 
change in CEO is sensitive to level of performance and capital structure levels. This kind of 
analysis would require grouped data. 
 
This study addressed methodological issue by employing canonical correlation technique to 
identify and cross match appropriate measures of capital structure and performance. It also 
employed generalised linear model (GLM) as an improvement on ordinary least regression 
(OLS). OLS based studies focus only on the test of significance of predictor coefficients but do 
not use levels of performance to predict levels of leverage and vice versa. The other 
improvement is that both levels of leverage and performance are subjected to generalised 
estimating equations (GEE) model to predict change in CEOs; and in that, respect identifies a 
target overall debt level. 
 
 Earlier studies do not explain their selection of performance and capital structure indicators, but 
go by tradition; to address the issue of variable selection, this study employs canonical 
correlation analysis in choosing the indicators of performance and capital structure from a list of 
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potential indicators.Kenya provides an ideal case for such investigation as it has undergone 
political and economic adjustment that included introduction of multi-party politics, reluctance 
by donor agencies such as World Bank to extend credit, restructuring on the NSE and 
participation of a substantial number of firms in the capital market. Therefore this study seeks 
answers to the following research questions: 
 
i. Does leverage have effect on firm performance?  
ii. Does performance have effect on firm leverage?  
iii. Does performance have effect on change of CEO?  
iv. Does leverage have effect on change of CEO? 
v.  Does leverage and performance (interaction effect) have effect on change of CEO?  
 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
1.3.1 Primary Objective 
The primary objective of this study is to investigate the relationship between capital structure, 
performance and change in CEO in firms listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange. 
 
1.3.2. Secondary objectives 
In order to achieve the primary objective, the secondary objectives of the study are: 
 To establish if firm performance has an effect on leverage. 
 To establish if leverage has an effect on firm performance. 
 To establish if firm performance causes changes of CEO. 
 To establish if leverage cause change of CEO. 
 To establish if leverage and firm performance (interaction effect) causes change of CEO. 
1.4 Hypotheses for the Study 
In order to investigate the relationship between variables, five null hypotheses were tested. The 
null hypotheses and alternative hypotheses tested in this study were as follows: 
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H01: Firm performance does not have a significant effect on leverage, and alternative  
H11: Firm performance has a significant effect on leverage. 
 
H02: Leverage does not have a significant effect on firm performance; and the alternative 
hypothesis:  
H12: Leverage has a significant effect on firm performance. 
 
H03: Firm performance does not have a significant effect on Change of CEO 
H13:  Firm performance has a significant effect on Change of CEO. 
 
H04: Leverage does not have a significant effect on change of CEO. 
H14:  Leverage has a significant effect on change of CEO. 
 
H05: Leverage and firm performance does not have a significant effect on Change of CEO 
H15:  Leverage and firm performance has a significant effect on Change of CEO. 
The testing of the null and alternate hypotheses is conducted in chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
1.5 Value of the Study 
The contribution of this study is at methodological, theoretical and practical levels. It contributes 
to academic literature by exploring the role of debt capital in corporate governance in emerging 
economy; by establishing the effect firm performance has on debt capital it contributes to the 
theory of debt management; and contributes to selection of capital structure and performance 
indicators. It contributes to the theory of change in CEOsby establishing empirically whether 
organization can change their negative performance by changing the CEO; specificallyleverage 
and performance effect on change of CEOs. The data confirmed the presence ofechelon and 
match theory at the NSE. It raises theoretical issue on finance theory; and whether there is a 
sound theory about change of management. On the basis of this study researchers can proceed to 
establish the effect of change of CEO on performance. The study opens a debate about the use of 
ROA as a performance indicator and the reliability of the book value and the market value of a 
share as a performance indicator and the cost of relying on mispecified performance indicators. 
20 
 
 
This study provided out-of-sample evidence. The data used in this study is outside developed 
economies, that is, in emerging economy that exhibit unique legal and economic factors when 
compared to developed economies. The analogy is in the assertion that studies on market return 
anomalies must be subjected to out-of-sample tests if the results are to be credible.  
 
At a practical level, the findings are important to managers in making financial decisions, 
particularly choice of an optimum capital structure or whether to use debt or not. To 
shareholders, it confirmed debt capital‘s monitoring role and shareholders will benefit by having 
debt capital in their firm. In this market it is like there static trade off theory and not pecking 
order theory should be preferred. 
 
In terms of methodology, it goes beyond OLS regression and subjected the data to canonical 
correlation, general linear model (GLM) and generalised estimating equation (GEE). It also 
questioned the indicators of both performance and capital structure that managers used. 
 
The analysis provides insights into the structure of the different variable sets (capital structure, 
performance and change of CEO as they relate to dependence in their relationships. The findings 
are of practical and conceptual significance and opened a window for further studies. For 
example, it employs the use of multiple variables instead of examining each variable 
independently.  
1.6 Conceptual Frame Work 
1.6.1 Financing Choices, Agency Problem and Performance 
It is the interaction between human and non-human resources that add value to the firm.  
However, owners and managers are different, yet owners expect a manager to take actions that 
add value to the firm. In this study, the assumption is that corporate governance realigns 
manager's financing, investment, products and or service's choices and even the markets that they 
position in with the objectives of the firm. It is manager‘s choice that positively or negatively 
factor into performance. 
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The agency theory provides a framework to align managerial and shareholders conflicting 
interest. The literature presented in chapter 2 suggested that financing choices could alleviate the 
agency problem (corporate governance) is researchable as illustrated in Figure 1.1. In Figure 1.1 
of the two basic competing theories relating to the capital structure decision, that is, whether the 
capital structure is relevant or irrelevant is illustrated.  The bench mark for evaluation of 
investment, financing and asset-management policy is the impact of that policy on the wealth of 
the owners of the firm. The relevancy of capital structure implies that managers identify the 
optimal capital structure to maximise the value of the firm.  
The choice of an optimum capital structure is influenced by capital structure theories. The 
examples of capital structure theories are: pecking order theory, agency theory, contracting 
theory and information theory. The result of application of a capital structure theory is a set of 
capital structure choices in respect to the amount of debt capital that a firm can use. The level of 
usage of debt capital by firms can be classified as high or low and then compared to firm 
performance to set an optimum capital structure.  
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Figure 1.1: Financing Choices, Agency Problems and Performance 
Source: Author 
1.7 Scope and demarcation of the study 
The scope and demarcation of the study is that the study will be category specific and will focus 
on the disciplinary role of debt capital of firms listed at the NSE, in Kenya (see Figure 1.1). The 
other aspects such as tax advantage of debt are excluded and the contribution of capital structure 
to organization theory is the focus. 
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1.8 Limitations of the Study 
 
This study is limited to Kenya's conditions as a practical approach to strengthening corporate 
governance mechanism. This study is a baseline study that other researchers can improve on. 
There has not been sufficient research on the issues to be addressed in this study in Kenya. 
 
The other limitation is that there are other reasons why the shareholders force a CEO to leave by 
sacking or refusing to renew contract or even the reason why a CEO leaves voluntarily that 
cannot be captured by secondary data. The other limitations are deduced from the short comings 
inherent in the accounting data, derived from annual reports that from the core of data that will 
be used in this study. Accounting numbers contained in annual reports are affected by a number 
of firm oriented factors; industry and economy factors that make it difficult for the analyst to 
make intra and inter firm comparisons. The assumption in this study is that annual reports 
contain useful information. The other limitation could be due to use of panel data and use of logit 
regression. The problem of the logistic regression is that serial correlation might exist in the 
explanatory variables. It might be that lenders favor profitable borrowers, such as that firm with 
low debt ratios are poor performers. 
1.8.1 Delimitations of the Study 
The delimitations of the study are items that are not captured in both the statement of the problem 
and research objectives. For example the study does not attempt to answer questions such as: 
Apart from performance, what factors do firms consider before issuing debt?  
1.9 Ethical Considerations 
The ethical consideration in this study could relate to using unfair means to get the data and 
misrepresent findings. Fortunately most of the data to be used in this study is within the public 
domain. 
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1.10 Division of Chapters 
To ensure a comprehensive coverage of the relevant literature to place the research problem in its 
correct perspective, existing methods and the proposed goals, this thesis is organized sequentially 
as follows: 
 
Chapter one presents the background of the study, statement of the problem, objectives of the 
study, justification and limitations of the study. In this, chapter is presented the key concepts and 
conceptual frame work of the study. 
 
The second chapter is the literature review that focuses on the intervention of debt capital in 
terms of agency costs and benefits and specifically the impact of debt capital and performance 
and the impact of performance on debt capital.  
 
Chapter three covered the literature reviewed valuable in understanding the contribution of debt 
capital to corporate governance; and the role that debt capital, along with firm performance play 
in forcing a CEO to quit. This is examined in the context of the relationship between debt capital, 
performance, and change in CEO. 
 
Chapter four provides the link between previous chapters and subsequent chapters.  It relies on 
earlier chapters to select appropriate (optimal) research methods required in addressing research 
questions, objectives and testing resulting hypothesis as presented in chapters 1, 2 and 3; at the 
same time, its output informed the findings and conclusion of this study presented in chapters 5, 
6, 7 and 8. The highlights of this chapter are the research philosophy; research design; population 
and sample; data and variables of the study; hypothesis of the study; and the models used in this 
study, namely canonical correlation, general  linear model (GLM) and Generalised estimating 
equation (GEE). 
 
Chapter five presented the findings from the canonical correlation analysis. The findings 
addressed the questions: How are the best linear combinations of capital structure variables 
related to the best linear combinations of the performance variables? Which are the best 
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indicators of performance and capital structure? The answer to this question helped in choosing 
relevant indicators that best described the relationship between capital structure and performance 
from a list of competing indicators. In addition, the canonical correlation was used as a 
reconnoiter of the relationship between capital structure and performance, before subjecting the 
data to additional analysis.  Two indicators of performance namely the book to the market ratio 
and asset turnover, and an indicator of level of borrowing namely, the total debt to the total asset 
ratio are selected as useful in determining whether a relationship between performance and 
capital structure existed on the NSE. It reports a bidirectional relationship between performance 
and capital structure. 
 
In chapter six are presented the findings on the relationship between capital structure and 
performance using general linear models, after subjecting the data to GLM procedure. In relation 
to the first hypothesis, the data supports the hypothesis that productive and profitable firms 
employ more debt than comparable firms that are less profitable, possibly because their exposure 
financial risk is low (propensity to be bankrupt is low). There is no evidence to support the 
franchise hypothesis that efficient firms use less debt on the NSE. However, the data only show 
statistically significant relationship if asset turnover ratio and not the book value to the market 
value ratio is used as a performance indicator to predict usage of debt capital. In relation to the 
second hypothesis, that is, on the influence of debt on performance, the finding is that after 
controlling for equity capital, firms using more debt outperform those using less debt. Therefore, 
the data on the NSE support the efficiency hypothesis that the use of debt capital alleviates 
agency costs that led to be improved in firm performance. 
 
Chapter seven presented the findings on the relationship between debt capital, performance, and 
change in CEO using generalised estimating equations (GEE). When the book to market ratio 
(BV/MV) is employed as a performance indicator, we conclude no association between 
performance and change in CEO; and that the change in CEO in all groups that is, firms with 
positive growth, negative growth and no growth are not different. However, when the asset 
turnover ratio is used as the performance indicator, we see positive association; and confirm that 
those firms with a low asset turnover are 3.045 times likely to change CEO compared to firms 
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with a high asset turnover while the change in CEO in the firms with a medium asset turnover 
this group is not different from the firms with a high asset turnover. In relation to the influence of 
debt capital on change in CEO, a positive association is visible and the data confirm that firms 
with high are 3.430 times likely to change CEO compared to firms in low leverage, while the 
firms with medium leverage are 6.491 times likely to change CEO compared to firms in the 
reference group, that is low leverage. The propensity to replace CEO is higher in a medium 
leveraged than high leveraged, suggesting that by insisting on replacing non performing CEO's 
debt holders in medium leverage firms could be more risk averse than those in high leveraged 
firms. 
 
Chapter eight is the summary of findings, conclusion, and recommendations and areas for 
future research from this study, and contribution of the study to knowledge. The basic conclusion 
in first part of this study related to choice of performance and capital structure variables to be 
employed in this study, and the conclusion is that asset turnover ratio is a better performance 
indicator to relate borrowing levels, while the total debt to the total asset ratio is a best capital 
structure indicator to relate to performance. The existence of a bi-directional relationship 
between performance and capital structure is confirmed. 
 
It might be that the choice of performance and capital structure variables required to evaluate the 
relationship between the two variables is contingent on the data set employed. In relation to 
replacement of CEO, the tendency to replace CEO was higher in firms where there is dispersed 
ownership contrary to concentrated ownership; corporate governance tended to be strengthened 
in such firms. In some cases, some cases, managers that performed poorly were replaced and, 
specifically the power of asset turnover as a performance indicator to predict change in CEO 
supported the data. The evidence to support the prediction that firms in which corporate 
governance is strengthened, poor performance preceded replacement of CEOs. In relation to debt 
capital, the conclusion is that debt capital alleviates managerial excesses by propelling 
replacement of non-performing CEOs. 
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The contribution of this study was at methodological, theoretical and practical levels. Using 
canonical correlation, the data identified asset turnover ratio and book value to market values as 
measures of performance and total debt to total asset as a measure of level of borrowing useful in 
structuring the relationship between performance and leverage. Using GLM, it used group data 
to examine the relevancy and irrelevance of capital structure decisions. It used GEE to examine 
CEOs' survival in the face of poor performance and debt capital. In terms of theory, it contributes 
to the debate and therefore, literature on bi-directional relationship between capital structure and 
performance and the role of debt capital in respect to corporate governance. From a practical 
perspective, in addition from this research, the advice to managers would be that the range of 
optimum capital structure is medium debt ratio 0.3515 to 0.44781 or in percentage terms from 
35.15 percent to 44.78percent. There are methodologies that may be used to validate the study 
that was not employed here. An example is for those firms that replace CEOs, how long do they 
take to recognize that the CEO should be replaced? Such analysis uses duration data analysis 
often called hazard models. The other alternative is to look at the duration (23 years) and 
examine what influences the number of CEOs at each firm; that is, CEO turnover per company.   
 
1.11 Summary of the chapter 
The primary objective of this study is to investigate the relationship between capital structure, 
performance and change in CEO in firms listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange. This chapter 
presented the background to this study. The aim of the study is the examination of management 
and justification of use of debt capital by establishing bi-relationships between leverage, 
performance and change of CEO. The specific sections presented in this study are the statement 
of the problem, the objectives of the study, the hypothesis, limitations of the study, conceptual 
frame work and finally the structure of the thesis. The next chapter is a review of literature on the 
relationship between capital structure and performance. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
2.1 Introduction 
In chapter one, the three aims of this study are stated as the examination of moderating effect of 
debt capital on managerial behaviour, the impact of performance on manager's decision on the 
amount of debt to use and the extent to which performance and capital structure influence change 
of CEO. The objective of this chapter is to anchor three key research objectives through analysis 
of literature, namely refinement of the research problem, set a platform for selection of research 
design and identification of theories to be relied on in interpreting the findings and support to the 
conclusions of this study. It reviewed previous studies on capital structure, performance, 
corporate governance and their interaction. The focus was on the intervention of debt capital to 
contain agency problems (costs) between managers and shareholders and between debt holders 
and shareholders (Becker & Strömberg, 2011:2). In addition, it reviews studies on the effect firm 
performance has on usage of debt. 
 
The order of the review is as follows: section 2.2 is the impact of corporate governance on 
performance, to establish agreement or lack of agreement among researchers on this issue; the 
review is extended to the success or failure of agency theory in solving corporate governance 
problems to enhance performance, and the monitoring role by stakeholders. This provides 
answers to what would face firms that are lacking on corporate governance and in addition 
interrogates agency theory. Section 2.3 is divided into two parts namely, capital structure 
theories and debt monitoring role. It captures the relevancy and irrelevancy of capital structure 
decision; that is, whether financing decisions impact on the value of the firm or not. The two 
theorist prescriptions relevant to this study, namely the use of debt capital to alleviate agency 
costs and subsequent improvement in performance; and the theory of using debt capital to tame 
managers so as to enhance firm performance, are reviewed. The role risk theory plays in 
enhancing debt holders‘ monitoring role was also explored.Insection2.4, is a review of the link 
between capital structure and performance. This is a bi-directional review of studies that assert 
that the amount that firms borrow is influenced by the firm‘s level of performance; and 
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researchthatasserts that having debt as part of capital structure can improve corporate governance 
thus enhancing firm performances discussed. In section 2.5 measures of capital structure and 
performances are discussed. Section 2.6 presented the results of the review; that is, hypotheses of 
the study. Section 2.7 is a summary of the chapter and the chapter‘s link to chapters 3 and 4. 
2.2 Corporate Governance and Performance 
 
Corporate governance is about how firms are managed; and that firms must generate benefits to 
the owners. The literature on the classic economic theory is emphatic thatbusinesses exists make 
choices that maximise wealth of the owners. Therefore, firms that do not maximise the wealth of 
the owners are either denied capital by investors or forced into bankruptcy or taken over by new 
owners. In addition, as a result of poor performance management is replaced. In finance 
literature, it hypothesised that managers which are not owners might not be as committed as 
owners would want them to be (Crawford, 2007; Mark, 2004; Jensen & Meckling, 1976: 307; 
Berle & Means 1932:8). The challenge then is to come up with organization structures that 
maximise the value of the firm. The question normally asked is of what importance is corporate 
governance to investors?  
 
Investors are interested in corporations that are financially sound, profitable and exhibit adequate 
growth prospects. To achieve economic development, the high level approach is to manage 
macroeconomic factors that impact on all firms‘ performance, but at a lower level, and equally 
important are the microeconomic policies that power firm level performance. The proposition is 
that the economy as a whole benefit from well managed micro units, in line with the structure-
conduct-performance approach, which states that industry's performance and by extension, the 
economy depends on the conduct of firms within the economy (Edwards, Allen &Shaik, 2009; 
Carlton & Perloff, 2004: 2-3; Scherer & Ross, 1990). In the corporate world, the belief is that 
corporate governance weaknesses translate into financial crisis in firms, consequently having an 
adverse impact on the economy as a whole (Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), 2009).  
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The corporate governance structure is to protect investors in cognisance of investor‘s objectives. 
It is the way in which suppliers of finance assure themselves a return on their investment. It 
requires rules, procedures, and administration of the firm's contracts with its shareholders, 
creditors, employees, suppliers, customers, and regulators (Becht, Bolton &R¨oell, 2005). 
 
Studies on the relationship between corporate governance, firm valuation and operating 
performance show mixed results. Black, Jang and Kim (2006) find significant relationship for 
Korean firms, but offer evidence consistent with a causal relationship between an overall 
governance index and higher share prices. In Mexico Chong and  Lopez-de-Silanes (2006) using 
firm-level data set on corporate governance and firm performance, show that better firm-level 
corporate governance practices are linked to higher valuations, best performance and more 
dividends disbursed to investors. Black, Jang, and Kim (2006) find it difficult predicting firm-
level governance choices and relate governance to performance, concluding that more work is 
needed to identify firm-level factors that predict governance across emerging markets; they 
recommend a corporate governance index for each country.Durnev and Kim (2005) reported no 
relationship between corporate governance and performance. 
 
In US, Kose, Lubomir and Yeung (2008:1725), using a cross-country panel sample data to 
determine whether better investor protection could lead corporations to undertake riskier but 
value-enhancing investments, found that corporate risk-taking and firm growth rates are 
positively related to the quality of investor protection. In Australia, Thomson and Jain (2006:47) 
analysed the impact of corporate governance failure by management and board of directors on 
National Australia Bank‘s performance over the period 2001 to 2005 and found that corporate 
governance failure led to the company‘s poor results. Liu, Zeng, Wang, Sun and Feng (2012) 
after studying corporate governance characteristics and performance of high-tech corporations, 
conclude that to improve corporate performance, effective corporate governance is a must. The 
link to performance is explained in terms of corporate governance theories that gravitate around 
sources of agency conflicts, namely moral hazard, earning's retention, risk aversion, horizon 
problem- ex-post settling-up costs, moral hazard problem, and adverse selection problem 
(Andres, Betzer, Geogern & Metzger, 2010:44; Riaz, 2008). 
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Charreaux (2004) conducted an elaborate survey of corporate governance theories that can guide 
practitioners in making corporate governance choices. The corporate governance theories 
suggested by Charreaux (2004) are: the macro theories of corporate governance; disciplinary 
view; knowledge-based view; law and finance view; and political theory. In addition, Charreaux 
(2004) separated the theories based on appropriation of the organizational rent from those 
attributing a dominant role to production and highlighted the financial view of corporate 
governance. This study is based on law and finance view. 
While a review of literature indicates that the ideals of good corporate governance have been 
adopted by developing countries since the 1980s, developing countries need to develop their own 
corporate governance models that incorporate the cultural, political and technological conditions 
found in each of these countries (Mulili & Wong, 2012). The assumption is that valid corporate 
governance eliminates inefficiencies and unethical business practices that undermine economic 
prosperity, especially for the emerging economies. 
The corporate frauds that came to light in recent times have brought about a change and 
necessitated substantial external regulations apart from internal controls and regulations 
(Mutyala & Dasaraju, 2011). Business failures and frauds in the USA, several scandals in Russia 
and the Asian crisis (1997) brought corporate governance issues to the forefront in the transition 
economies (Mutyala & Dasaraju, 2011). These scandals have adverse effects on firm 
performance and wealth of shareholders. 
Chen, Chen and Wei (2009) tell us that investors are more willing to offer valuable financing or 
pay a higher equity price for firms with better governance, while Black, Jang, and Kim (2006) 
concluded that higher corporate governance ratings are causally related to higher firm value. In 
conclusion, corporate governance is important in emerging economies where firms are forced to 
rely on outside investors to help finance growth opportunities. 
Hugilland Siegel (2013) find that firm characteristics explain 37.3-50.3% of the corporate 
governance ratings‘ variance, and country characteristics explain roughly 11-28.5% of the 
variance. In developed economies, a different pattern is found. Observable and unobservable 
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firm characteristics explain only 15.3-19.1% of governance rating's variance in developed 
economies while country characteristics explain 45.9-57.3% (Hugill&Siegel, 2013). In emerging 
economies, firm variables explain roughly the same amount and often more of the governance 
variance than do country variables; while in developed economies, country variables explain 
significantly more of the corporate governance rating than do firm variables (Hugill&Siegel, 
2013). 
Kenya had its share of corporate governance problems; and it is not a surprise that Capital 
Markets Authority (CMA) has developed guidelines for good corporate governance practices by 
public listed firms in Kenya in response to governance shortcomings; this is to safeguard the 
interest of those who invest in capital markets and firms that rely on capital markets to raise 
funds for worthwhile projects (CMA, 2002). Nevertheless, even with these guidelines, an 
examination of CMA website shows evidence of corporate governance shortcomings in listed 
firms. As an example,  in March 2013, CMA further extended the suspension from trading of 
shares of CMC Holdings Limited (CMC) shares for a further period of 53 (fifty three) trading 
days from 30 March 2013 to 14 June 2013 on request of the Company (CMA, 2013). 
Suspensions of trading the shares‘ inconvenience‘s investors and therefore, dilute investors‘ 
confidence in the market thus adversely impact on borrowings firms‘ cost of capital. On 
Thursday 30
th
May 2013 Herbling in Business Daily, Nairobi reported that ‗operation at Kenya 
Meat Commission risked grounding to a halt following the sacking of its entire leadership over 
poor management, which has left the corporation in huge debts.‘ In addition an examination of 
firms listed on at the Nairobi securities Exchange (NSE) indicates a mixture of firms that post 
good returns and others that perform poorly over the past 10 years. A report in a daily newspaper 
showed that Kenya‘s ranking in the Corruption Perception Index 2012 improved to 139 out of 
174 economies while the 2011 index ranked the country at 154 out of 183 economies included in 
the survey (Mugwe, 2012).  Such signals necessitate re-examination of corporate governance 
standards.  
The world has its share of mega corporate governance failures. Examples of corporate 
governance failures included Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom in US and the subprime financial 
crisis in US. The corporate scandals and bankruptcies of the past decade highlighted laxities in 
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corporate governance (Heremans, 2007:2). In any case, a report by PwC (2012) pointed out the 
importance of corporate governance to private companies by asserting that though it is not a 
regulatory requirement for most private businesses, in the USA, a large majority of private 
companies (80%) are adopting specific corporate governance practices. The firms in USA 
adopting corporate governance practices believe it helps them successfully navigate an 
increasingly complex and volatile business landscape (PwC, 2012). PwC (2012) concluded that 
private companies are embracing corporate governance primarily because it makes good 
business sense as they look forward to increasing value for their stakeholders and keep pace with 
new business realities. 
2.2.1 Agency Theory and Performance 
Manager‘s investment decisions impact a firm‘s growth rate, risk, and market value; thus the 
returns to owners depend on the quality of managerial decision (Fontaine, Haarman & Schmid, 
2006:3). Managers that become slaves of self-interest adopt management practices that exhibit 
value destroying ways (Ghoshal, 2005; Yermack, 2004a: 212 -213). 
 
In chapter one, it is stated that in modern corporations, managers are separated from owners, an 
arrangement that results into agency costs (Hannah, 2007: 404-406; Jensen& Meckling, 
1976).Agency model could have a positive or negative impact on performance of the firm, and 
like any model, the justification lie on whether the benefits exceed the costs of the models 
(Dobbin & Jung, 2010). Agency cost includes excessive consumption of perquisites, exerting sub 
optimal effort; empire building that includes hiring relatives who are not qualified and above all 
making poor investment decisions. 
 
The principal-agent problem discourses the problems that arise under conditions of incomplete 
and asymmetric information under a principal, and the loss of market value of a firm when 
original owners sell part of the firm to outsiders and recruit managers that are not owners to 
manage the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976: 308). This occurs when managers hired as agents of 
shareholders, put their own interest ahead of those they work for. The owner incurs additional 
costs that include monitoring cost, bonding costs and residual loss (Fabozzi& Drake, 2009; 
Fama& Jensen, 1983:332). 
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Japanese domination of auto and electronics industry, and the worry of losing dominance as the 
leader in technology, forced the western world to question the then management models and 
techniques (Dobbin & Jung, 2010:30). Agency theory was then recommended as treatment to 
corporate woes (Dobbin & Jung 2010:30; Jensen & Meckling 1976: 305-306).In rebuke to the 
gospel truth status attached to agency theory, is an observation that managerial behaviors 
associated with the agency theory could be destroying rather than building corporations 
(Ghoshal, 2005:86). In US when businesses were not doing well in the 1970‘s agency theory 
based solutions were advanced and faithfully adopted by corporations.  The response inherent in 
the agency theory was that firm performance was to be improved by: offering incentives to 
managers; emphasis on core business and reengineering business's financing. However, the 
feeling now is that the agency based prescriptions set stage for corporate failures in US (Dobbin 
&Jung, 2010:30).  
 
The agency problem also refers to a situation where shareholders take actions that impact 
adversely on other stakeholders. As an example, managers and shareholders might invest in 
marginal project with expected high returns but of high risk to the detriment of other 
stakeholders (Becht, Bolton & Röell, 2005: 21 - 22). Agency theory can be used to justify the use 
of debt by firms. Debt capital can control managers that waste free cash on perquisites and bad 
investments (Yordying, 2011:53; Fama & French 2002:5- 6). Such behaviors are rampant in 
Kenya where external control mechanisms, such as free flow of information, efficient labor 
market required to support corporate governance is weak as in the case of CMC whose share is 
still suspended from trading at the Nairobi Stock Exchange, making shareholders pay dearly for 
the boardroom wars that have dogged the company (Wafula, 2012). 
 
The link between agency cost and performance is critical to current and potential investor‘s 
because investors must be discouraged from investing in poorly governed firms (Giannetti& 
Simonov, 2006). Intuitively investors will ignore poorly managed firms with in adequate returns, 
unless they can turn them around (Christian, Karl & Francis, 2009:3246). A study on the 
importance of corporate governance to investors‘ show that over sixty percent of investors 
sampled might avoid individual firms with poor governance (McKinsey & Company, 2002). 
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However, there is a class of investors who would identify and acquire poorly managed firms to 
turn them around.  
 
2.2.2 Monitoring by stakeholders 
Managers might have goals and risk preferences that conflict with preferences of other 
stakeholders. The conflicting preferences need to be realigned so that the firm can operate 
optimally. For example, in a bank there is a need to efficiently align the investment decisions of 
managers in a bank to the risk/return goals of the shareholders (Ford & Sundmacher, 2006).  
Achieving goal congruence between managers and owners requires that shareholders have the 
capacity to monitor managers. Manager‘s motivation to self-interest requires an appropriate 
disciplinary device and effective positive incentives.  
 
The first-level managerial control is monitoring by the firm's shareholders and board members. 
This they do by recruiting quality managers and through subsequent advice and by interrogating 
managerial actions reported internally, and in audited financial statements presented to 
shareholders or as special reports. Simultaneously, firm managers are aware that shareholder's 
ability to discipline them is limited; and business judgment rule encourages managers to make 
business decisions thus limiting shareholder's involvement in operating decisions (Smith, 
2013:7). Now and again, shareholders are dispersed and too weak to have unified stand against 
blundering management; alternatively, that shareholders might lack the sophistication and 
resources to monitor what managers are doing in their firm (Low, Makhija & Sanders, 2007:2).  
 
Financial and non-financial incentives are used to motivate managers to exert optimum effort 
(Kupiec, 2013; Peterson & Luthans, 2006:1). Kupiec (2013:1) conclusion is that ‗In a stylized 
model; financial intermediary risk managers can expend effort reducing  a loan probability of 
default (PD) and loss given default (LGD), but that effort is costly and unobservable‘. The other 
forms of managerial discipline include, market for corporate managers and labor market, that 
emphasize the desirability of the manager maintaining a reputation for high standards of business 
conduct in order to avoid sanctioning by holders of large debt and equity stakes; that is, 
institutional investors (Deakin & Singh, 2008:10 – 22; Commission, SEC, 2007;Milhaupt, 
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2006:200) and product markets, that is, product competition drives inefficient firms out of 
business (Pant, 2010: 348 -349).  
 
Though a manager may seek self-interest, the same manager has an incentive to behave 
prudently to preserve his or her special interest. The incentive to behave sensibly and act in the 
best interest of shareholders is anchored by stewardship theory (Caldwell, Hayes, Karri& Bernal, 
2008:153 - 155). The stewardship theory asserts that managers will truly act as a responsible 
agent of the shareholders when managing corporations, because this will benefit the shareholders 
(Barney & Hesterly, 2010). The stewardship theory emphasizes psychological ownership 
contrary to capital ownership that suggests a self-interested manager. The argument is that 
managers can psychologically feel as owners, thus maximising the value of the firm (Pierce, 
Kostova, & Dirks, 2002:299; Martynov 2009:240). 
 
Smart managers are aware that by satisfying the economic goals of the shareholders, they 
maximise their personal self-interest (Podrug, 2008:2). Managers would want to develop a 
reputation in order to cultivate an image of a manager free from moral hazard to extend their 
tenure at the firm. Management on their own might control their appetite for excessive risk if 
they realize that shareholders have the power to discipline them. Such managers are aware that it 
is shareholders and debt holders who bear significant losses when an investment fails and has the 
power to sack them (Zandi, 2009:3).  
 
Board of Directors might find it difficult controlling entrenched managers, even if entrenchment 
has a negative impact on a firm‘s performance (Kose & Litov, 2008). Managerial entrenchment 
is found in director primacy theory espoused by Bainbridge (2003). Bainbridge (2003) suggests 
that while the board is appointed by the owners, the power to be exercised is not under the 
control of the shareholders. The board defines their own role encompassing monitoring, advisory 
and networking. It is the conflicts and contradiction in these roles that precede board failure to 
propel their firm to good performance(Faleye, Hoitash & Hoitash, 2011; Jiraporn, Singh, & Lee, 
2009).The director primacy theory requires directors to act on behalf of the firm and not as 
agents of shareholders (Asher, Mahoney & Mahoney, 2005).As early as in 1930‘s Dodd 
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(1932:1148) from Harvard Law School proposes the entity view contrary to property view, that 
is, ‗a view of the business corporation as an economic institution which has a social service as 
well as a profit-making function‘; but not much is done in having debt holders in corporate 
boards. 
 
The four theories that model board of directors roles are agency theory (Jensen&Meckling, 1976; 
Eisenberg's, 1976, 1997), monitoring theory (Blair Lynn, 1999), mediating hierarch theory 
(Bainbridge, 2003), anddirector primacy theory discussed above. These theories signal lack of 
agreement on the role of the board. Nevertheless, these controls developed out of these theories 
have not stopped managers from acting against the interest of investors (Adams, Hermalin, & 
Weisbach, 2010).  
 
It is mentioned above that primarily corporate governance is vested in shareholders who delegate 
this responsibility to board of directors who have a fiduciary duty to serve the interests of the 
corporation rather than interests of the firm's management. But there exists a minimum of self-
regulation by managers themselves (Graham & Woods, 2006). Again, economic reasons explain 
why both CEO and the other membership of the board of directors would want to see their firm 
succeed. The board and CEO have the discretion to underperform or misappropriate their firm‘s 
asset, but that could expose them to an adverse reputation crisis and costs. In addition to dented 
reputation, the CEO loses benefits if the firm sinks or once replaced.  
 
The effectiveness of board of directors to protect debt holders and shareholders or even protect 
the firm attract different of opinions.  At times, regardless of attendant conflict in interest (when 
directors are entrenched), the directors can be suppliers of their firms or major customers. 
However, the catch is that directors are infrequently held accountable for poor decision-making, 
unless they intentionally acted wrongfully (Davidoff, 2011). The corporate failures rotate around 
the interdependency of authority relationships between the board and top management, implying 
the need to explore and develop complementary control models (Ravina & Sapienza, 2010:964; 
Gordon, 2007).  
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The imperfections and frictions in capital and money markets and credit risk inherent in lending, 
is a reason for debt holders (as lenders) to monitor firms that they lend money to. Debt holders 
are conscious that borrowers can involve in bait and switch strategy; at the same time, 
shareholders are aware that debt holder‘s response to bait and switch strategy would be to 
discount such a possibility in debt issue price, thus transferring such agency cost to shareholders 
(Jerzemowska, 2007). Institutional shareholders prefer that the firms whose securities they hold 
post acceptable returns (income and capital gains) as a guarantee to the safety of their 
investments. Therefore, investors, both debt holders and shareholders, have to monitor 
managers‘ actions (Greenwood & Schurz 2009; Gillian & Starks, 2007).  
 
The reasons that explain why dispersed shareholders might not exercise effective corporate 
governance includes, their reduced incentive to acquire information; their deficient capacity to 
process information; and that they find it costly hiring financial analysts who can meaningfully 
process information on their behalf (Marshall, Ramsay & Mitchell, 2008; Mitchell, O'Donnell & 
Ramsay, 2005; Devriese, Dewatripont, Heremans & Nguyen, 2004:97). 
Furthermore, the spontaneous monitoring nature of dispersed shareholders is due to the small 
amount they invested, and that they can reduce their risk exposure and losses through 
diversification (Dhillon& Rossetto, 2009). Concentrated ownership has its benefits and costs. 
Concentrated ownership might bring effective monitoring of management but attracts cost such 
as low liquidity of shares, low diversification and suppression of minority shareholders.  Such 
costs are negatively discounted in share prices and impact adversely on minority shareholders. 
It is apparent that different control mechanisms have advantages and disadvantages. Therefore, 
the search for competing monitoring mechanisms is still on. Shareholders might consider other 
control mechanisms such as encouraging a takeover of their firm as was in the case of Phillips 
and Drew in which ―Despite persistent poor performance, the management of some of the firms 
in which they had large shareholdings, stubbornly remained in place, as a result, Phillips and 
Drew actively used their holdings to encourage hostile takeovers‖ (Franks & Mayer (2002:1).  
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Even if shareholders have the power to sack managers, they rarely do so unless the performance 
is too woeful (Hamilton & Micklethwait, 2006:196).  
Based on the perception held by the Scottish that the fish rots from the head, the board and top 
management should be held responsible for corporate failures. There is no unanimity on how 
effective shareholders and board of directors monitoring role are, as evidenced in a battery of 
studies on the relationship between ownership structures and corporate performance; and that in 
some studies relationship between ownership and performance is negative while others report 
positive relationship, yet others find no relationship (Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010: 940). In some 
cases, argument that shareholders destroy value is advanced, and the benefits shareholders' 
activism on firm performance is challenged (Kahan & Rock, 2007: 1022-1024). Except for study 
by Becht, Franks, Mayer and Rossi (2010) it is uncertain whether shareholder's activism 
translates into effective monitoring that enhances the firm value (Bebchuk & Weisbach, 
2010:941-943).  
 
In summary, the challenge in corporate governance is to design a proficient monitoring structure 
to reconcile and reinforce monitoring among the stakeholders to enhance the wealth of 
shareholders. The current governance system that includes an active market for disciplining 
management, the board of directors acting as a monitoring specialist of management, 
performance linked contracts to remunerate and motivate management and shareholding activism 
restoring shareholder‘s democracy, cited in Heremans (2007:10) has not fully protected 
investor‘s wealth. 
2.3 Capital structure theories 
Capital structure theory is important because it guides managers in their choice of their firm's 
mix of the amount of equity capital and debt capital that maximise the shareholder's wealth. 
However, researchers are yet to agree on the impact of debt capital on the value of the firm. 
 
Since Modigliani and Miller‘s (1958: 263-266, 358) proposition that purely financial transactions 
do not change the total cash flows and are therefore, zero NPV investments, opposing views 
emerged. The departures imply that debt capital affects the firm value. This is because debt 
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capital impacts on a firm's tax obligation, affects contracting costs, influences real investment 
policy and plays a disciplinary role (Diamond & He, 2011; Myers, 1977:147-148).  An example 
that debt is relevant is in the assessment by Smith and Warner, (1979:118) assertion that ‗with 
risky bonds outstanding, management acting in the stockholders‘ interest, has incentives to 
design the firm‘s operating characteristics and financial structure in ways, which benefit 
stockholders to the detriment of bondholders. 
 
The known capital structure theories are the static trade off model and the pecking order (Berk & 
DeMarzo, 2011; Myers, 1984). The static trade off theory suggests that optimum capital structure 
is determined by balancing corporate tax savings against cost of bankruptcy, and this theory 
predicts that profitable firms with potential low bankruptcy costs use more debt; the pecking 
order hypothesis predicts that debt is used to finance new investments after exhausting retained 
earnings and that firms will have no leverage targets (Berk & DeMarzo, 2011:520- 522, 539-
540). The agency costs of free cash flow should act as an incentive to firms to use more debt 
(Fama & French 2002:5). The existence of pension plans also appears to explain why 
corporations tend to use less debt because corporations consider pension assets and liabilities in 
determining their leverage ratios (Shivdasani & Stefanescu, 2010: 1320). 
 There is no unanimity on these theories as to which of these theories have an impact on capital 
structure decisions. It is not clear whether it is the trade-off theory or pecking order theory that 
explains capital structure levels (Leary &Michael, 2010; Korteweg, 2010; Lemmon & Zender, 
2008). Fama and French (2002:30) in an attempt to explain the capital structure decision 
summarises the status of research as follows: ‗In sum, we identify one scar on the trade-off 
model (the negative relation between leverage and profitability), one deep wound on the pecking 
order (the large equity issues of small low-leverage growth firms), and one area of conflict (the 
mean reversion of leverage) on which the data speak softly. The many shared predictions of the 
two models tend to do well in our tests. However, when shared predictions are confirmed, 
attributing causation is elusive: we cannot tell whether the results are due to trade-off forces, 
pecking order forces, or indeed other factors overlooked by both‘.  
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In the literature it emerges that the primary factors influence capital structure decisions are: 
business risk, tax position, financial flexibility, managerial conservatism or aggressiveness and 
discipline of capital markets. The proposition then is that the optimal capital structure is achieved 
when there is a balance between risk and return to maximize the price of a firm‘s share. 
Therefore, these primary factor's researchers have generated testable hypotheses about capital 
structure, tested the derived hypothesis and theories emerged. The emerging theories suggested 
as useful in understanding capital structure decisions include the static trade - off theory, pecking 
order theory and the organizational theory. There is also Miller's (1977) idea of neutral mutation 
as a theory that explains capital structure decisions. Under the neutral mutation hypothesis, 
Miller (1977) suggested that firm's practice financing patterns or habits which have no effect on 
firm value. 
 
Under the static tradeoff framework, the firm is viewed as setting a target debt-to-value ratio and 
gradually moving towards it and that there is a refinancing point. In relation to trade off theory 
and referring to Modigliani and Miller (1958) proposition, Myers (1993:80) words, ‗Their 
practical message is this: if there is an optimal capital structure, it should reflect taxes or some 
specifically identified market imperfections. Thus, managers are often viewed as trading off the 
tax savings from debt financing against costs of financial distress, specifically the agency costs 
generated by issuing risky debt and the deadweight costs of possible liquidation or 
reorganisation. I call this the "static trade-off" theory of optimal capital structure.‘ 
 
As mentioned above, the static tradeoff theory suggests that firms choose their optimal capital 
structure by balancing the corporate tax advantage of debt against bankruptcy and agency costs. 
Again, Myers (1993:82) argument is that ‗Most business people immediately agree that 
borrowing saves taxes and that too much debt can lead to costly trouble.‘ Therefore, static 
tradeoff theory renders itself to empirical hypotheses. Specifically, it predicts reversion of the 
actual debt ratio towards a target or optimum, in addition it infers a cross-sectional relation 
between average debt ratios and asset risk, profitability, tax status and asset category. The related 
question will be whether firms rebalance their capital structure (Leary & Roberts, 2008). 
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Under pecking order theory, firms prefer internal to external financing and debt to equity if it 
issues securities (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Therefore, under the pecking order theory, firms have 
no definite target debt-to-value ratio suggested by the static tradeoff theory. The pecking order 
theory is explained in terms of information asymmetry that is because outsiders (investors) know 
little about firms, the outsiders undervalue firms stock, and this could explain the heavy reliance 
on internal finance and debt as the source of new capital. Therefore, financing decisions are 
concerned primarily with signaling effects of such decisions; that is, adding more debt to the 
firm's capital structure can serve as a credible signal of high future cash flows. From a practical 
perspective, the specific prediction of pecking order theory is that firms with few worthwhile 
projects and substantial cash flows will have low debt ratios; and that firms with positive net 
present value projects and lower operating cash flows will have high debt ratios. Pecking order 
can also be triggered by agency costs between the firm owners/managers and the outside 
investors (Frank & Goyal, 2007).  Equity capital as a source of finance is a last option (Bistrova, 
2011; Huang & Ritter, 2009). This is another testable proposition; specifically firms which 
information asymmetry is large and have no retained earnings should issue debt to avoid selling 
under -priced stocks (shares) (Myers, 1983). 
 
Chen (2004), Fama and French (2002), Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001) and Titman and 
Wessel (1988), tested the tradeoff theory and found that profitable firms use less debt; this 
differed from the prediction in tradeoff theory that profitable firms should use more debt. Fama 
and French (2002) reported that the speed of adjustment towards target leverage is slow. 
Therefore, Famaand French (2002) questioned managers‘ commitment to the concept of 
optimum capital structure (target debt ratio). Hovakimian, (2004); Hovakimian, Hovakimian and 
Tehranian, (2004), Frank and Goyal (2004) and Korajczyk and Levy (2003) found evidence that 
supported trade-off theory, thus confirming the existence target debt ratio. However, Flannery 
and Rangan (2006) report that firm‘s exhibit rapid adjustment towards the target capital 
structure. 
 
There have been tests of pecking order theory. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) tested the static 
tradeoff against pecking order models of capital structure; their test is based upon the prediction 
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of what type of financing is used to fill the ―financing deficit." Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
prediction was that external debt financing is driven by the internal financial deficit, has a much 
greater time series explanatory power than a static tradeoff model; they showed that their tests 
have the power to reject the pecking order against alternative tradeoff hypotheses and that the 
statistical power of some usual tests of the tradeoff model is virtually nil.  
 
Fama and French (2005) conclusion are that the managers make financial decisions that 
controvert the pecking order hypothesis; while Leary and Roberts (2008) study, to some extent, 
validated the pecking order hypothesis. Leary and Roberts (2008:32) assertion are that, ―there 
remains considerable debate over its usefulness as a conditional model when applied under 
conditions that match the model‘s assumptions." Frank and Goyal (2002) test the pecking order 
theory of corporate leverage on a broad cross-section of publicly traded American firms for 1971 
to 1998; they report that contrary to the pecking order theory, net equity issues track the 
financing deficit more closely than do net debt issues.  
 
Large firms exhibit some aspects of pecking order behavior; the evidence is not robust to the 
inclusion of conventional leverage factors, nor to the analysis of evidence from the 1990s (Frank 
& Goyal, 2002). Frank and Goyal (2002) in their analysis do not find support for the hypothesis 
that financing deficit explains net debt issues over time for firms of all sizes. Fama and French 
(2005) agree with Frank and Goyal (2002) in disagreeing that these findings contradict the 
pecking order theory. Lemmon and Zender (2008) after considering firms‘ debt capacities when 
testing the pecking order theory concluded that the pecking order theory explained well the 
financing behavior of a broad cross - section of firms. It is reported by Mazen (2012) that   
Molay (2005) tested the pecking order theory and the static trade-off theory and concluded that 
the French data is biased towards the pecking order theory than with the static trade-off theory.  
The different capital structure theories propagate competing models for financing decisions, thus 
confirming how complex the capital structure decision is, and point at the need for further 
research. The indefiniteness of the relation between capital structure and performance (value of 
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the firm), made renowned scholars to refer to capital structure theory as a puzzle and a dilemma 
(Stiglitz, 1989; Myers, 1984).  
2.3.1 Debt capital monitoring role 
There are two theorist prescriptions relevant to this study, namely the use of debt capital to 
alleviate agency costs and subsequent improvement in performance under different investor 
protection environments.  These issuesare raisedin Ellul, Guntay and Lel (2007) whileHarvey, 
Lins and Roper (2004) study the extent debt capital mitigates agency costs to create shareholder 
value. Gamba and Triantis (2014) examine the effectiveness of debt covenants in alleviating 
financial agency problems, concluding that the presence of debt capital and enforcement of debt 
covenants significantly alters dynamic financing and investment policies, and is an important 
element of structural models. These prescriptions define a new role for debt, and again, presented 
testable propositions. 
Risk theory helps us differentiate shareholders from debt holders. In a market that is in 
equilibrium, shareholders and debt holders are satisfied because they receive risk-adequate 
returns from their investment. However, if at any point in time, the assets of a corporation are not 
able to cover its liabilities, then the amounts realized from the assets are distributed to debt 
holders, in which case shareholders get nothing. However, when the company assets ‗values are 
much higher than the total amount originally invested by shareholders and debt holders, all the 
additional value accrues to shareholders and nothing to debt holders. First, this tells us that 
rational debt holders are a class of investors who are more risk averse than shareholders. 
Secondly, prior to lending, debt holders might not have full information about borrowers; that is, 
debt holders face an adverse selection problem (Mishkin, 2010: 174-175). Third, shareholders 
can adversely transfer some risk to debt holders‘ that is, moral hazard problem (Mishkin, 
2010:180).  
 
The possibility of managers adopting bait and switch strategy put debt holders on the alert mode. 
The bait and switch strategy is when a firm obtains money by promising one investment policy 
and then switching to another policy after receiving the money, a strategy that is prevalent in 
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firms that use debt to fund their operations (Brigham &Daves, 2010:582). In firms where debt 
capital is substantial, debt monitoring could discourage managers from practicing the bait and 
switch strategy, because debt holders are technically residual claimants whenever a firm's assets 
do not fully cover debt holders‘ claim on the firm's assets (Tirole, 2006).  
 
Apart from credit risk, the lenders other worry is managerial actions that result into asset 
transformation; that is, the possibility that the borrower replaces a less risky asset with a riskier 
asset, as this enhances the probability of default. The asset substitution and underinvestment 
problem places more risk on the debt holders without providing them with additional safety and 
return (compensation). Again if the high-risk project fails, the firm's chances of defaulting on its 
debt increases to the detriment of debt holders, but if (for example, levered mergers)it succeeds, 
then it is shareholders not debt holders who benefit(Bernile, Lyandres & Zhdanov, 2007). 
The argument that debt holders should supplement equity holders in monitoring management is 
based on information asymmetries, and shareholders lack of capacity to monitor management, 
coupled with debt holders‘ information advantage.  However, the shortcoming with debt holders 
and to some extent, board of directors monitoring role is that the information they rely on is 
largely made available by management, who might be selective about the monitoring 
information supplied (Ravina & Sapienza 2010). Intuitively, management might be reluctant 
releasing information to those they perceive to be criticizing their actions or directors who audit 
their actions. 
 
Financial institutions are in a class of debt holders who can demand from the borrowers' 
information useful in monitoring and controlling the activities of their borrowers. Comparedto 
other stakeholders, financial institutions have professionalswith the capacity to process 
information for the benefit of other less informed stakeholders (Heremans, 2007). After the 
financial crises experienced in USA and in the rest of the world in the recent past, we expect 
financial institutions to monitorthe behaviour of their corporate clients; an evolution that brings 
into focus the corporate governance expected of the financial institutions within a rapidly 
changing economic landscape (Heremans, 2007:2). 
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2.4 Capital structure and performance 
Studies on capital structure in developing countries emphasized the use of debt equity and 
retained earnings to fund business operations, and on factors that influence capital structure 
(Lemma & Negash, 2011; Abor & Biekpe, 2009; Abor & Biekpe, 2005; Chen, 2004). The 
benefits of debt capital are discussed under tax benefits and the capacity of debt holdersto 
disciplinemanagement. Damodaran (2007: 9 – 12) argument is that ―Equity is a cushion; debt is a 
sword; managements of firms which have high cash flows left over each year are more likely to 
be complacent and inefficient." 
 
The research finding on effect of debt capital and financial distress on shareholder‘s return is 
mixed (Myers, 2001). Abor and Biekpe (2009:84) observed that ‗the few empirical studies on the 
capital structure ofSMEs have tended to concentrate mainly on developed economies with varied 
and inconclusive results.‘ The following assertion in Abor and Biekpe (2009:84) that ‗The 
differences in institutional arrangements and financial markets between advanced and developing 
countries actually merit the need to look at the issue from the perspective of developing 
economies, especially within the context of sub-Saharan Africa such as Ghana‘, confirmed that 
there is no consensus on how firms should manage debt capital. 
 
Garlappi and Yan (2011:819) foundthat ―the same hump-shaped relationship between expected 
returns and default probability predicts that momentum profits should be enhanced among firms 
with both high default likelihood and strong prospects for shareholder recovery upon financial 
distress." Garlappi and Yan (2011:790) hypothesised that the apparently contrasting empirical 
patterns can be understood within an equity valuation model that clearly accounts for financial 
leverage. Shareholders can default on their debt, but may recover part of the residual firm value 
after the resolution of financial distress.  
 
From a risk sharing and insurance perspective, debt capital can hedge shareholder's losses, in 
which case debt capital is evaluated in terms of its impact on the value of the firm.  The value is 
traced to the debt capital ability to condition managerial choices. This is a shift from the neutral 
mutation hypothesis that implies that firms adopt habits of financing, which do not impact on the 
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value of the firm (Anderson & Carverhill, 2012; Miller, 1977). The thesis then is that firms 
should be required to employ an optimum amount of debt in their capital structure.   
 
From the agency perspective, a conflict exists between shareholders and debt holders in terms of 
dividends that can be paid, selection of new investments and servicing of debt obligations. Debt 
covenants contain restrictions on the company's activities that might compromise manager‘s 
creativity and innovativeness necessary to add value to the firm. Furthermore, if firms make 
investment and financing decisions based on their existing capital structure, then a possibility 
that debt capital can induce debt overhang or underinvestment problems is real(Admati, 
DeMarzo, Hellwig, & Pfleiderer, 2012:2). 
 
The debt overhang or underinvestment problems can force managers to relinquish beneficial 
projects, thus undermining profitability, growth and survival of the firms. The debt overhang 
problem is value and growth destroying, and is witnessed when lenders refuse to advance money 
to firms (borrowers) with positive NPV projects (Allen, Bhattacharya, Rajan, & Schoar, 2008). 
From the preceding review, it is apparent that debt has it negative and positive sides that need to 
be managed and exploited, and the debt effect on firms can be determined by studying the effect 
of debt capital on firm performance. 
2.4.1 Influence of performance on capital structure 
It was hinted above that debt capital might augment the probability of a distressed firm being 
liquidated. F distress is costly because it adversely impacts on shareholders and managerial 
investment decisions (Campbell, Hilscher & Szilagyi, 2008).In this context, the link between 
capital structure and performance is conceived by way of the direct link between financing and 
real investment decisions (La Rocca, La Rocca & Gerace, 2008:17). 
 
Debt holders just like any other investors get attracted to profitable and financially sound 
businesses. The testable theory predicts performance as a factor in explaining the use of debt, the 
meaning of this is that productive and money-making firms will use more debt (Margaritis 
&Psilaki, 2010). The reverse of the preceding thesis is that efficient firms may use less debt to 
minimize their exposure to financial risk (He &Matvos, 2012:2).In addition, the franchise value 
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hypothesis suggests that the more profitable and liquid the firm is, the lower the leverage (Cheng 
& Tzeng, 2011; Margaritis& Psillak, 2007; Berger &Bonaccorsi, 2006; Lai, Lin & Wen, 2005). 
 
 A study in Ghana by Abor and Biekpe (2005) reported positive associations between the 
variables' debt ratio (capital structure), firm size and growth; however, they found that asset 
tangibility, risk, corporate tax and profitability were negatively related to the debt ratio.Abor and 
Biekpe (2009) reported that variables such as firm's age, size, asset structure, profitability, and 
growth as influencing the capital structure choices of small and medium enterprise (SMEs) in 
Ghanaian. 
2.4.2 Influence of capital structure on performance 
Literature on the debt holders (lenders) influence on the activities by the borrowing firm was 
presented in section 2.3.2. The implication was that firm performance (efficiency hypothesis) can 
be influenced by the amount of debt in capital (Margaritis & Psillak, 2007; Cheng & Tzeng, 
2011). Abor (2005) reported that in Ghana, profitable firms depended more on debt as their main 
financing option. In Brazil, the rates of return to shareholders presented a positive correlation 
with short-term debt and equity, and an inverse correlation with long-term debt (Carvalho, de 
Mesquit &Lara, 2003). 
 
In India, a study by Azhagaiah and Gavoury(2011) found a strong one-to-one relationship 
between capital structure variables and profitability variables, return on assets (ROA) and return 
on capital employed (ROCE) and that capital structure has significant influence on profitability, 
and increase in use of the debt capital tends to minimize the net profit. Berger and Bonaccorsi di 
Patti (2006) findings are that higher leverage or a lower equity capital ratio is associated with 
profit efficiency, while other studies hypothesize a negative relation between profitability and 
capital structure (Chen& Zhao, 2006: Strebulaev, 2003).These mixed findings need further 
confirmation in different economies. 
 
In finance theory, the three core variables are time, risk and return. The standard in finance is 
that the return from an investment must be commensurate with risk in that investment. This 
explains why, theoretically the beta of equity in unlevered firm is lower than that of a levered 
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firm, and a possible explanation is that the use of debt capital momentums a firm closer to 
financial distress. Studies in capital markets show anomalies, as an example, high default 
probability firms, with low credit rating tend to exhibit lower future stock returns (Campbell, 
Hilscher & Szilagyi, 2008). This absence of a risk premium for default risk ―adds a new 
dimension to the complex relationship between financial distress (debt induced) and cross-
sectional properties of equity returns‖ that require further research (Garlappi& Yan, 2011: 790). 
 
Welch‘s (2010:2) comment that ―in the theory of capital structure, one common hypothesis 
derives directly from the equity-sensitivity channel: a firm with more leverage has both higher-
powered incentives and (usually) a higher probability of financial distress. In turn, this means 
that leverage can influence managerial behavior. A second common hypothesis about leverage 
arises from the fact that interest payments to creditors are excluded from corporate income tax. 
These two hypotheses have formed the basis of modern capital structure theory since Robichek 
and Myers (1966)‖; and there is need to confirm this hypothesis empirically. 
 
2.5 Measures of capital structure and performance 
Studies in this area, whether in developed economies or developing economies have common 
approaches that should be improved on. The source of a common problem is how leverage and 
performance are operationalised and the statistical methods employed in the studies. The 
literature captured a battery of measures of both leverage and performance, thus making it 
difficult pinpointing the correct indicator of performance and capital structure. Incorrigible 
choices of a single performance or leverage indicator that assume that the performance indicators 
tell the same story this might not be the case, if used in establishing a relationship between 
performance and capital structure lead to misleading results. 
 
The choice of performance and capital structure indicators as variables of this study needs to be 
confirmed through advanced statistical analysis.  It is possible that distinct indicators of 
performance haveunusual impact on leverage and vice versa; therefore, variable selection varies 
from one country to another country; therefore, a correct measure of leverage is critical to capital 
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structure research. As a result, in this study the researcher intended to improve on previous 
research by using correlation and canonical correlation analysis as in Tacq (1997) to choose 
representative measures (indicators) of both leverage and performance. The studies above did not 
adopt this approach yet canonical correlation analysis is appropriate to handling latent variables 
such as performance and leverage. The importance attached to the choice of indicators of 
leverage suggests that the strength of existing findings in the literature has to be assessed on a 
case-by-case basis (Welch, 2010:10).  
2.6 Emerging hypothesis 
The literature review in this chapter set a frame work for the hypothesis to be tested. The aim is 
to examine the bi-directional relationship between capital structure and performance and to select 
appropriate measures of performance. Thefirst hypothesis is the firm performance influence on 
the amount of debt capital employed by firms. This is based on the proposition that efficient and 
profitable firms have lower expected bankruptcy costs thus are able to employ more debt than 
comparable firms that are less profitable. Even so, it is conceivable that profitable firm will 
employ less debt to protect the firm from potential debt induced liquidation. The second 
hypothesis is formulated as follows:  
 
H01: Firm performance does not have a significant effect on leverage, and the alternative 
hypothesisis: 
H11: Firm performance has a significant effect on leverage. 
 
The second hypothesis is about the influence of debt capital (leverage) employed by firms on the 
performance of firms. If leverage has an impact on performance, then there are two possible 
outcomes. The first outcome is that leverage mitigates agency costs and therefore, improves firm 
performance. Second leverage increase agency costs; therefore, more use of debt will impact 
negatively on firm performance.  Thus the second hypothesis for this study is as follows: 
 
H02: Leverage does not have a significant effect on performance; the alternative hypothesis 
being: 
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H12: Leverage has a significant effect on firm performance. 
2.7 Conclusion and summary of the chapter 
Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes(2006) and  Black, Kim, Jang and Park (2006)offered evidence 
consistent with a cause and effect relationship between an overall governance index and higher 
share prices in emerging markets; and that best firm-level corporate governance practices are 
linked to higher valuations, satisfactory performance and higher dividends to investors. 
However, Durnev and Kim (2005) found it hard to predict firm-level governance choices and 
related it to performance; they suggested that more work was required to identify firm-level 
factors that explain governance across emerging markets. Due to structural variation in emerging 
economies, Durnev and Kim (2005) recommend a corporate governance index for each country.  
 
Though the agency theory is relied on in this study, it is important taking note of the recent 
criticism by Ghoshal (2005:86) that managerial behaviors that upshot from the agency theory 
could be destroying corporations. It is also possible that, manager is not the manager described in 
agency theory, a manager laden with self-interest,  but could be a manager with a desire to 
maintain a reputation for high standards of business conduct in order to avoid sanctioning, a 
manager fascinated in extending his tenure at the firm will make choices to benefit other 
stakeholders. In addition, it emerges that Kenya has its share of corporate governance problems 
that needs remedying, and the starting point would be a study such as this one. 
 
The worry and therefore, the need to strengthen the monitoring of firms were derived from the 
literature review. The argument was that dispersed shareholders are too weak to have unified 
stand against management; shareholders lack the sophistication, and the resources required to 
monitor and control their managers; and that they find it costly engaging financial analysts to 
process information and offer advice. They can also reduce the risk of their investments through 
diversification; and that they hold small amounts of shares in the firms they invest in. 
 
There is no consensus on capital structure theories, but a substantial amount of research has been 
done to justify the use and active nature of debt (Berk & DeMarzo, 2011:520- 522, 539-540). 
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The reality and behaviour at capital markets are that managers cannot be passive when it comes 
to choosing between equity and debt capital (Berk & DeMarzo, 2011:520-522, 539-540). The 
research about debt holders monitoring role, has support in the need to identify synergistic, 
intervening and motivational factors that influence manager‘s behaviors that are required to 
improve firm performance. This study was designed to explore if debt capital, is an interactive, 
intervening and motivational factor that restrains managers‘ excesses. Further, each capital 
market has its share of imperfections and frictions that demand for different monitoring and 
control devices. Managers and shareholders can be shellfish (shareholders can adversely transfer 
some risk to debt holders) and need monitoring; therefore, debt holders must monitor firms 
(borrowers) that they lend money to. 
 
The importance of debt capital must be evaluated in terms of its impact on the value to the firm. 
In the context of this study, we establish whether increasing leverage imposes discipline on 
management or propels management to exert more effort thereby enhancing the value for the 
firm by negating the neutral mutation hypothesis. It is possible that debt can magnify financial 
distress in a firm. Financial distress is costly because it adversely affects shareholders and 
managerial investment decisions, thus inducing substantial inefficiency in the firm. If debt 
capital affects firm performance, then the prescription to the managers would be to mix debt and 
equity capital and that an optimum capital structure is located for each firm. Firm performance 
(efficiency hypothesis) could be influenced by the amount of debt in capital structure; and this 
traced to corporate governance.  Capital structure decisions will cease to be irrelevant if 
performance is a factor in deciding on the amount of debt that a firm deployed as part of capital 
structure. 
 
In some of the studies reviewed the researchers used ordinary least square regression (OLS) 
model to build a relationship between performance and capital structure (Abor & Biekpe, 
2009;Berger & Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006;Abor &Biekpe, 2005;Chen, 2004). The limitation of 
regression is that it can only handle on dependent variables at a time, yet for a variable such as 
performance a number of indicators exist, and a composite index is preferred. The other 
limitation of OLS is that it cannot handle grouped data, which is a requirement in this study. This 
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study will improve on methodology. This study used canonical correlation to explore the two 
theoretical concepts, performance and capital structure and then proceeded to use the general 
linear model (GLM) to establish the existence of bi-directional relationship between capital 
structure and performance. The GLMis a flexible statistical model that incorporates normally 
distributed dependent variables and categorical or continuous independent variables (Dobson, 
2002; Horton, 1978). 
 
In the next chapter (3) the literature on debt capital as a corporate governance influencing 
variable is examined in the framework of the relationship, performance, and change in CEO and 
capital structure.  
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CHAPTER 3: 
FIRM PERFORMANCE, CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND CHIEF 
EXECUTIVE OFFICER TURNOVER 
3.1 Introduction 
The focuses in this chapter are the determination of capital structure choices, specifically the 
relationship between performance, capital structure and change of CEO. It recognised the need to 
confirm whether debt capital plays an effective corporate governance role through examination 
of the existence of relationships between leverage, performance and change in CEO. Chapter 2 
was a review of previous studies on capital structure, performance, corporate governance and 
their interaction. Inthis, chapter (3)is presented literature helpful in understanding debt capital 
and performance as corporate governance influencing variables; specifically the role that debt 
capital along with firm performance play in influencing change of chief executive officers 
(CEO). 
The chapter is arranged as follows: Section3.2reviewed the relationship between performance 
and management turnover; this is the extent to which managers are replaced due to poor firm 
performance. Section 3.3 is a review on debt capital and change in top management, specifically 
whether debt capital play monitoring and control role in poorly performing firms. Section 3.4 
reviewed studies and theories about change in CEO and firm performance.  The emphasis is 
about debt capital as a resource that would influence behavior and replacement of top 
management when the firm is managed sub optimally. Section 3.5 presentedare view on change 
of CEO and change in capital structure; this enables a researcher a chance to deduce whether 
debt capital is relevant or not as discussed in chapter 2, such that the incoming CEO is forced to 
recommend a revised capital structure. In section, 3.6 are the upshot of the literature review, 
namely the hypothesis set to test the relationship between performance, capital structure and 
change in CEO.  At the end of this review is a summary and conclusion to this chapter in section 
3.7. 
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3.2 Performance and management turnover 
 
One way to evaluate corporate governance is to assess the extent to which inefficient managers 
are replaced. Performance is a critical variable in evaluation of corporate governance because of 
the impact of a firm‘s performance on the firm‘s market value and on wealth of shareholders. 
Investors and regulators cannot observe CEO ability but might infer it from reported firm 
performance, and this makes performance a critical corporate governance variable. The detailed 
literature review on the relationship between corporate governance and performance (see chapter 
2, section 2.2), and in the same, chapter is presented literature on the bi-directional relationship 
between performance and capital structure. Fisman, Khurana and Rhodes (2010) presented a 
model in which weak governance protects mediocre CEOs from dismissal, while shielding the 
board. Other studies suggested that a link between management turnovers to poor performance 
confirmed adequacy in corporate governance (Firth, Fung & Rui, 2005; DeFond & Mingyi, 
2004). Bechmann and Raaballe (2010) discuss in detail bad corporate governance in the board 
room and proceed to establish a link between powerful CEO and board performance. 
 
The actual firm performance reflects strategies adopted by management to achieve the objectives 
of their firm. Firms whose managers selected, and implemented good projects report adequate 
returns for investors (Boyne, James, John & Petrovsky, 2010; Lumby& Jones, 2011). A 
commonly held opinion is that corporate failure is a characteristic of deficiencies in management 
by way of lapses in corporate governance (fraud), deficiency in management skills, inadequate 
approaches to risk management and hostile environment (OECD, 2009; Kirkpatrick, 2009 a, b). 
From a CEO perspective, failure to match managers to the objectives of the firm is a source of 
failure, and this assertion has support in match theory. 
 
The matching theory is a mathematical framework attempting to describe the formation of 
mutually beneficial relationships over time (Shimer, 2005). In match theory, firm productivity 
and performance are explained in terms of the match between CEO and the firm (Cordeiro-
Nilsson & Shaw, 2010; Cordeiro, 2010; Allgood & Farrell, 2003). It is logical that whenever a 
mismatch is located between CEO and the firm, the CEO should be replaced by a manager of 
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quality to reverse the decline (Barney & Herstley, 2010).In any case managers choosing effective 
strategies coupled with the efficient strategic management processes build competitive advantage 
thus adding value to their firm; and such managers are retained through an effective incentive 
system that includes good salaries and benefits, the prospect of promotion and tenure (Barney& 
Herstley, 2010).However, a study into the labor market for directors reported negative turnover 
consequences for outside directors in firms that underperform relative to their peers (Davidoff, 
Lund & Schonlau, 2013:2).  
 
From the finance perspective, performance is a reflection of a firm‘s revenue generating capacity 
after taking into account costs incurred to generate that revenue. Inside cost is the large amount 
paid to top management, a cost that top management must justify by only choosing projects and 
activities that add value to the firm (Bebchuk & Grinstein, 2005). In the face of endless corporate 
scandals, the dispute is whether directors and top management face penalties for poor 
performance, specifically in emerging economies such as Kenya.  
 
A study that split firms into performance deciles showed that while normal or high performance 
does not lead to the likelihood of the CEO staying, the lowest performing firms experienced 
higher CEO turnover. However, ‗the change in turnover in response to a decline in performance 
is insignificant or even goes against firing underperforming managers‘ (Dimopoulos & Wagner, 
2010:2). Studies indicated that if corporate governance was effective, poor performance 
preceded replacement of management (Mnzava, 2013:28; Wermers, Wu &Zechner, 2008:26; 
DeFond & Mingyi, 2004; Volpin, 2002).    
 
In Ukraine, Muravyev, Talavera, Bilykand Grechaniuk (2009:21) found evidence of an inverse 
relationship between the past performance of firms and the likelihood of managerial turnover. 
Though other authorities assert that directors that include CEO are held responsible for their poor 
performance, at times managers only vacate their position when there is a financial crisis as was 
in the recent financial crisis in US (Eisfeldt & Kuhnen, 2013; Goldman, 2009; Berman, 2008). In 
some case, it requires a presidential order to remove CEO as was in the case of General Motors 
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in US when, despite persistent poor performance, the then CEO was removed after President 
Obama‘s intervention orders (Grand Rapid Press, 2009).  
 
In many instances, it is difficult solving governance problems without replacing managers, even 
if replacement of managers would improve performance (Fidrmuc & Fidrmuc, 2007; Fidrmuc & 
Fidrmuc, 2006). It might be that the link between firm performance and management turnover is 
fuzzy due to weak laws, weak regulation and underdeveloped capital markets (Strenger, 
Kleindiek, Schmelzle, & Volynets, 2012). In Finland, Maury (2006:222) found that firms that 
have a two-tier board structure are more likely to replace poorly performing CEOs than firms 
with a single tier board structure and that higher turnover of board members is a response to poor 
stock price performance and operating losses.  
 
In studies, relating performance to management turnover, operationalisation and measurement of 
the two variables is critical and varies from study to study. The definition of performance is 
important if it is to be used to evaluate top management. It is important that an accurate, 
objective and reliable measure of performance is identified. The principle of accountability 
requires that managers are only held responsible for factors within their control (Jenter & 
Kanaan, 2010).  In Maury (2006) firm performance is captured as the firm‘s market-adjusted 
stock return and change in operating profits to total assets, that is, both market and accounting 
measures of performance are employed. The alternative measures of stock performance used for 
studies similar to this are: stock performance of the firm relative to the industry, the stock 
performance within the industry relative to the stock market, and the performance of the overall 
stock market. This is because some boards respond not only to poor performance relative to the 
industry, but also to both poor industry performance and to poor market performance (Kaplan & 
Minton, 2008:2).  
 
The appropriate performance measure should be discriminative enough as to ensure that CEOs 
are fired efficiently and justly, and that few CEOs are dismissed in good times, or too many fired 
in bad times (Jenter & Kanaan, 2010). The use of industry and market measures of performance 
is appropriate in deciding whether to bring a new CEO to respond to the emerging-market 
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challenges (Kaplan& Minton, 2008:26).  In addition different measures of performance are 
required to unmask poor managers who erect a defense when performance is poor, but use 
selective measures of performance to hide behind industry and market booms and declines. The 
concept of peer performance requires benchmarking firm performance against comparable firms 
in industry and in some case the market (Jenter& Kanaan, 2010). This ensures that managers are 
accountable for only those factors within their control. 
 
Accounting measures of performance and leverage are used to determine the relationship 
between performance, capital structure and management turnover (Muravyev, Talavera, Bilyk & 
Grechaniuk, 2009; Jenter & Kanaan, 2008:25; Huson, Huson, Parrino & Starks, 
2001).Performance indicators provide information to investors about profitability prospects; 
while capital structure indicators highlight the firms‘ liquidity and solvency. Investorsuse capital 
structure and performance information to make investment choices.  
 
Economic and financial performance levels are both measurable in book value and market value. 
Therefore, the reliability of accounting indicators depends on the adequacy of the accounting 
standards. The accounting profession agrees that ‗The measurement objective of accounting 
estimates can vary, depending on the applicable financial reporting framework and the financial 
item being reported‘ (AICPA 2012:1843).The reliability of market indicators depends on how 
developed a country‘s capital market is. As an example, a popular indicator of a company‘s 
future growth potential and performance is Tobin‘s Q ratio (Tobin, 1969; Brainard & Tobin, 
1968). However, Tobin‘s Q ratio reliability as a performance indicator depends how efficient a 
capital market is in valuing financial assets (Lieven, De Jonghe & Vennet, 2007; Dushnitsky & 
Lenox, 2006).  
 
Given that the goal of the firm is maximization of shareholder's wealth, the correct indicator to 
trigger intervention by investors in the affairs of the firm is a decline in the market value of the 
firm. Unfortunately, in Kenya's market data is limited and researcher have to rely on other 
measures extracted from audited annual reports such as accounting revenue and earnings, 
solvency, and liquidity and the resulting ratios as indicators of a firm‘s performance and 
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financial strength. Examples of accounting indicators of performance (accounting measures) are 
return on investment (ROI) which is an indicator of a firm's economic profitability and return on 
equity (ROE) which is an indicator of a firm's financial profitability (Venanzi, 2012; Venanzi, 
2010). The other useful indicator is the book value to the market value as a measure of investors‘ 
perception of net asset value of the firm. In terms of decision making, the higher the ROI and 
ROE the more profitable the firm is.  
 
The starting point to determining management turnover is the definition of management turnover 
and that when performance is poor the possibility facing the CEO is either retention or voluntary 
turnover or forced turnover. Management turnover could mean replacement of CEO or 
replacement of entire top management, including the board of directors. The top management 
theory suggests that managers are heterogeneous due to variations in their cognitive psychology 
(Nielsen, 2010; Chen, Ge & Song, 2010; Boeker 1992). Hence, the CEO should be replaced 
independent of other managers of his or her team.  But in practice, as witnessed in a number of 
top world football clubs, the manager and his entire staff are replaced. This explains why 
researchers in predicting change in top management at times emphasize replacement of CEO and 
at times on entire top management. In practical terms, to report turnover, the CEO in a given 
year, t0, is no longer the CEO by the following year t1.   
 
In some organizations, some boards are deeply involved in managerial activities, and it will be 
meaningless changing a CEO without changing such a board (Lawler, 2008).However, However, 
However, in organizations where power and authority absolutely belong to the CEO, a change of 
CEO would indicate a change in management; however, in firms where power and authority are 
not engrossed on an individual (CEO) there will be an effective change only when the entire 
management is replaced (Lawler, 2008). There could also be a change without changing the 
CEO, in such a circumstance; the existing CEO directs a shift in overall priorities and goals of 
the firm to reverse poor performance. 
 
CEO turnover is engineered either internally or externally. CEO's internal turnover is connected 
to shareholders or boards of directors‘ decision to replace a CEO; but CEO‘s external turnover is 
60 
 
experienced when a firm is taken over or the firm enters into bankruptcy (Jenter & Kanaan, 
2010; Kaplan & Minton, 2008:2). Studies showed that firm-specific performance, industry 
performance, and the performance of the overall market impact on internal CEO turnover; on the 
other hand, the three performance components did not impact on external CEO turnover (Jenter 
& Kanaan, 2010). Management dismissal can be either forced or voluntary. Forced dismissal is 
preceded by significant declines in firm performance, and in some instances are political 
contests; and this explained why the replacement of CEO is to improve firm performance 
(Huson, Malatesta & Parrino 2004). 
3.3 Debt capital and change in management 
Debt holders are major suppliers of capital to corporations; however, debt holders like other 
creditors have no role in running the company because in tradition and law, corporate 
governance focuses on shareholders (Baird & Henderson, 2008). Debt holders onlyget involved 
in running a firm when that firm is in financial distress to minimize their losses. Intuitively, one 
would expect debt holders to monitor their borrower‘s investment, financing, and dividend 
decisions as to safeguard their investment and to take remedial action. 
 
Debt holders might monitor both shareholders and CEOs to tame shareholder's appetite for 
excessive risk (Bolton, Mehran & Shapiro, 2010; Jorion, 2007). Debt holders have a choice to 
secure their loans by designing debt covenants that transfer decision rights in a timely manner. 
Covenants include restrictions on acquisition (asset substitution) and disposal of assets, payment 
of dividends and issuing and terms of issuing new capital (claim dilution) (Reisel, 2014; 
Nikolaev, 2010; Lumby& Jones, 2011). Reisel (2014) suggested that investors viewed bond 
covenants as important instruments in mitigating agency problems, and increase in the cost of 
debt to borrowing firms due to agency problems could be substantial.  
 
In thin and illiquid markets like Nairobi Securities Exchange, where the debt capital market is 
underdeveloped, debt holders find it difficult and costly disposing their investment on receiving 
adverse information from the borrowing firm. An illiquid market apart from being a hindrance to 
investors‘ management of risk given reduced diversification opportunities is an impediment to 
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managerial discipline(Senbet& Otchere, 2008:23). In addition to difficulty in pricing of assets 
(securities),transaction costs of disposing security issued by a non performing firm in an illiquid 
market is prohibitive (Ryan, 2008). 
 
The other alternative left to debt holders is direct intervention that would include replacing 
management instead of liquidating assets to settle their claim. However, the reality is that even if 
a firm violates the terms of debt contract, debt holders are hesitant seizing assets that serve as 
collateral for their loans to the firm, and they are even unwilling filling bankruptcy proceedings. 
This is because debt holders need a firm to continue doing business (lending to) with, and 
therefore, debt holders are more likely to opt for preservation of the firm (who is their customer) 
(Gilson, 2012: 25). 
 
CEOs excessive risk taking over the watch of board of directors led to a financial crisis of 
unparalleled magnitude in the world‘s largest economy, USA (Jickling, 2010; Pinyo, 2008, 
Sharma, 2008). The USA economic crisis was felt worldwide and epitome‘s corporate 
governance failure that requires resolute monitoring of CEOs. In USA the financial crisis put to 
question the willingness of CEO to be good stewards. The impact from the crisis stressed that in 
future, firms focus on both the entity and shareholder views on the organization because adverse 
managerial activity affect not only the shareholders but also other stakeholders who include debt 
holders, customers and suppliers. The entity view would imply that debt holders be part of the 
company management. 
 
The immediate response to corporate scandals was to include independent directors in the board 
of directors. Buteven after the introduction of independent board members, corporations continue 
to collapse. One reason advanced to explain the failure of independent directors is that managers 
provided incomplete information (Ravina & Sapienza, 2010:963).It is possible that some of them 
are compromised. In terms of information, debt holders are privileged and has the sophistication 
required to process the information for their benefit and benefit of shareholders. It is also 
possible that independent directors can be compromised. 
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Using the dissent- cost to equity loss ratio model, Chemmanur and Fedaseyeu (2012:33) showed 
that boardswere passive in replacing CEOs. They attributed the failure to replace non performing 
managers to coordination problems, personal interest trade off among board members, and wider 
shareholders. Given that competing theories translate into different approaches to taming 
reprobate managers, a convincing conclusion is that board of directors control model requires 
reinforcement that would consider bringing debt holders on board. 
 
Factors that influence CEO turnover are performance, board size, board composition and 
ownership structure (Chemmanur& Fedaseyeu, 2012; Adams, Hermalin & Weisbach 2010; 
Lausten, 2002). In Russia, ownership structure, control changes, and financial performance 
prompted CEO turnover (Kapelyushnikov & Demina, 2005).From corporate finance perspective, 
the use of debt capital (borrowed funds) is likely to escalate the probability of bankruptcy, and 
this clarifies why Reinhart and Rogoff (2011:1702) are emphatic that external debt surges are a 
precursor to banking crises. The peril of bankruptcy may trigger CEO turnover, specifically 
forced CEO turnover (Fidrmuc & Fidrmuc, 2007). Even if a firm is not bankrupt, firms with 
similar business risk, but levered to tend to be closer to default risks how high beta (market risk), 
when compared to firms that do not use debt capital (Brealey, Myers & Allen, 2010: 485–486; 
Cohen, 2007).  
 
Wei Ting (2011) concluded that debt capital influenced CEO turnover, and that firms with higher 
default risk are likely to change their top management in the subsequent accounting period. 
Therefore, we expect change in CEO in firms with substantial debt in their capital structure, and 
less change in comparable firmswith less debt. Logically, to test this hypothesis, the approach 
would be to classify firms using leverage, and then establish whether significant variation in 
change in management is explained by level of leverage. 
 
Though it is suggested in the finance literature that debt capital plays certain disciplining role, 
the empirical evidence about the debt holder‘s role in corporate governance is sparse. This 
explained why in the following comment, Tung (2009:117 - 123) referred to leverage in the 
board room as the unsung influence of private lenders in corporate governance, ‗The dearth of 
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attention to lender governance is ironic given the dominance of the contractualist view of the 
corporation within the legal academy and the thick web of contractual commitments that bind the 
public company. Despite the ascendancy of the contractualist view of the corporation within the 
legal academy, legal scholars have not generally noticed the extent of lender governance or 
discussed its contours or potential effects.‘ Creditors, including debt holders can act as effective 
monitors, especially when there are conflicts of interests such as replacing a manager whose 
performance is wanting, but for one reason or another cannot be disciplined by shareholders or 
board of directors (Nini, Amir &Smith, 2011). 
 
In Japan, change in management following poor performance is common in firms that heavily 
rely on bank debt; however, this is because Japanese firms‘ capital structure is dominated by 
bank debt capital and less reliance on equity capital and corporate bonds (Tokuo, Chiaki & 
Takefumi, 2011). In Japan, banks as the major supplier of debt capital have seats in the board of 
directors in the firms that they lend to and are allowed to participate directly in corporate 
financing and other strategic decisions. Tung (2009:119-220) cited a company where debt 
holders forced a non performing entrenched CEO to vacate his position, while Shepherd, Tung 
and Yoon (2008) discussed the aspects of debt capital as a corporate governance mechanism  and 
concluded that bank monitoring added value to shareholders. 
 
Though debt holders are privileged to have access to information about borrowing firms useful in 
effectively monitor corporations, there are circumstances under which debt holders might not 
exercise a disciplinary role. The first situation will be where a debt holder and shareholder is the 
same person. Second is where the firm issued debt in the face of undue influence from debt 
holders.  Save for the business entity concept, the first situation makes nonsense of the meaning 
and usefulness of capital structure ratios as a measure level of owner‘s commitment to the firm 
or as a measure of leverage for corporate governance purposes. In the second situation, those 
who take favors rarely complain. The third situation is when lenders, consider their debt 
covenant, fool proof, or who are fully diversified or who have insured their asset portfolio can 
become ineffective monitors because they feel their investments are safe, therefore, their 
contribution to corporate governance will be nonexistence. 
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If debt capital governance matter, then one way of evaluating a firm is by monitoring changes in 
corporation‘s financial risk. Adverse changes in risk acts as a signal to shareholders and 
regulators to take corrective action that include replacement of top management. Excess financial 
risk aggravates corporation risk thus reducing the value in the firm.  In the absence of debt 
capital, such a signal will be lacking. Managers knowing that a poor debt-equity ratio 
downgrades the credit rating of their firm must monitor the ratio for them to take timely 
corrective action. 
3.4 Performance following change in top management 
The exits and entries of top management are expected to have an impact on subsequent firm 
performance. Change of CEO makes sense if a new CEO comes up strategies that add value to 
shareholders. In developed economies, studies on post-turnover performance assess the quality 
of the new CEO; other studies evaluate the correctness of the decision to replace the CEO by 
looking at post CEO change performance. Changes in the top team which lead to higher degrees 
of dissimilarity between old and new members of a team might result into a negative effect on 
firm performance(Glunkand Heijltjes, 2003:11). 
Firms enter woeful performance due to economic distress; that is, when there is a decline in 
industry performance and poor management (Damodaran, 2009). If the remedy for reversing the 
decline in performance is to replace top management, then the CEO replacement must translate 
into improved performance. This means that the performance before the change of CEO must be 
lower than that after the change of CEO. This hypothesis has support in the common sense 
theory (that is, sound and prudent judgment based on a simple perception of the situation or 
facts: in Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, 2011) that assume that the new CEO has the 
capacity to enhance performance (Dimopoulos & Wagner, 2010). The opposite is the vicious 
circle theory which suggests that replacement of CEO has detrimental results due to its disruptive 
nature (Geraldo, Mendoza, Rosas& Tellez, 2013:5; Rowe, Cannella, Rankin& Gorman 2005; 
Schlesinger& Heskett, 1991; Grusky; 1963).  
A number of theories justify the change of management in non performing firms. The upper-
echelon theory inference is that demographic diversity of senior management is positively 
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associated with the diversity within the workforce; therefore, it is important that a CEO's 
capability is matched to a firm‘s resources that include the work force (Nishii, Gotte & Raver, 
2007). The dependency theory characterizes organization behavior, and proceeds to consider a 
manager as the critical resource for the success of corporations. Exchange-based power implies 
that debt capital is a resource that can influence behavior and replacement of top management 
(Drees & Heugens, 2013; Davis & Cobb, 2010; Casciaro &Piskorski, 2005). Agency and 
efficiency theory rationalize replacement of underachieving managers (Pan, 2012; Huang, 2008). 
The assumption is that after replacing CEOs, there will be an improvement in firm performance. 
This is because CEO replacement creates space for correction of errors made by the past 
management. Therefore, CEO turnover and post-turnover engagements address productivity 
shock perpetuated by the previous management, and post-turnover actions mirror the pre CEO 
turnover shock (Pan & Wang, 2012). 
 
Well managed firms that are performing poorly because they are in an industry or market on the 
decline might or might not benefit from corrective management actions or should not change 
CEO. Improvement in performance is significant when the newly appointed CEO is an outsider 
instead of an insider (Dimopoulos & Wagner, 2010). The post management change improvement 
on performance could vary across firms depending on whether the firm was performing poorly or 
not before the replacement of CEO. Firms with entrenched CEOs exhibit significantly poorer 
performance during the year prior to forced turnover, and such firms post significant 
performance improvements during the three years following forced turnover (Cristian Dezs˝, 
2006). Fisman, Khurana and Rhodes (2010:16) find that entrenched firms experience greater 
improvements in performance after a forced turnover. 
 
After the change in CEO, large improvement in performance is reported by poorly performing 
firms, while no improved performance is visible in firms that were performing well (Cornelli, 
Kominek & Ljungqvist, 2012; Huson, Malatesta & Parrino 2004). Adams and Sattar (2009:22) 
after examining the impact of CEO turnover on investors‘ wealth, report that CEO turnover is 
value decreasing to debt holders but value enhancing to stockholder values, thus confirming 
wealth transfer and signaling hypothesis.  
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The degree of organizational disruption created by the CEO's departure, whether forced or 
natural and the subsequent organizational turbulences are important factors affecting subsequent 
firm performance, to an extent that post CEO replacement can be negative or positive. This was 
the case in Manchester United Football Club that posted negative performance immediately Sir 
Alex Ferguson was replaced as a manager. Bas (2011:279 – 289) using sports data on both 
manager characteristics, decisions and firm outcomes find no statistically significant 
improvements in performance after the manager is replaced. Firth, Fung and Rui (2006) asked 
the question, ―Will the successor pursue new policies that result in better performance?‖ They 
then examined the turnover rates of the chairperson of the board of directors of listed firms in 
China to identify factors that influence these changes. They found out that poor performance 
based on accounting numbers is a factor in chairperson turnover and that stock returns are not 
considered in replacing CEOs. However, they found no evidence that change in top management 
leads to an improvement in firm performance during the year after replacement; poorly 
performing firms failed to reverse the decline. 
3.5 Change of CEO and change in capital structure 
Changes in CEO provided a chance to a researcher to deduce whether the capital structure 
decisions are relevant or irrelevant, as an approach to confirming or rejecting M&M proposition. 
Capital structure decision will be relevant if significant changes in capital structure levels are 
observed after CEO replacement. For example, if the new CEO introduced different capital 
structure policies, then we assume that capital structure matters. If debt capital is irrelevant, the 
incoming manager might not change the capital structure policy that existed before the change of 
CEO. Due to agency conflicts, managers may not always adopt leverage choices that maximise 
shareholders‘ value. Firms with dominant CEO are likely to adopt significantly lower leverage, 
possibly to prevaricate the disciplinary mechanisms associated with debt financing (Jiraporn, 
Chintrakarn &Liu, 2012). 
 
On empirically examining the influence of CEOs on corporate financial policy, Cao and Mauer, 
(2010) found that CEO turnover is followed by significant debt policy changes, and this is 
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pronounced in firm in which the new CEO is an outsider. A new CEO might not change debt if 
the firm has predetermined debt ratio, and the predetermined ratio is within an acceptablerange 
(Graham & Leary, 2011). In cases where change of CEO is as a result of poor performance, a 
new CEO who believes in tax advantages and distress effects of debt capital might review usage 
of debt capital. Poor performance that approached financial distress triggered control rights 
changes and in a way that might influence financing choices and not much research has been 
done on this area (Roberts & Sufi, 2009; DeMarzo & Fishman, 2007). 
3.6 Emerging hypothesis 
The studies into the relationship between performance and replacement of top management lack 
agreement on the direction in the relationship and therefore, are not conclusive. Fisman, Khurana 
and Rhodes (2010) showed a model in which weak governance protects mediocre CEOs from 
dismissal, but shielded the board even when firm performance is poor. In some cases, 
managersonly vacate their position when there is a financial crisis as was witnessed in the recent 
financial crisis in USA (Eisfeldt & Kuhnen, 2013; Goldman, 2009; Berman, 2008). In some 
cases, it requires a presidential order to remove CEO; this was in the case of General Motors in 
US when, despite poor performance, the then CEO was removed on President Obama‘s orders 
(Grand Rapid Press, 2009). 
 
Leland Miller (2012) showed that the relation of management turnover to performance is 
insignificant in the absence of cross border listing. Firth, Fung and Rui (2006), find evidence of 
very high turnover of company chairpersons in China, and that turnover is related to a firm's 
profitability but not to its stock returns. After outlining several theoretical arguments on the 
relationships between a firm‘s capital structure, performance and CEO turnover, there is meaning 
to generate the following hypothesizes. 
 
The third hypothesis is based on the microeconomic theory that predicts that firm performance 
depends on the managers‘ skills, and their efforts; and expectation is that managers whose 
performance is poor are dismissed. The assumption is that improvement in performance might be 
unattainable if the management that made the original decision that pushed the firm into 
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operating and financial difficulties is still part of the management team. Therefore, the third 
overall hypothesis for this study and its alternative are as follows:  
 
H03: Firm performance does not have significant effect on Change of CEO 
H13:  Firm performance has significant effect on Change of CEO. 
The fourth hypothesis is based on perceived corporate governance or disciplinary role of debt 
capital. Debt holders just like any other investors prefer firms that are profitable, financially 
stable and with both survival traits and growth prospects. If debt capital played a disciplinary 
role, then there should be visible differences in CEO changes between two groups of firms, that 
is, highly leveraged firms (high pressure) and low leveraged firms (low pressure). At the same 
time, shareholders, directors, the legal frame and capital market infrastructure might lock out 
debt holders from decision making, in which case debt holder influence on the borrowing firm 
collapses. In which case the fourth hypothesis and its alternatives are as follows:  
H04: Leverage does not have significant effect on Change of CEO 
H14:  Leverage has significant effect on Change of CEO. 
The fifth hypothesis is the combined and interaction of debt capital and firm performance on the 
replacement of CEO. The argument is on the possibility that what the debt holders cannot 
achieve on their own might be strengthened by shareholders if the firm is performing poorly. The 
fifth hypothesis and its alternative are stated as follows: 
H05: Leverage and performance does not have significant effect on Change of CEO 
H15:  Leverage and performance has significant effect on Change of CEO. 
3.7 Chapter summary and conclusion 
 
This chapter is an in-depth knowledge about the meaning, concepts and relationship between the 
three study concepts, namely firm performance, debt capital and CEO turnover. Performance is a 
proxy of adequacy in corporate governance in situations where investors and regulators cannot 
directly observe CEO ability. Proper management of debt capital is equally important to a 
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corporate governance perspective. In such a set up investors infer adequacy of corporate 
governance from reported firm performance. To protect firms from a ruinous corporate 
performance, firm's device a corporate governance system useful in effectively monitoring and 
correcting the enterprise‘s operations. The board of directors and shareholders can be passive and 
captive to management to a point that they cannot dismiss anon performing CEO. 
 
Firm performance results from strategies adopted by management, and firms that selected and 
implemented successful projectsearned adequate returns for their owners.  While firms 
categorised as weak in corporate governance are expected to post poor performance. Initiative 
must be taken to replace its management (by now assumed to be deficient in skills and other 
relevant competencies!) in order to reverse poor performance. The supposition is that there are 
positive links between management turnovers and firm‘s performance. However, in the face of 
endless corporate scandals, it is not definite that directors and top management face penalties for 
poor performance, specifically in emerging economies such as Kenya. Therefore, in instances 
poor financial performance fails to trigger dismissal of top management. The chapter presented 
alternative measures of performance and concluded that the shortcoming of market data forced 
the use of a mixture of market and accounting measures of performance in this study. Alternative 
measures are identified to inform the variable definition of change in management in chapter 4; 
that is, at research design stage.  
 
From this review, the conclusion is that the evidence on the link between performance and 
change in CEO is mixed. Some studies confirmed that where corporate governance was 
observed, poor performance preceded replacement of management; other researchers presented 
evidence of an inverse relationship between the past performance of firms and the likelihood of 
managerial turnover. Another strand of research finds weak or insignificant relationship between 
performance and management turnover, and traced their findings to weak laws, weak regulation 
and underdeveloped capital markets. 
 
If it was true that board of director‘s found it difficult firing non performing CEO, what is the 
way forward? The immediate response to corporate scandals was the introduction of independent 
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directors. However, even the introduction of independent directors did not stop the financial 
difficulties that ultimately lead to firm collapse. Studies reviewed suggested the role of debt 
holders to effective corporate governance be enhanced to enhance corporate governance. 
 
The tradition is that debt holders have no role in running the company; however, get involved 
when the company is in financial distress in a way of protecting their investments within the 
firm. Nevertheless, in Kenya and many other emerging markets, debt capital markets are not 
developed, and debt holders find it difficult disposing their investments should they want to. 
Perhaps an alternative to debt holders is direct intervention that requires replacing management 
instead of liquidating assets. In any case debt, holders need a firm to continue doing business 
(lending to) with; therefore, debt holders are reluctant opting for bankruptcy proceedings, but 
might favour realignment of rights as well as replacing CEOs to preserve the value within the 
firm. The proposal from this behaviour is a debt holder who actively monitors managers. 
 
In successful economy like Japan, the major suppliers of debt capital have seats in the board of 
directors, to enable them to participate directly in corporate financing and other strategic 
decisions. Furthermore, adverse change in a firms financial risk is a signal to shareholders to take 
corrective actions early enough to avoid bankruptcy; however, in the absence of debt capital, 
such a signal will not be available. The exchange-based power based theory posits potential of 
debt capital as a resource that would influence behavior and replacement of top management. 
This study is a movement towards an arrangement where firms are obliged to uphold an amount 
of debt in their capital structure. 
 
Common sense theory and the vicious circle theory contrast in explaining post CEO replacement 
as a response to firm performance. The common sense theory stipulates that the new CEO has 
the capacity to enhance performance; however, thevicious circle theory suggests that 
replacement of CEO is disruptive.  The upper-echelon theory suggests a need to match the CEO 
with the resources, human and non-human. The dependency theory characterizes organization 
behaviour concluding that managers are critical resources for the success of firms. Finally is the 
literature on change in leverage after the change in CEO.  This is the case when poor 
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performance magnifies financial distress that subsequently triggers control rights adjustments; in 
which case a review of financing choices and decisions is necessary. 
 
This chapter explored studies on whether debt holders impose discipline on top management in 
the wake of poor performance. The prediction is that debt holders might moderate top 
management excesses to need to be tested empirically. Even in developed economies the 
corporate governance models based on boards of directors fail to stop recurring failures that have 
overwhelmed the corporate world, and there is a need for a search for alternative or 
supplementing governing mechanisms. Elson, Helms and Moncus (2002: 1926) proposition are 
that ‗When the board fails to monitor effectively, disaster results—executive enrichment and 
corporate failure ensue. To curb managerial opportunism and protect against disastrous corporate 
performance, a firm must implement a corporate governance model capable of effectively 
monitoring the enterprise‘s operations.‘ It came out that boards that are passive and captured by 
management (not objective) find it most difficult replacing non performing managers.  
 
It is evident in the studies that the relationship between performance and replacement of top 
management lack agreement both at pre and the post CEO replacement direction. It is apparent in 
the studies that the relationship between debt holders and replacement of top management lacked 
agreement both at pre and the post CEO replacement direction. Therefore, it is important 
diagnosing the effect of both performance and debt capital on change of CEO. 
 
Depending on how debt holders relate to management, the influence of debt holders on corporate 
governance can be positive, negative or nonexistence and is therefore, an empirical issue; 
specifically whether debt capital governance mechanism is associated with successful 
turnarounds, that is, succession effect. In the studies reviewed, a number of study report presence 
or absence of relationship but fail to identify the source or why the relationship persists. 
 
The next chapter describes the methodology that was used to execute the study. It lays focus on 
research design to address the research questions in Chapter 1 and the hypotheses generated in 
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Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter four provided a road map for the study and act as a control required to 
achieve research objectives. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the research philosophy, approach, design and methods used to address the 
research problem. The two previous chapters reviewed literature on three concepts namely 
capital structure, performance and change in CEO. In chapter 2, hypotheses emerged.  The first 
hypothesis is about the effect of performance to the amount borrowed by firms and that the 
performance coefficient can be negative or positive or zero. The second hypothesis is about the 
effect of leverage on performance propelled by the perceived corporate governance or 
disciplinary role of debt capital, and that the leverage coefficient can be negative or positive or 
zero. In chapter 3, three, testable propositions emerged. 
 
The first, (but the third overall) hypothesis is based on the microeconomic theory that predicts 
that firm performance depends on the managers‘ skills and their effort and therefore, managers 
whose firms perform poorly are replaced to reverse the decline in performance. The second (but 
the fourth overall) hypothesis is based on perceived corporate governance or disciplinary role of 
debt capital and that firms with debt capital in their capital structure are more likely to put 
pressure on the firm to replace non performing managers. The third (but the fifth overall) 
hypothesis is the combined and interaction of debt capital and firm performance on the 
replacement of CEO. The argument is on the possibility that what the shareholders cannot 
achieve, for example, disciplining managers if the firm is performing poorly, might be 
strengthened by the presence of debt holders in a firm.  
 
This chapter (chapter 4) linked the preceding chapters to subsequent chapters.  It relied on 
theories in earlier chapters to select appropriate (optimal) research methods required to address 
research questions, objectives and testing resulting hypothesis as presented in chapters 1, 2 and 
3. I output informed the findings and conclusion of this study as presented in chapters 5, 6, 7 and 
8. The outputs of this chapter are the research philosophy; research design; population and 
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sample; data and the variables of the study. The other outputs from this chapter were the models' 
namely canonical correlation, general linear model (GLM) and generalised estimating equation 
(GEE). 
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: in section, 4.1 is presentedthe research 
philosophy; in section, 4.2 are the five hypothesis of the study, as summarised above; section 4.3 
are the research design and justification of research design; section 4.4 capture population of the 
study; section 4.5 is the sample of the study; in section, 4.6 are the data to be collected, validity 
issues relating to secondary data, data that capture performance, capital structure and change in 
CEO. Section 4.7 is the variables that capture the three key concepts to be used in testing their 
relationships. In section 4.8 to 4.9 is presented the method of analysis, and the summary is in 
section 4.10. 
4.1 Research Philosophy 
The research philosophies are discussed under the headings' epistemology, ontology, axiology 
and doxology and quantitative-qualitative dichotomy (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009; 
Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Jackson, 2008; Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). A research philosophy is a 
belief about the way in which data about a phenomenon should be gathered, analysed and used; 
but science is about transforming things believed (doxology) to things known (epistemology) 
(Saunders, Lewis &Thornhill, 2009; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Jackson, 2008; Hussey & 
Hussey, 1997; Becker, 1996). In this study, the beliefs are that a relationship exists between 
capital structure and performance that managers in firms posting poor performance are replaced 
and that debt holders play a monitoring role, but it is only on the conclusion from this study that 
the truth of these propositions will surface. 
 
In this study, the core philosophy is that research apart from providing the intellectual resources, 
contributes to an intellectual rigor and discipline of practical significance. Research is about what 
is not known; therefore, ‗research philosophy is an over-arching term relating to the development 
of knowledge and the nature of that knowledge‘ (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009).  
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Researchers can be categorised into two, either positivists (positivism) or non-positivism 
ornaturalists (interpretivism) (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Jackson, 
2008). Positivists‘ uses quantitative tools and techniques that emphasize measuring and counting. 
Naturalists prefer the qualitative tools of observation, questioning, and description research. The 
difference between positivism and interpretivism is extended to their assumptions about what is 
important to study; what can be known? What are the appropriate research tools and designs? 
What standards do you apply to judge the quality of the research? In Table 4.1, are the two 
philosophies presented by Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Jackson (2008) to guide researchers. 
 
Table 4.1: Research paradigms 
 Positivists (positivism) Naturalists (interpretivism) 
Basic beliefs The world is external and 
objective (objectivism) 
The world is socially 
constructed and subjective 
(subjectivism) 
Observer is independent Researcher is part of research 
process 
Science is value-free Science is driven by 
human interests 
Researcher should Focus on facts Focus on meanings 
Look for causality and 
fundamental laws 
Try to understand what is 
Happening 
Reduce phenomenon to 
simplest elements 
Look at the totality of each 
Situation 
Formulate hypotheses and 
then test them that is, move 
from theory to data. 
Develop ideas through 
induction from data 
Preferred methods 
Comprise 
Operationalizing concepts 
so that they can be 
measured 
Using multiple methods to 
establish different views of 
phenomena 
Taking large samples that is 
the necessity to take samples 
of sufficient size in order to 
generalize conclusions. 
Small samples investigated 
in depth or over time, due to 
less concern of need to 
generalize 
Source: Adapted from Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2008 
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The primary objective of this study is to investigate the relationship between capital structure, 
performance and replacement of CEO in firms listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange 
between the periods 1990-2012. Literature has been used to inform the study, and the study is set 
to test pre-existing theory relied upon quantitative data, to discover and understand the 
relationships among the three concepts, performance, capital structure and change of CEO. 
Therefore, this study adopted a positivist position to address the research problem and research 
objectives. 
 
4.2 Study hypotheses 
In order to investigate the relationship between capital structure, performance and replacement of 
CEO in firms listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange, the following five hypotheses have been 
stipulated: 
The first hypotheses test the influence of performance on leverage 
H01: Firm performance does not have a significant effect on leverage, and alternative  
H11: Firm performance has a significant effect on leverage. 
 
The second hypotheses test the influence of leverage on performance  
 H02: Leverage does not have a significant effect on firm performance; the alternative hypothesis 
being: 
H12: Leverage has a significant effect on firm performance. 
The third hypotheses test the effect of performance on change of CEO 
 H03: Firm performance does not have a significant effect on Change of CEO 
H13:  Firm performance has significant effect on Change of CEO. 
The fourth hypothesis test the effect of leverage on change of CEO 
H04: Leverage does not have a significant effect on change of CEO. 
H14:  Leverage has significant effect on change of CEO. 
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The fifth hypotheses test the combined effect of leverage and performance on change of 
CEO 
H05: Leverage and performance has a significant effect on Change of CEO 
H15:  Leverage and performance do not have significant effect on Change of CEO. 
4.3 Research design 
 
Using data in an emerging economy, Kenya, this study established the relationship among three 
variables namely, capital structure, performance and CEO turnover. This qualified this study to 
be a correlation (observational) study, which is extended to cause and effect. It is a confirmatory 
research, to test a-priori hypotheses (Creswell, 2012). 
 
Correlational research was used todiscover or establish the existence of a relationship among 
variables in this study; that is, between performance, capital structure and change in CEO. The 
results of correlation research have implications for decision making within businesses; however, 
the limitation of correlation research is the interpretation of causal relationships. Observational 
study provides information on what is happening in the real world (Rosenbaum, 2009). In 
confirmatory studies, hypotheses are usually derived from theories, and then the predictions 
about the outcomes are made before the measurement phase began. The result of corroborative 
research is more meaningful in the sense that it is impossible to claim that a certain result is 
statistically significant or universal unless it is. 
4.4 Population of the study 
 
The population of this study consists of all firms listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE) 
during the period 1990 to 2012. The 2013 data is excluded because at the time the data was 
collected, some of the firms delayed releasing their annual reports. As on 31
st
 December 2012, 
sixty one (61) firms were listed on the NSE (see appendix 1). Using panel data the study was to 
employ approximately 1403 (61x23years) CEO years. 
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NSE listed companies are established firms with ‗elaborate‘ corporate governance procedures, 
with audited annual report that contained information useful in addressing the objective of this 
study. The choice of the period 1990 to 2012 is as a result of data availability, taking into 
account unit of analysis, as a benchmark, in similar studies elsewhere. In Australia, Nielsen and 
Nielsen, (2013) sampling 146 Swiss listed firms collected data from company annual reports and 
Web sites on an annual basis for the period 2001–2008; in The Netherlands Glunk and Heijltjes, 
(2003) studied 60 firms over an 11-year period; in China, though there is no indication of 
population size, Firth, Fung and Rui (2006) cover a five-year period from 1998 to 2002. In the 
US based capital structure and performance study, Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) 
employed a sub-sample of 695 banks.  
4.5 Sampling and sample design 
 
Though all firms listed on the NSE will be included, sample issues arose. The basic sample 
should enable identification of firms that exhibit the following characteristics over the period of 
the study: level of performance at both accounting and stock market levels; change in top 
management and level of borrowing. Such firms must have disclosed the amount of debt and 
information on top management in their financial statements for the period of the study.  
Purposive sampling is used, and out of the sixty one firms listed on the NSE, firms classified as 
financial institutions are left out, leaving44 firms that translate into 1012 (44x23) possible CEO 
years, but this  depended on availability of data. The next section is on the data required to 
address research objectives. The data included measures (indicators) of performance and capital 
structure and change in CEO. 
4.6 Data collection 
The study relied on secondary data (see Appendices 2 and 3 for data collection instruments). The 
data, specifically market and accounting data required in this study were obtained from the 
annual reports, copies of which are obtainable through the individual firms, and share price 
listing found at theNSE and Capital Markets Authority (CMA). Thedata was collectedover the 
period 1990 to 2012.  
79 
 
Due to lack of depth and thinness of Kenya Capital Market, there were data limitations, that is, 
issue of sufficient data required to carry a credible study of this level. Therefore, this study 
employed panel data; that is, instead of a firm being a unit of observation, each firm (or CEO) 
year during the sample became an observation as in Faleye, Hoitash and Hoitash (2011). As an 
example, firm X, with 23 years annual variable provides twenty three observation points and not 
the expected one observation. Panel data is also known as longitudinal or cross sectional time-
series data. It is a data set in which the behaviors of organizations are observed across time. The 
advantage of panel data is that they capture the trend in the study variables in each firm and 
across firms, and that it is a better way to study the timing of changes in CEO. 
Secondary data have their problems, and it is naive to assume that they are free from errors and 
flaws (Maxwell, 1996). The main concerns to a researcher relying on secondary data are data 
validity problems, reliability issues, trustworthiness of data and information, and data source 
bias. Validity concerns must be addressed because it raises questions on legitimacy of the 
conclusions that are drawn from data (Trochim, 2006; Maxwell, 1996). Researchers can only 
defend the use of secondary data when the definitions of a situation by the original data collector 
match or coincide with that of the theoretical definition of the secondary data user.  
 
Construct validity seeks agreement between concepts expressed by the researcher (constructs) 
and specific measuring devices or procedures adopted by the researcher. Constructvalidity is 
identification of data variables that if manipulated will correctly capture the concepts of 
performance, capital structure and change in CEO. This was attained through literature search 
(chapters 2 and 3) and adopting standard definitions of performance, capital structure and change 
in CEO in authoritative studies. This approach took care of content validity concerns. 
The comfort in extracting information from annual reports is that they are subjected to an audit 
by reputable audit firms while the comfort in using market data is that such data is on public 
domain and is subjected to public scrutiny. An audit lends credibility to information contained in 
annual reports. However, where returns per share are to be calculated, there will be a need to 
adjust share prices for dividends and share splits.  
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However, trading activity in some share was too low; that is, some shares traded even once a 
year and lacking in terms of validity constructs in the sense that they were inactive and therefore, 
did not capture firm performance. This was handled by using a number of performance measures 
and using canonical correlation to select the appropriate indicators. Finally, the data was 
subjected to cleaning procedure to identify errors; however, outliers were deliberately retained 
because the statistical techniques allowed for non-normal distribution. The three major variables 
of this study are performance, change in CEO and capital structure (leverage).  Note that the term 
leverage, capital structure, debt capital and debt ratio is used interchangeably.  
4.6.1 Firm performance 
Competing measures of performance were identified and canonical correlation used to select 
measures of performance used in a further analysis. At a different level, the sample contained 
firms with superior performance (base year) immediately preceding a year of extreme poor 
performance (distress year), such that the sample consisted of poorly and not poorly performing 
firms; this enabled disaggregation of firms into performers and non-performers.   
Including firms with poor performance and debt capital in their capital structure, then 
determining whether there were significant changes in CEO in such a sample enabled the study 
to establish the effect of debt capital on both CEOs changes and performance. By including all 
non-financial firms listed on the NSE over the period under the study, such as biases were 
eliminated. However, there was needed for control firms as in Faleye, Hoitash and Hoitash 
(2011), in which case the sample should include even firms that performed well but experience 
change/or no change in management. In addition, performance should be analysed in terms of 
factors within the control and those not within the control of CEO. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that Boards of directors fail entirely to filter exogenous shocks to firm performance 
from their CEO replacement decisions (Jenter &Kanaan, 2008). The filtering can be done by 
benchmarking firm performance against market performance and by including all listed firms. 
4.6.2 Change in chief executive officer (CEO) 
CEO turnover is defined differently by researchers. Coates and Kraakman (2010:2) explored the 
relationships between CEO tenure and three modes of CEO turnover that they describe as ―deal,‖ 
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or external turnover triggered by a friendly acquisition of the firm, ―fired,‖ or forced internal 
turnover initiated by the board, and ―retire,‖ or all other forms of internal turnover. There is a 
difference between ‗internal‘ CEO turnover that is driven by boards of directors, and ‗external‘ 
turnover (Kaplan &Minton, 2008). Allgood and Farrell (2003) focus non-deal-related turnover 
and ignore deal-related turnover while Fisman, Khurana, and Rhodes (2010) describe and 
classify CEO departures as ―forced‖ or ―voluntary,‖ based on CEO age and assume that 
departures of CEOs below 60 are forced. Change in CEO can also arise when a company is 
delisted (Kaplan & Minton 2008). 
Faleye, Hoitash and Hoitash (2011:166)stated that ‗While we painstakingly strive to identify 
turnovers correctly, we recognize the difficulties involved deciphering the intentions of relevant 
parties when CEO leaves office. Therefore, we estimate an additional regression for all CEO 
turnovers as a robustness check‘. In this study, we recognize difficulties involved in decoding 
CEOs and include all CEO changes.  
4.6.3 Capital structure 
The originality in this study is the reliance on capital structure theoretical framework to assess 
the effect of debt capital, along with performance on the replacement of CEO as a corporate 
governance mechanism in firms listed on the NSE during 1990-2012. This enables us to assess 
the strength of corporate governance in these and whether there is a need to augment 
shareholder's power. Fisman, Khurana, and Rhodes (2010:1 - 2) report that Facebook, LinkedIn, 
and Group put up initial public offerings (IPOs) with dual class share structures with super-
voting shares retained by insiders and also introduced a new class of nonvoting shares, which are 
close to debt capital whose holders do not carry voting rights. 
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Figure 4.1 Data and Analysis Structure (Unit, Characteristics and Distinctions) 
(Source: Author) 
The way in which the units are spread over the characteristics can be presented in a cross 
tabulation as in Table 4.2 that highlights the level of dispersion. 
UNITS OF ANALYSIS - ORGARNIZATIONS 
(LISTED FIRMS on the NSE) 
 
CHARACTERESTICS OF UNITS 
       CEO PERFORMANCE CAPITAL 
STRUCTURE 
DISTINCTIONS: 
 ∆of CEO 
 No ∆of CEO 
  
 No ∆ of CEO 
 
DISTINCTIONS: 
 POOR 
 AVERAGE 
 GOOD 
  
 GOOD 
DISTINCTIONS: 
 LOW 
 AVERAGE 
 HIGH 
GENERATE HYPOTHESIS TO DETERMINE THE LEVEL OF 
INTERACTIONS OF THE DISTINCTIONS. 
OTHER CHARACTERESTICS 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
COLLECT DATA 
Subject the data to statistical analyses using the following 
techniques (methods): 
1. Canonical correlation 
2. General  linear model (GLM) 
3. Generalized estimating equation (GEE) 
 
Results of The Analysis 
Summary of Findings Conclusion, Areas for 
Further Research 
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Table 4.2: Cross tabulation of the change in CEO and predictor variables (Performance 
and Capital Structure) 
 
 PERFORMANCE CAPITAL STRUCTURE TOTAL 
 POOR AVERAGE GOOD HIGH AVERAGE LOW  
∆ IN CEO        
NO ∆ IN CEO        
 Where:   ∆CEO=CHANGE IN CEO.  
(Source: Author) 
 
Again, our interest is on the relationship between performance and capital structure and whether 
the performance and capital structure impact on a third variable, CEO. The variables of the study 
and specific measures (indicators) of performance, leverage and change in CEO are presented in 
the next section. 
4.7 Operationalisation and measurements of variables of the study 
4.7.1 Measurers of firm performance 
This section explains the measures of firm performance indicators used for this study. Similar 
studies use annual stock returns and accounting returns to differentiate poorly performing firms 
from those with good returns (Faleye, Hoitash & Hoitash, 2011; Whitaker, 1999; Lai 
&Sudarsanam, 1997; Ofek, 1993; Wruck 1990; Gilson, John & Lang, 1990). Their choice of 
performance indicators is informed by the objective that firms exist to benefit owners, and this 
might justify the choice market price as a superior measure of firm performance. However, the 
studies use accounting and stock return as a measure of firm performance (Jung, Wong& Zhang, 
2014; Faleye, Hoitash & Hoitash, 2011;Keating,Fischer&Gordon, 2005). Annual reports are 
vehicles useful in monitoring and controlling the actions of board of directors and managers.  
 
Financial distress as a situation where cash flow is insufficient to cover current financial 
obligations such as the amount payable to employees, rent in arrears, and interest in arrears was 
operationalised in terms of accounting or cash flow measures of performance.Accounting 
indicators that can be used in a study such as this one includes; return on equity (ROE), return on 
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assets (ROA), earnings per share (EPS), and operating cash flow per share (OCFPS), asset 
turnover ratio (AssTurn); growth sales (GrSales), earnings before interest and tax (EBIT), 
dividend payout ratios (DPR), and dividend omissions (DOR). These variables assist in 
identification of the cutoff point between firms with poor and those with good performance; that 
is, will be used to group firms; and enable standardization of these measures relative to the 
market. The summaries of performance variables in this study are: 
 
i. Return on total assets (ROA) – this is the operating profit after depreciation plus interest income 
and dividend income in relation to total assets.  
ii. Earnings before tax and interest to total assets (EBtTA) - It measures the true productivity of the 
firm‘s assets, independent of any tax or leverage factors. 
iii. Return on the market value of equity (RPS) – this is the market assessment of the firm from 
investor‘s perspective. 
iv. Return on book value of equity (ROE) - this compares earnings after tax available to equity 
shareholders to equity shareholders‘ investment in the firm. 
v. Book value to the market value ratio (BVtMV) this is also the market assessment of the firm 
from investor‘s perspective relative to a share's book value. 
vii. Growth in sales (GrSales) – this is the change in sales between conservative years.It gives to 
investors an idea of which direction a company is headed for in terms of generating revenue and 
cash. 
vii. Asset turnover ratio (AssTurn) - the asset turnover ratio evaluates how well a company is 
utilizing its assets to produce revenue. 
4.7.2 Capital structure variables 
Capital structure variable captured lender's investment in the firm relative to that of shareholders. 
The capital structure reflects how the capital invested among the assets of the firm, short and 
long term, is packaged between lenders and owners. This affects risk sharing between 
shareholders and debt holders; and subsequent sharing of earnings generated from the firm‘s 
assets. The capital structure variables to choose from include the ratio of debt to equity; debt to 
total capital (equity plus debt); current ratio; quick ratio; interest coverage ratio; fixed charge's 
coverage ratio; cash fixed charges coverage ratio; long-term debt to the total debt ratio; the total 
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debt to the total asset ratio, public debt to the total debt ratio; private debt to the total debt ratio. 
However, in this study the following debt ratios were used: 
i. Interest covers ratio(InCovR)- The interest coverage ratio is calculated by dividing a 
company's earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) by the company's interest 
expenses for the same period, and is calculated as follows: Interest coverage ratio = 
EBIT / Interest expenses. 
ii. Long-term debt to the equity market value ratio (LtD/EQMV) - This book value of 
long-term debt divided by market value of equity indicates the extent to which the 
amount contributed by debt holders is protected by the amount contributed by 
shareholders at market value. 
iii. Long-term debt to the equity book value ratio (LtD/EQBV) -This is the book estimate 
of the debt ratio, obtained by dividing the book value of debt by the book values of 
equity plus the book value of debt. 
iv. Total debt to the total asset ratio (TDtTA) – this is a leverage ratio that defines the 
total amount of debt relative to assets. It allows for the comparisons of leverage to be 
made across different firms. A higher the degree of leverage signifies the financial 
risk. This is a broad ratio that includes long-term and short-term debt (borrowings 
maturing within one year), as well as all assets – tangible and intangible. 
v. Equity book value to the total debt ratio (EQBVtTD) - This is a financial ratio 
indicating the relative proportion of shareholder‘s at book value and debt (short and 
long-term debt used to finance a company's assets. Closely related to leveraging, the 
ratio is also known as risk or gearing at equity book value. 
vi. Equity market value to the total debt ratio (EQMVtTD) - This is a financial ratio 
indicating the relative proportion of shareholder‘sinvestment atmarket value and debt 
(short and long-term debt used to finance a company's assets. Closely related to 
leveraging, the ratio is also known as risk, gearing at equity market value. 
4.7.3 Variable change in CEO 
There is a change in CEO when a new CEO takes over. This is categorical variable that capture, 
both change and no change over the period of the study. 
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4.7.4 Control variables 
Board size is the number of board members expressed in log form. The variable that captures 
CEO duality, where the CEO chairs board meetings, is a categorical variable. Board composition 
variable is the ratio between independent and all directors. The other control variables are the 
firm size which is the log of market value of equity; and industry which is a categorical variable. 
The other variables that influence change in CEO and therefore, handled as control variables are 
ownership structure and ownership type. In this study given the nature of data and that panel data 
will be employed, the only control variable used is ownership structure to capture concentrated 
and dispersed ownership (Morck, 2007). 
 
Caixe and Krauter (2013) asserted that the accumulation of shares by the controller(s) can affect 
corporate performance due to both the alignment (or incentive) effect and the entrenchment 
effect. The presence of large shareholders enhances the effectiveness of management monitoring. 
However, very high levels of ownership concentration allow controllers to dominate the 
corporation's decision-making process, which could result in the expropriation of wealth from 
minority shareholders. 
4.7.5 Classification of variables 
Two sets of variables, dependent and independent variables were employed in this study. 
Independent variable has been potential to influence the dependent variable. Performance can be 
a dependent variable, such that poor performance requires a response. The response (independent 
variable) might include asset restructuring i.e. selling and investing in assets; scaling down the 
level of operations; employee layoff; debt restructuring and changing top 
management(Panicker& Manimala, 2011: 3 - 4). 
 
The responses are independent variables because they are assumed to be having an influencing 
effect on the dependent variable. In this study, depending upon the hypothesis being examined, 
the dependent variables will be performance when the impact of debt capital on performance is 
being examined; debt capital when the impact of performance on debt capital is being examined; 
change of CEO, when debt capital and performance are considered as influencing change in 
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CEO. In the bi-directional analysis of the relationship between capital structure and performance, 
the variables are both dependent and independent. 
4.8 Methods of analysis 
4.8.1 Introduction 
In the first and second hypothesis, canonical correlation is used to test the bi-directional 
relationship between capital structure and performance; and to select appropriate indicators of 
performance and capital structure indicators for use in subsequent hypothesis tests. After 
selecting the indicators, general linear model (GLM) and Generalised estimating equations 
(GEE) were used to test the hypotheses. To the researcher‘s knowledge, canonical correlation, 
GLM and GEE, model has not been used to address capital structure issues in emerging 
economies despite their conceptual appeal. 
4.8.2 Canonical correlation 
Canonical Correlation was used to determine whether capital structure and performance are 
independent of one another. Studies on capital structure reviewed in chapters 2 and 3 are 
inconclusive due to their empirical shortcomings:  ‗Empirically, these theories have experienced 
both successes and challenges. Each view succeeds in explaining a number of broad patterns in 
ascertained capital structure. However, neither view has succeeded in explaining much of the 
observed heterogeneity in capital structures, leverage changes, nor security issuance decisions‘ 
(Graham & Leary, 2011). Graham and Leary(2011) add that in some instances, the problem lies 
not in the models themselves, but in our empirical measures of leverage and proxies for firm 
characteristics (such as performance indicators), or biased estimates of model parameters, and 
recommends that richer features of financial contracts should be considered. 
 
In determining the relationship between performance and leverage (capital structure), this study 
identified latent relationships by building composites of variables rather than the individual 
variables using competing indicators of capital structure and performance. This was to determine 
whether capital structure and performance are independent of one another. The logic of 
composite variables is that investors when evaluating firms to make investment decisions 
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examine both income and balance sheet ratios and not just a single ratio. At the same time, 
investors rely on a battery of performance indicators that include accounting and market 
performance indicators. The relevant equations are: 
Performancei = αi + βiCapitalStructurei + Ɛi…………………………………Equation 4.1 
Where: 
α is a constant; β is the coefficient generated by regression and Ɛ is the error term,  and the 
reverse equation is: 
Capital Structurei = αi + βiPerformancei + Ɛi…………Equation……………………. 4.2 
Again, α is a constant; β is the coefficient generated by regression and Ɛ is the error term 
 
Since the interest in this study is to compute the (simultaneous) relationship between five 
measures of performance with five measures of capital structure, canonical correlation was the 
appropriate method of analysis. Canonical correlation isa procedure for assessing the relationship 
between variables (Huang, Lee & Hsiao, 2009; Wolfgang & Samir, 2007). Canonical correlation 
allowed us to investigate the relationship between two sets of variables. Canonical correlation is 
appropriate for it allows for the assessment of the relationship between metric independent 
variables and multiple dependent measures (Tacq, 1997). 
 
The importance of and sense in the canonical correlation analysis is derived from the regression 
analysis. In multiple regressions, there is only one dependent variable, and a set of independent 
variables; in the case of canonical correlation, there is an entire set of dependent and independent 
variables. Therefore, canonical correlation is an attempt to find a linear combination between 
dependent and independent variables in such a way that the two are maximally correlated.  
 
The seven performance indicators were: book value to the market value ratio (BtM), earnings 
before tax and interest to total assets (EBtTA), return on total assets (ROTA); return on book 
value of equity (ROE), return on the market value of equity or return per share (RPS); growth in 
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sales (GrSales), return on equity (ROE return), and the asset turnover ratio (AssTurn). The six 
capital structure indicators were: interest covers - times (InCovR), long-term debt to the equity 
market value ratio (LtD/EQMV), long-term debt to the equity book value ratio (LtD/EQBV), the 
total debt to the total asset ratio (TDtTA); equity book value to the total debt ratio (EQBVtTD), 
and equity market value to the total debt ratio (EQMVtTD).are as presented in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3: Summary of variables used canonical correlation analysis 
Capital Structure Variables: Measurement Level Variable Type 
Interest Cover Ratio (InCovR) Continuous (Times) Independent /Dependent Variable 
Long term debt to equity market value ratio 
(LtD/EQMV) 
Continuous (Times) Independent/Dependent Variable 
Long term debt to equity book value ratio (LtD/EQBV) Continuous (Times) Independent Variable/Dependent 
Total debt to total assets ratio (TDtTA) Continuous (Times) Independent Variable/Dependent 
Equity book value to total debt ratio (EQBVtTD) Continuous (Times) Independent Variable/Dependent 
Equity market value to total debt ratio (EQMVtTD) Continuous (Times) Independent Variable/Dependent 
Performance Variables:   
Book value to market value ratio (BtM) Continuous (Times) Independent/Dependent Variable 
Earnings before tax and interest to total assets  (EBtTA) Continuous (Times) Independent/Dependent Variable 
Return on Total Assets  (ROTA) Continuous (Times) Independent /Dependent Variable 
Return on Book Value of Equity (ROE) Continuous (Times) Independent/ Dependent Variable 
Return on Market Value of Equity (RPS) Continuous (Times). Independent/Dependent Variable 
Growth in Sales (GrSales) Continuous (Times) Independent/Dependent Variable 
Asset turnover ratio (AssTurn) Continuous (Times) Independent/Dependent Variable 
(Source: Author) 
The two theoretical concepts, performance and capital structure are the canonical variables. The 
correlation between the two is known as canonical correlation. The first canonical variable 
performance is measured by p = seven (7) indicators, from book value to the market value ratio 
to the asset turnover ratio, and we consider performance* a linear combination of these seven 
variables. The idea is to build a composite performance index consisting of seven performance 
indicators. In comparable mode, capital structure* which is the second canonical variable, is also 
a linear combination of q = six (6) indicators, interest cover – times to total debt to the total asset 
ratio. (See the Figure 4.2). 
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ρ is the canonical correlation 
Figure 4.2: Casual canonical correlation - Capital structure and performance variables 
(Source: Author) 
 
The set of two variables too are each presented by a linear combination in the form: 
Capital Structure* = α1InCovR + α2LtD/EQMV + α3LtD/EQBV +α4TDtTA + α5EQBVtTD + 
α6EQMVtTD and Performance* = β1BtM +β2EBtTA +β3ROA + β4ROE + β5RPS + β6GrSales + 
β7AssTurn.……………………………………………………….Equation……………………. 4.3 
The two linear combinations (canonical variables) Capital Structure* and Performance* are 
unknown that is, the question of causality remain an open one, it can be performance influencing 
capital structure or capital structure influencing performance or both (bidirectional relationship). 
The parameters, α and β or weights are generated through correlation analysis. Canonical 
correlation analysis chooses weights in such a way that the canonical correlation (ρ) is maximal 
(Tacq, 1997). Based on canonical weights, we interpreted the association between capital 
structure and performance. The correlation between the primary variables and canonical 
variables (structure correlations) often offers better possibilities for interpretation (Hair, 
Capital 
structure* 
 
Performance
*
 
Book to Market Value (BtM) 
Earnings before tax and interest 
to total assets (EBtTA) 
Return on Total Assets (ROA) 
Return on Equity (ROE) 
Return per Share (RPS) 
Interest Cover Ratio (InCovR) 
Long term debt to equity market 
value ratio (LtD/EQMV) 
Long term debt to equity book 
value ratio (LtD/EQBV) 
Total debt to total assets ratio 
(TDtTA) 
Equity book value to total debt 
ratio (EQBVtTD) 
Equity Market Value to Total Debt (EQMVtTD) 
 
Growth in Sales (GrSales) 
Asset turnover ratio (AssTurn) 
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Anderson, Tatham & Black, 2010). Of interest and important to the researcher is that the 
structure correlations help in determination of which of the primary variables contribute most to 
original canonical variables. 
In order to confirm the association between capital structure and performance various canonical 
correlation statistics were computed and interpreted. The statistics interpreted were: level of 
significance, magnitude of the canonical correlation of the relationship between capital structure 
and performance, and the redundancy measure of shared variance. In addition, there was a need 
to interpret the canonical variate, canonical weights (standardised coefficients), canonical 
loadings (structure correlations), and canonical cross-loadings to support a holistic and credible 
conclusion (Wolfgang & Léopold, 2007). By default, statistical packages such as statistical 
analysis system (SAS) and STATA test all the canonical dimensions together, listing four 
multivariate test statistics and their significance levels. In this study, SAS was used to generate 
Pearson and canonical correlation coefficients. 
 
Our null hypothesis was that the two sets of variables describing capital structure and 
performance are not related, i.e. the canonical correlation is not different from zero (0). The 
outputs of canonical correlation analysis include: 
 
 Canonical correlation's coefficients (raw correlations or canonical variates) – these are 
Pearson's correlations of the pairs of canonical variates for capital structure and 
performance variables. These tell us the dimensions that set of variables of performance, 
and capital structure has in common. These are always nonnegative. The number of 
canonical dimensions is equal to the number of variables in the smaller set; in our case 
capital structure, have fewer variables (six) while performance has seven variables; 
therefore, the result is six canonical dimensions (Shore, 2005). 
 
 Adjusted canonical correlations - are asymptotically less biased than the raw correlations 
and can be negative. The adjusted canonical correlations might not be computable, and 
they are displayed as missing values if two canonical correlations are nearly equal or if 
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some are close to zero. A missing value is shown if an adjusted canonical correlation is 
larger than a previous adjusted canonical correlation. (Shore, 2005, Lawley, 1959). 
 The approximate standard errors of the canonical correlations (Shore, 2005). 
 Eigen values of INV (E)*H, which are equal to CanRsq/ (1 CanRsq), where CanRsq is 
the corresponding squared canonical correlation. Additionally, to be displayed for each 
eigen value is the difference from the next eigen value, the proportion of the sum of the 
eigen values, and the cumulative proportion (Shore, 2005). 
 Likelihood Ratio - this confirms the hypothesis that the current canonical correlation and 
all smaller ones are zero in the population. The likelihood ratio for all canonical 
correlations equals Wilks‘ lambda (Shore, 2005). 
 Approx. F statistic is based on Rao‘s approximation to the distribution of the likelihood 
ratio (Shore, 2005; Rao, 1973). 
 Num DF and Den DF (numerator and denominator degrees of freedom) and Pr 
(probability level) associated with the statistic (Shore, 2005). 
 Multivariate statistics, also known as multivariate tests, are tests for the null hypothesis 
that all canonical correlations are zero in the population: 
- Wilks‘ lambda; 
-  Pillai‘s trace; 
-  Hotelling-Lawley trace; 
                     -       Roy‘s greatest root;  
 and for each multivariate statistic, the following statistics are displayed:  
- approximation or upper bound  
- Num DF, the numerator degrees of freedom 
                       -  Den DF, the denominator degrees of freedom  
                       - , the probability level  
 Raw (unstandardised) and standardised canonical coefficients normalized to give 
canonical variables with unit variance.  
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 Four canonical structure matrices, giving correlations between the canonical variables 
and the original variables 
 The canonical redundancy analysis that include raw (unstandardised) and standardised 
variance and cumulative proportion of the variance of each set of variables explained by 
their own canonical variables and explained by the opposite canonical variables (Shore, 
2005). 
4.8.3 Modeling performance, leverage and change in CEO 
The assertion in the statement of this study's problem was that debt capital is said to reduce 
agency costs or induce agency benefits, only if there are noticeable differences in performance 
across distinct levels of capital structure. Capital structure is relevant if the difference in capital 
structure is evidentcross different levels of performance. Therefore, managers would consider 
performance in managing debt levels and vice versa. 
Debt capital is an effective corporate governance mechanism if it has a noticeable effect on 
corporate performance and influence on change on CEO.As an example, if debt capital positively 
influences replacement of CEOs, then firms are advised to have debt as part of capital. To 
establish the role of debt to corporate governance, both performance variables and capital 
structure variables are subjected to group analysis. In group analysis, datais sorted by an 
observable variable and the mean values of the dependent variable in the resulting ranked groups 
are compared. The test power of group analysis is maximised when the two extreme groups each 
contained 27percent over the sample (Lys & Sabino, 1992).  
4.8.4 Variables - performance, leverage and change in CEO 
In modeling the relationship among performance, leverage and change in CEOs the indicators to 
be relied on are presented in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4: Summary of Variables for general linear model (GLM) and Generalised 
estimating equations (GEE). 
VARIABLE MEASUREMENT COMMENT 
Change In Top Management 
(∆CEO) 
Binary
1
  1=Yes; 0 = No Dependent
5
 Variable 
PERFORMANCE AND CAPITAL STRUCTUREMEASUREMENTS 
Book to Market Value (BtM) 
 
Continuous
2
; but converted into 
ordinal variable/ Categorical
3
 
Dependent
5
 Variable / 
Independent
6
 variable 
Asset turnover ratio (AssTurn) 
 
Continuous
2
; but converted into 
ordinal variable/ Categorical
3
 
Dependent
5
 Variable / 
Independent
6
 variable 
Total debt to total assets ratio 
(TDtTA) 
 
Continuous
2
; but converted into 
ordinal variable/ ‖ 
Categorical
3
 
Dependent
5
 Variable / 
Independent
6
 variable 
Control Factors 
Industry indicators (Ind) Nominal: 1=Agricultural; 2 
=Commercial;  
3 = Industrials 
Independent
6
 variable / 
Control
7
 variable 
Firm size (FSize) Ordinal. Log of Total Assets Independent
6
 variable/ 
Control
7
 variable 
Ownership Structure -state, 
legal persons (institutions), and 
domestic individuals 
Ordinal. Percentage Independent
6
 variable/ 
Control
7
 variable 
Year Continuous
2
 Independent
6
 variable/ 
Control
7
 variable 
 
(Source: Author) 
Continuous2 variable is a variable that is not restricted to particular values (other than limited by 
the accuracy of the measuring instrument. 
 
Categorical3 Variable is usually an independent or predictor variable that contains values 
indicating membership in one of the several possible categories, for example, gender (male or 
female). The categories are often assigned numerical values used as labels, for instance, 0 = 
male; 1 = female; its synonym is nominal variable or a factor. 
 
Nominal
4
 is the synonym for categorical variable. 
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Dependent
5
 variable is the presumed effect in an experimental study. The values of the 
dependent variable depend upon another variable, the independent variable. Strictly speaking, 
―dependent variable‖ should not be used when writing about non experimental designs. 
 
Independent
6
 variable is the presumed cause in an experimental study. All other variables that 
may impact the dependent variable are controlled. The values of the independent variable are 
under experimenter control. 
 
Control7 variable is an extraneous variable that an investigator does not wish to examine in a 
study. Thus the investigator controls this variable. 
4.8.5 General linear model (GLM) 
The use of GLM and canonical correlation in examining the relationship between capital 
structure and performance is to make sure that the findings are independent of the model. 
General linear models (GLM) synthesis and extend familiar regression models such as the linear 
models (Taylor, 2011; Nelder & Wedderburn, 1972; McCullagh& Nelder, 1989). The GLM 
provides regression analysis and analysis of variance for one dependent variable by one or more 
factors and/or variables (Taylor, 2011; Norusis, 2004; Horton, 1978). The factor variables divide 
the population/sample into groups; and GLM is then used to test null hypotheses about the 
effects of other variables on the means of various groupings of a single dependent variable. 
At this stage of analysis, and in this model, the dependent variable which is either capital 
structure variable or performance variable, depending on hypothesis being tested, is a covariate; 
however, the independent variable that defined groups is a factor; that is, dichotomous, nominal, 
ordinal, or grouped interval. After grouping the variables into different categories, general linear 
model (GLM) is used to examine the bi-directional relationship between capital structure and 
performance. The GLM generated the coefficients for the following equations: 
Performancei = αi + βiCapitalStructurei+ βiControlVariablesi + Ɛi…Equation….4.4 
 
Capital Structurei = αi + βiPerformancei + βi ControlVariablesi + Ɛi…Equation…4.5 
α is a constant; β is the coefficient generated by GLM regression and Ɛ is the error term. 
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The control variables are presented in table 4.4. The GLM procedure provided both regression 
analysis and analysis of variance of categorised variables. The GLM procedure tested the null 
hypothesis about the effect of capital structure indicator and ownership structure on performance 
as captured by equation 4.3.  The GLM procedure tested the null hypothesis about the effect of 
performance and ownership structure on capital structure, again this is original to this study as 
captured in equation 4.4. 
To derive the factor's from the variable, groups were formed within each variable. From the 
indicator of capital structure, we had low, medium and high leverage; and for performance, we 
had poor, average and above-average or low medium and high turnover. Using this general linear 
model procedure, the null hypotheses were tested for the effects of grouped independent 
variables on a single dependent variable. With GLM, you can investigate interactions between 
factors as well as the effects of individual factors, some of which may be random. In addition, 
the effects of a covariate and covariate interactions with factors can be included. For regression 
analysis, the independent (predictor) variables were specified as covariate. 
The output of GLM univariate procedure includes (Taylor, 2011; Norusis, 2004; Horton, 1978):  
 Descriptive statistics for each combination of factors in the model; test of homogeneity of 
the variances that tests the null hypothesis that the variance of the error term is constant 
across the cells defined by the combination of factor levels;  
 Post Hoc Tests, which is the tests of between-subjects effects, help you to determine the 
significance of a factor. Theydo not indicate how the levels of a factor differ, but show 
the differences in model-predicted means for each pair of factor levels;   
 Estimated marginal means specify the mean response for each factor adjusted for any 
other variables within the model and is useful for exploring the possible interaction effect 
between factors. There are also tests of between-subjects effects, that is, analysis of 
variance, such that each term in the model, plus the model as a whole is tested for its 
ability to account for variation in the dependent variable. 
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The statistics used to interpret tests of between-subjects effects were: p-value with a cut of value 
of 0.05; r – square and adjusted r- square; the partial eta squared statistic that reports the 
"practical" significance of each term; and the variation left to error. Larger values of partial eta 
squared indicate a greater amount of variation accounted for by the model term, to a maximum 
of 1. This is necessary given that individual terms, might be statistically significant, do not have 
great effect on the value of dependent variable (lack practical value). 
 
A general linear model (GLM) synthesises and extends familiar regression models to include 
grouped data(Elder & Wedderburn, 1972; McCullagh& Nelder, 1989). The three components in 
GLM: a random component, specifying the conditional distribution of the response 
variable;Yi(for the ith of n independently sampled observations); and the values of the 
explanatory variables in the model. In the initial formulation of GLMs, the distribution of Yi is a 
member of an exponential family, the Gaussian (normal), binomial, Poisson, gamma, or inverse-
Gaussian families of distributions. 
4.8.6 Generalised estimating equation (GEE) 
To quote Cui (2007:1) ‗the generalised estimating equation (GEE) approach is a widely used 
statistical method in the analysis of longitudinal data in clinical and epidemiological studies. It is 
an extension of the generalised linear model (GLM) method to correlated data such that valid 
standard errors of the parameter estimates can be drawn. Unlike the GLM method, which is 
based on the maximum likelihood theory for independent observations, the GEE method is based 
on the quasi likelihood theory, and no assumption is made about the distribution of response 
observations. ‗Based on the results of canonical analysis above and using dominating original 
variables, hypothesis three, four and five were examined further using GEE. 
The next stage was to examine the influence of performance and capital structure on change of 
CEO. In the statement of the problem, the thesis is that debt capital only becomes a relevant 
corporate governance mechanism if it has a noticeable effect on corporate governance, namely 
replacement of CEO‘s in poorly performing firms. This requires a close examination of changes 
of CEO to establish how much of the change is explained by poor performance and how much 
change is attributed to debt capital, as this provides evidence on strength or deficiency of both 
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performance and capital structure as corporate governance variables on the NSE. The resulting 
three hypotheses were: 
H03: Firm performance does not have a significant effect on Change of CEO 
H13:  Firm performance has a significant effect on Change of CEO. 
 
H04: Leverage does not have a significant effect on change of CEO. 
H14:  Leverage has a significant effect on change of CEO. 
 
H05: Leverage and performance not have a significant effect on Change of CEO 
H15:  Leverage and performance has a significant effect on Change of CEO. 
 
The hypotheses were operationalised into three equations: 
In equation form, the relationship is modeled as follows: 
∆CEOi = αi + βiPerformancei + βiCapitalStructurei + βiOwnership Structurei + 
Ɛi…………………………………………………………………………………..…Equation 4.6 
∆CEOi= Logit p = log (probability of Change in CEO)/1 – probability of Change in CEO)  
Whereα, β parameters to be estimated and Ɛ is the error term. 
∆CEOi = αi + βiPerformancei + βiCapitalStructurei+ βi(Performance X Capital Structure)i 
+βiControl Variablesi + Ɛi………………………………………………………...…Equation 4.7 
∆CEOi= Logit p = log (probability of Change in CEO)/1 – probability of Change in CEO)  
Whereα, β and Ɛ the error term, parameters are estimated using GEE. 
 
The GEE model takes the form of convergent causal structure because there are two causes 
(Sainani, 2010), performance and capital structure, along with a control variable, ownership 
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structure and one effect, change in CEO. The variable CEO is having two parts, change and no 
change in CEO. Generalised estimating equation (GEE) model, unlike OLS regression is 
appropriate at this stage of analysis because it allows for a binary dependent (response) variable; 
the dependent variable CEO is binary (coded 0 for no change in CEO or 1 for change in CEO).  
Where outcomes are binary, ‗It is inappropriate to model these outcomes using ordinary least-
squares regression because such outcomes are always discrete and in no way mimic the 
interval‐level the dependent variables which OLS analysis requires‘ (Sanders & Brynin, 
2003:15). Studies have employed logistic regression in studies where the dependent variable is 
binary; logistic regression is based on the impact of an increase in one variable on the probability 
that the outcome under analysis will occur that is, it predicts the probability of change rather than 
the amount of probable change (Sanders & Brynin, 2003:15). However, in this study logistic 
regression is inappropriate because we have repeated measures (panel data) for each firm in the 
sample. 
The use of panel data also referred to as repeated measurement simply multiple responses for 
each firm sampled. T as a variable is a factor in the analysis. Panel data is potentially correlated 
within cluster and require attention during the analysis. Under such circumstances generalised 
estimating equation (GEE) is considered appropriate in handling correlated data. The GEE 
procedure extends the generalised linear model to allow for analysis of repeated measurements 
or other correlated observations, such as clustered data. The GEE specifies how on average a 
response variable of a subject change with covariate and factors while allowing for the 
correlation between repeated measurements on the same subject over time (Hardin & Hilbe, 
2003; Diggle, Heagerty, Liang, & Zeger, 2002; Pan, 2001; McCullagh & Nelder 1989; Liang & 
Zeger, 1986). 
In GEE model, we have within subject variables and subject variables and therefore, repeated 
measures. The combination of values of the within-subject variables defines the ordering of 
measurements within subjects; thus, the combination of within-subject and subject variables 
uniquely defines each measurement. The output of GEE procedure depends on the statistical 
software used and the researcher‘s specifications as in Landau and Everrit (2003), but in this 
study, the selected outputs reported are: 
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 Model information 
The model information table summarizes research modeling selections, which is useful 
for making sure the procedure fit the model that you intended to generate. It shows a 
summary of the number of levels, number of subjects, and number of measurements per 
subject and correlation matrix dimension. 
 Correlated data summary  
The correlated data summary provides information concerning the repeated measures' 
specifications.  In the summary, the minimum and maximum number of measurements 
per subject equals the number of levels of the within-subject effect; this tells you there is 
complete information for each subject. It shows the correlation matrix dimensions, and 
the dimension of the correlation matrix should equal the product of the levels of the 
within-subject effects.  
 Categorical variable information 
This capture the dependent and independent variable at factor levels. The factor variables 
are covariates turned into factors. CEO is the dependent variable at two levels, change in 
CEO and no change in CEO. The factors are: categorised ownership structure, which 
consisted of shareholdings of 20percentto 50percent (associate), shareholdings of 51 
percent to 100 percent (subsidiary), and shareholdings below 20percent (trade 
investment). Next is categorised capital structure, which consisted of high leverage, 
medium leverage and low leverage. Last is categorized performance, which consisted of a 
negative, constant and positive or low medium or high. The factors and independent 
variables are presented in terms of the number of cases. 
 Goodness of fit 
The usual concept of the likelihood function does not apply to generalised estimating 
equations; thus, the usual goodness of fit statistics cannot be computed. Instead, these 
information criteria based on a generalization of the likelihood are computed. The Quasi-
likelihood Model Criterion (QIC) can be used to choose between two correlation 
101 
 
structures, given a set of model terms. The structure that obtains the smaller QIC is 
"better" according to this criterion. 
 Working correlation matrix 
This correlation matrix represents the within-subject dependencies. Its size is determined 
by the number of measurements and thus the combination of values of within-subject 
variables. You can specify one of the following structures: 
- Independent. Under this model repeated measurements are uncorrelated. 
- AR (1). Repeated measurements have a first-order autoregressive relationship. 
The correlation between any two elements is ρ for adjacent elements, ρ2 for 
elements that are separated by a third element, and so on; ρ is constrained so that 
–1< ρ <1.  
-  Exchangeable. This structure has homogenous correlations between elements. It 
is also known as a compound symmetry structure. 
- M-dependent. Consecutive measurements have a common correlation 
coefficient, pairs of measurements separated by a third have a common 
correlation coefficient, and so on, through pairs of measurements separated by 
m−1 other measurements. Measurements with greater separation are assumed to 
be uncorrelated. When choosing this structure, specify a value of m less than the 
order of the working correlation matrix. 
- Unstructured. This is a completely general correlation matrix. 
By default, the procedure will adjust the correlation estimates by the number of non-
redundant parameters. Removing this adjustment may be desirable if you want the 
estimates to be invariant to subject-level replication changes in the data.  However, in this 
study the Quasi-likelihood under Independence Model Criterion (QIC) is used to help 
choose between correlation structures, given a set of model terms (Gosho, 2014; Pan, 
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2001). The structure that obtains the smaller QIC is "better" according to this criterion 
and adopted in the study. The computation of the QICC assumes that the distribution, link 
function, and working correlation matrix specifications are all "correct" for the data set. 
 Parameter estimates 
The GEE generated parameter estimates that are useful in deriving a sense from the 
model. The focus of GEE method is the estimation of regression parameters that have a 
population average interpretation together with the correlation structures that are treated 
as a nuisance (Weiss 2005). The mean and variance of the response variable are specified 
by one of the distribution functions in the exponential family. The distribution functions 
were binomial, gamma, inverse gaussian, multinomial, negative binomial, normal, 
Poisson, and tweedy distribution's (Cui, 2007: 211). 
In this study, binomial distribution is assumed. Binomial distribution is appropriate only 
for variables that represent a binary response or number of events. From this, one can 
identify the link function and because the binomial distribution is adopted, the link 
function in this study is logit, f(x) =log(x / (1−x)). 
The estimates are the ordered log-odds (logit) regression coefficients. Standard 
interpretation of the ordered logit coefficient is that for a one-unit increase in the 
predictor, the response variable level is expected to change by its respective regression 
coefficient in the ordered log-odds scale, assuming that the other variables in the model 
are held constant. Interpretation of the ordered logit estimates is not dependent on the 
ancillary parameters. The ancillary parameters are used to differentiate the adjacent levels 
of the response variable. The odd's ratios of the predictors are calculated by 
exponentiation of the estimate.  
 Interpretation of model parameter estimates 
If we take into account the specific group variables used in this study, the parameter 
estimate is generated for the model below: 
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= 𝞓CEO= α + β1Shareholdings 20% to 50% + β2Shareholdings  
51% to 100% + β3Shareholdings below 20% + β4High Leverage   + β5Medium Leverage + 
β6Low Leverage + β7Above Average Performance + β8Average Performance + β9Below Average 
Performance + ε1……………………………………………………………………Equation 4.8 
Note: the default in GEE is to use the first level, for example, example, below average 
performance and low leverage as the reference group. However, you can reorder the levels using 
the re-level command; moreover, reference group will not appear in the generated model. 
The estimates are the ordered log-odds (logit) regression coefficients. Standard interpretation of 
the ordered logit coefficient is that for a one-unit increase in the predictor, the response variable 
level is expected to change by its respective regression coefficient in the ordered log-odds scale 
while the other variables in the model are held constant. Interpretation of the ordered logit 
estimates is not dependent on the ancillary parameters; the ancillary parameters are used to 
differentiate the adjacent levels of the response variable. The odds' ratios of the predictors are 
calculated by exponentiating the estimate and the interpretation are that, the change in the odds it 
represents the outcome (change in CEO) (multiplicatively) by increasing x (independent 
variable) by one unit. In summary: 
•  If = 0, the odds and probability are the same at all x levels (e =1)  
•  If > 0 , the odds and probability increase as x increases (e >1)  
•  If < 0 , the odds and probability decrease as x increases (e <1)  
 
GEE observation statistics 
The following statistics were requested and provided: 
 The estimates are the ordered log-odds (logit) regression coefficients, β and exp(ß) 
 Wald chi-square test statistic that tests the null hypothesis that the estimates reported, β 
and exp (ß) equals 0. 
g( ) log
1
 
   
  
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 The degrees of freedom for each of the tests of the coefficients will be provided. For each 
parameter estimated in the model, one DF is required, and the DF defines the Chi-Square 
distribution to test whether the individual regression coefficient is zero given the other 
variables are in the model. 
 Significance Levels - These are the p-values of the coefficients or the probabilities that, 
within a given model, the null hypothesis states that a particular predictor's regression 
coefficient is zero after taking into account other predictors in the model. They are based 
on the Wald test statistics of the predictors. The probability that a particular Wald test 
statistic is as extreme as or more so, than what has been observed under the null 
hypothesis is defined by the p-value, and we set our alpha level to 0.05. 
 The standard errors of the individual regression coefficients are used in the calculation of 
the Wald test statistic and the confidence interval of the regression coefficient. 
 The Confidence Interval (CI) for an individual regression coefficient given the other 
predictors is in the model. For a given predictor with a level of 95 percent confidence, 
that is, we are 95 percent confident that the "true" population regression coefficient lies in 
between the lower and upper limit of the interval. 
Overall, the tests are to determine whether some of the regression parameters are different from 
0, any parameter to a value of zero (0) have no information content.  
4.9 Chapter summary 
Literature has been used to inform the study, and the study set out to test pre-existing theory 
using a different data set, through the use of a hypothesis; it is to rely upon quantitative data, to 
discover and understand the role of debt capital and how debt capital levels are set on the NSE. 
In addition large data is available. Therefore, in terms of research philosophy, this study adopts a 
positivist position to address the research problem and research objectives. This chapter 
explained the research philosophy, approach, design and methods used to address the research 
problem and research objectives. It explained how the bi-directional relationship between capital 
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structure and performance was examined and reported; and the extent to which poor performance 
and capital structure influence change in CEO was established.  
 
A total of five (5) hypotheses are tested using a sample of firms listed on the NSE. The 
appropriate research design to discover or establish the existence of or confirm a relationship 
between performance, capital structure and change in CEO, is correlation design. The 
population, and therefore, unit of analysis will be 61 firms listed on the NSE, over the period 
1990 to 2012. The 2013 data is excluded because some of this firms delay releasing their annual 
reports. However, using purposive sampling, financial institutions due to their unique capital 
structure are dropped, and this leaves a sample of 44 firms. The study used panel data, such that 
each company appeared 23 times, leaving 44 firms that translate into expected 1012 (44x23) 
possible CEO years, depending on availability of data. 
 
The practical circumstances and the logical output of literature review in chapters two and three 
favors the use secondary data collected from audited reports of the firm in the sample and from 
the official records of the NSE. Construct validity is attained through literature search and 
adopting standard definitions of performance, capital structure and change in CEO in 
authoritative studies. This approach takes care of content validity concerns. 
 
In this study, the following capital structure indicators used are interest cover ratio, long-term 
debt to equity market value, long-term debt to equity book value, long-term debt to equity 
market value, equity book value to total debt, and equity market value to total debt; while the 
performance indicators used are return on total assets, earnings before tax and interest to total 
assets, return on the market value of equity, return on book value of equity, book value to market 
value ratio, growth in sales, and the asset turnover ratio. Data on these variables are to be 
collected for the period 1990 to 2012. 
The data collected was subjected to statistical analyses using the following three techniques 
(methods): canonical correlation; general linear model (GLM); and generalised estimating 
equation (GEE). In testing the bi-directional relationship between capital structure and 
performance, the interest is to compute the (simultaneous) relationship between seven measures 
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of performance with six measures of capital structure; canonical correlation would be the 
appropriate method of analysis. Canonical correlation allowed us to investigate the relationship 
between two sets of variables. However, canonical correlation analysis is only informative to the 
extent that it informs us that there is a correlation between performance and capital structure; and 
just like ordinary least regression (OLS), will not enable us to establish whether the effect of 
capital structure on performance matter between different capital choices or whether the effect of 
performance on capital structure matter across different performance levels. To examine whether 
the effect of performance on capital structure or capital structure on performance matter across 
the different performance levels general linear model (GLM) is employed. 
The findings are presented in the next three chapters: chapters 5 are results of canonical 
correlation analysis from bi-directional relationship between capital structure and performance; 
and the selection of capital structure variables and performance variables. The selected variables 
wereused for further analysis in chapter 6 and chapter 7. Chapters 6 presented the results of bi-
directional relationship between capital structure and performance; and chapter 7 is the result of 
the model used to predict the change in CEO if performance and capital structure as predictor 
variables. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
CANONICAL CORRELATION BETWEEN CAPITAL 
STRUCTURE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter examined the relationship between capital structure and performance. It tested the 
extent to which capital structure might contribute to corporate governance and enhance 
performance and the extent to which performance influence usage of debt capital by firms. 
Alternative indicators of both capital structure and performance exist within the literature, but it 
is important that the choice of performance and capital structure indicators is not arbitrarily 
chosen. Studies that build a relationship between capital structure, and performance should 
justify their choice of performance and capital structure indicators (Michel, Oded& Shaked, 
2014; Atkinson, Kaplan, Matsumura & Young, 2007; Kaplan, 1994). Similar studies do not 
come out clear why they prefer the return on assets and not return per share as a performance 
indicator, or long-term debt to equity and not long-term debt to total assets as a measure of 
capital structure (Abad & Abu Rub, 2012; Abu Rub, 2012; Azhagaiah and Gavoury, 2011; 
Ebaid, 2009; Margaritis & Psillak, 2010; Carvalho, de Mesquit & Lara, 2003). An aspect of the 
originality in this study is that the choice of capital structure and performance indicators using 
canonical correlation, because it is the first study, the researcher is aware that the choice of 
performance and capital structure indicator is based on the strength in which that indicator 
explains the opposite indicator. 
 
This chapter identified best indicators of performance and capital structure from a list of 
substitute indicators and proceeds to use the identified indicators to explore the bidirectional 
relationship between performance and capital structure. The data set cover 23 years, for each 
company, from 1990 to 2012, for the 37 firms listed on the NSE. It employed canonical 
correlation analysis to simultaneously predict multiple dependent variables from multiple 
independent variables because canonical correlation is technique available for examining 
relationships with multiple dependent variables (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 
108 
 
2010).Canonical correlationhelped in answering the following question: How are the best linear 
combinations of capital structure variables related to the best linear combinations of the 
performance variables? Which are the best indicators, from original variables, of performance 
and capital structure? The answers to these questions help select relevant indicators that best 
describe the relationship between capital structure and performance from a list of competing 
indicators. The canonical correlation reconnoiters the relationship between capital structure and 
performance, before subjecting the data to additional analysis.  
 
The hypotheses tested in this chapter are: 
H01: Firm performance does not have a significant effect on leverage, and alternative  
H11: Firm performance has a significant effect on leverage; 
and, 
H02: Leverage does not have a significant effect on firm performance; the alternative hypothesis 
being: 
H12: Leverage has a significant effect on firm performance. 
 
Chapter five is organized as follows: In section 5.2, the description of the data and variables used 
to extract canonical correlations and identify competing capital structure and performance 
indicators are presented; in section 5.3, the measures of central tendency for capital structure and 
performance variables are presented; in section 5.4, Pearson's correlation coefficients for capital 
structure measures and performance are presented; in section 5.5, the canonical correlation 
analysis are presented; in section 5.6, raw canonical coefficients for the capital structure 
measurements are presented; in section 5.7, the standardised canonical coefficients for the capital 
structure measurements are presented; in section 5.8, standardized  coefficient for performance 
measurements are presented; in section 5.9, the canonical loading are presented; in section 5.10 
the correlations between the capital structure measurements and the canonical variables of the 
performance measurements are presented; in section 5.11, the correlations between the 
performance measurements and the canonical variables of the capital structure measurements are 
presented; in section 5.12, the results of canonical redundancy analysis are presented; in section 
5.13, the validation and diagnosis of findings are presented; in section 5.14, the discussion of 
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findings are presented; in section 5.15, the theoretical and practical significance of the findings 
are presented; and section 5.16 is the summary of the chapter. 
5.2 Performance and capital structure indicators 
The data used throughout this analysis covered a period of 23 years for each company, unless the 
company was listed after 1990 or suspended in some periods. Assuming data is available for all 
firms the expected total observations or cases are 851 that is, (23 years times 37 firms). However, 
not all firms were listed in 1990; furthermore, some firms were suspended and the suspension 
either lifted or the firm is delisted, all these results into missing data. In some cases final 
accounts of some firms were not available. The analysis of each firm and year is conditional 
upon the availability of the data. In summary, the number of observations read was 851, number 
of observations used was 708 and the number of observations with missing values was 143. 
The potential performance indicators to choose were: book value to market value ratio, earnings 
before tax and interest to total asset ratio, return on total asset ratio, return on book value of 
equity, return on the market value of equity, growth in sales and asset turnover ratio. The of 
capital structure indicators to choose were: interest covers ratio, long-term debt to equity market 
value, long-term debt to equity book value, total debt to total assets, equity book value to total 
debt, and equity market value to the total debt ratio. 
Since the alternative capital structure measures and alternative performance measures appear to 
measure the same thing one may wonder which ratio is preferable and the argument is that 
‗actually, each is acceptable. This chapter probed alternative capital structure and performance 
indicators by subjecting the alternative capital structure measures and alternative performance 
measures to canonical correlation analysis. At the end of this analysis one or two performance 
and capital structure indicators are identified for use in a further analysis in chapter six (6) and 
chapter seven (7). 
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5.3 Measures of central tendency – Capital structure and  performance 
variables 
 
The measures of central tendency of capital structure and performance variables are presented 
inTable 5.1. A central tendency is a typical value for a probability distribution. It is referred to as 
an average or just the center of the distribution, while the dispersion is contrasted with location 
or central tendency, and together the mean and standard deviation are the most-used properties of 
distributions. Operationally, the central tendency of a data set is the average value of a data set, 
as defined by the arithmetic mean, median, and mode. 
Table 5.1: Measures of central tendency for Capital Structure and Performance Variables 
   
Variable Name 
Variable 
Label 
Mean Std 
Dev 
Min Max 
Capital Structure Indicators:      
Interest Cover Ratio InCovR 6.41 11.67 -35.05 86.73 
Long Term Debt to Equity Market Value LtD/EQMV 0.38 1.3 0 17.16 
Long Term Debt to Equity Book Value LtD/EQBV 0.25 0.81 -5.56 11.22 
Total Debt to Total Assets TDtTA 0.41 0.26 0 2.04 
Equity Book Value to Total Debt EQBVtTD 2.91 4.08 -0.22 32.11 
Equity Market Value to Total Debt EQMVtTD 4.45 7.94 0 88.52 
Performance Indicators:      
Book value to market value Ratio BtM 1.7 3.17 -1.69 42.89 
Earnings Before Tax and Interest to Total 
Assets 
EBtTA 0.1 0.14 -0.66 0.86 
Return on Total Assets ROTA 0.13 0.42 -6.51 5.71 
Return on Book Value of Equity ROE 0.08 0.43 -4.29 2.8 
Return on Market Value of Equity RPS 0.39 1.28 -0.98 16.84 
Growth in Sales GrSales 0.16 0.55 -0.89 11.38 
Asset turnover ratio  AssTurn 1.12 0.92 0 10.19 
(Source: Author) 
For capital structure, the variables with the highest variation are the interest cover ratios 
(InCovR) with standard deviation of 11.67 a minimum cover of -35.05 and a maximum cover of 
86.73. Equity book value to total debt (EQBVtTP) has a mean of 2.91 and standard deviation of 
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4.08 a minimum of -0.22 and a maximum of 32.11. Equity market value to total debt 
(EQMVtTP) has a mean of 4.45; a maximum of 0.00 and a maximum 88.52. The other aspect of 
capital structure is the ratio of total debt to total asset (TDtTA) with a mean 0.42. This implies 
that on average 42 percent of assets are financed using borrowed funds, and the rest is financed 
using equity. In this study, the calculation of total debt to the total asset ratio (TDtTA) includes 
both long-term debt and short-term debt as a measure of level of borrowing. The rest of capital 
structure measure showed less variability that is, standard deviation less than 1. This suggests an 
amount of uniformity in usage of debt by sampled firms. 
The performance measures with a standard deviation of more than one (1) are book value to the 
market value ratio (BTM). The average of BTM ratio is 1.70 indicating that over 23 years that 
the study covered, market values were less than book values on average and that the market did 
not grow, despite the market return per share  (RPS) boasting an average return of 39 percent. 
When a company like Safaricom issued its shares, immediately after the issue, the share prices 
declined from Shs. 5 to Shs. 2 and for a long time, the price was below both the issue price and 
the book value. The low book value to the market value ratio is an indicator of corporate 
governance limitations in this market. The other performance measures show a standard 
deviation of less than one but return per share (RPS) has a standard deviation of 1.28 of 
variations in market share prices.  Some performance's indicators show unusual statistics. The 
maximum return per share is 16.83 percent while there is one firm with a return on assets of 570 
percent and another with a loss of 651 percent. There are some cases in some years when firms 
show negative capital. However, the few extreme cases (outliers) are smoothed as a result of the 
large data set. The low standard deviation confirms this, and it appears that there are much fewer 
variations in these values. 
5.4 Pearson correlation coefficients - capital structure measures and 
performance measures 
 
The correlation coefficient tests the existence of a linear relationship between two variables 
measured on the same subject. When two variables are of a continuous nature, the measure of 
association most often used is Pearson‘s correlation coefficient. The association may be 
expressed through a number (the correlation coefficient) that range from –1 to +1. The 
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population correlation is in the form of a Greek letter rho(r), and the sample statistic (correlation 
coefficient) is r, while a t-test is utilized to determine if the correlation coefficient is ―strong‖ or 
―significant‖ or not.  
5.4.1 Pearson correlation coefficients for capital structure variables 
The outputs of Pearson correlation coefficients (r) for alternative indicators of capital structure 
are presented in Table 5.2. The total numbers of cases used for this analysis are 708. For 
example, the correlation between interest cover ratio (InCovR)  and total debt to total asset 
(TDtTA)  is -0.163, or r = -0.163. The number under each correlation is a p-value that tests to see 
if r is statistically significant. In statistical terminology, this is a test of the following hypotheses: 
 H0: rho = 0 (the null hypothesis) and Ha: rho≠ 0 (the alternative hypothesis). If the p-value for 
the test is small (usually less than 0.05), then the conclusion is that rho is not 0, thus the 
relationship is statistically significant. In the case of the correlation between interest cover ratio 
(InCovR) and total debt to total asset (TDtTA) the p-value is <.0001, the conclusion is that rho is 
not 0, thus the relationship is statistically significant; the interpretation is that as more debt is 
employed the interest cover ratio declines. It is recommended that a professional judgment is 
made to determine if the association is significant in terms of the experiment performed. 
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Table 5.2: Pearson corrélation coefficients - Capital structure variables 
 
Test of hypothesis: Prob> |r| under H0: Rho=0 
  InCovR LtD_EQMV LtD_EQBV TDtTA EQBVtTD EQMVtTD 
InCovR 1      
p-value       
LtD_EQMV -0.067 1     
p-value 0.0767      
LtD_EQBV -0.076 0.359 1    
p-value 0.042 <0.0001     
TDtTA -0.163 0.326 0.255 1   
p-value <.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001    
EQBVtTD 0.014 -0.164 -0.177 -0.590 1  
p-value 0.7065 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001   
EQMVtTD 0.048 -0.151 -0.132 -0.400 0.535 1 
p-value 0.201 <0.0001 <0.0004 <0.0001 <0.0001  
In italics are P- values, level of significance. (N = 708) 
(Source: Author) 
 
The results presented in Table 5.2, show fewer larger within set correlations between capital 
structure variables. The correlation between long term debts to equity book value ratio 
(LtD_EQBV) and long-term debt to equity market value (LtD_EQMV) is 0.326 and statistically 
significant. The correlation between long-term debt to equity market value ratio (LtD_EQMV) 
and long-term debt to equity book value (LtD_EQBV) is 0.359 and statistically significant. The 
correlation between the equity book value to total debt (EQBVtTD) and total debt to the total 
asset ratio (TDtTA) is -0.590 and statistically significant. Overall, the correlations between most 
of capital structure variables are below 40 percent and statistically not significant.  The meaning 
of this is that knowing the values in one of the capital structure measures might not tell much 
about the other alternative capital structure measures. Therefore, at this stage, the safe 
observation is that one can use each capital structure variable independent of the other. 
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5.4.2 Pearson correlation coefficients for performance variables 
The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients between each pair of performance 
variables are as presented in Table 5.3. The results indicate that there are fewer larger within set's 
correlations between performance measurement variables. 
Table 5.3: Pearson corrélation coefficients- Performance variables 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 
Number of Observations 708 
  BtM EBtTA ROTA_ ROE RPS GrSales AssTurn 
BtM 1       
p-value        
EBtTA -0.1953 1      
p-value <0.0001       
ROTA_ -0.069 0.533 1     
p-value 0.0681 <0.0001      
ROE -0.231 0.379 0.158 1    
p-value <.0001 <.0001 <0.0001     
RPS 0.178 0.041 0.061 0.200 1   
p-value <0.0001 0.2808 0.1041 <0.0001    
GrSales 0.032 0.081 0.070 0.075 0.050 1  
p-value 0.3951 0.0307 0.0621 0.046 0.1838   
AssTurn -0.073 0.067 -0.006 -0.044 0.014 -0.036 1 
p-value 0.0531 0.0757 0.8824 0.2383 0.7045 0.3426  
In italics are P- values, level of significance. For the pairs with the p-values that are smaller 
than 0.01 there is sufficient evidence that at alpha=0.01 the correlation are not zero 
(Source: Author) 
The correlation between earnings before total tax to total assets (EBtTA) and book value to the 
market value ratio (BtM)is negative and significantly different from zero (-0.195; p-
value=0.0001), therefore, as earnings before tax to total assets increase the book value to the 
market value ratio decreases. The correlation between EBtTA and return on total assets (ROTA) 
(0.533) is positive and statistically significant; therefore, the two variables seem to tell a common 
story. ROE and EBtTA are also positively correlated. The correlation between return on equity 
(ROE) and book value to the market value ratio (BTM) is 0.238 and that of earnings before tax 
to total asset ratios to ROE is 0.3786. The correlation between the book value to market value 
ratio (BTM) and asset turnover ratio is not different from zero  (-0.073, p-value=0.05), 
suggesting variation in information in these two variables. 
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5.4.3 Pearson correlation coefficients for performance and capital structure 
variables 
The correlations between capital structure variables and performance variables are presented in 
form of a matrix in Table 5.4; it is a matrix that presents performance measurements in columns 
and capital structure variables in rows. This highlights the correlation between all combinations 
of variables in different groups. Because we have seven performance variables and six capital 
structure variables, the matrix is 6 multiply by7, resulting into forty two (42) such correlations 
exist. 
The correlations between these variables are moderate for a few variables. The data show that for 
the variables, the correlation between performance variables and capital structure variables is 
low.  The highest correlation is between the asset turnover ratio as an indicator of performance 
and total debt to total asset as an indicator of capital structure, (r=0.4401).The correlation 
between long-term debt to equity market value (LtD_EQMV) and book value to the market value 
(BtM) ratio is 0.3597; and between long-term debt to equity market value (LtD_EQMV) ratio 
and earnings before interest and tax to the total asset ratio   (EBtTA) are -0.187.  
Table 5.4: Pearson Correlation Coefficients between Capital Structure Variables and 
thePerformance Variables 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients  
Prob> |r| under H0: Rho=0  
Number of Observations 708 
  BtM EBtTA ROT
A_ 
ROE RPS GrSales AssTurn 
InCovR -0.0646 0.3529* 0.0931 0.2079 0.0973 0.0719 0.0268 
LtD_EQMV 0.3597* -0.187 -0.0601 -0.0749 0.2014 0.017 -0.0173 
LtD_EQBV -0.0179 -0.2229* -0.1995 -0.1363 0.0429 -0.0428 -0.0388 
TDtTA -0.0398 -0.1905 0.0543 -0.0735* 0.0246 -0.007 0.4401* 
EQBVtTD -0.0075* 0.1118 -0.0001 0.0244 -0.0254 0.0026 -0.3106* 
EQMVtTD -0.188 0.2923* 0.0672 -0.007 -0.0867 0.003 -0.1115 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
(Source: Author) 
The correlation between interest cover ratio (InCovR) and earnings before interest and tax to the 
total asset ratio   (EBtTA) ratio is 0.3529. If we stop the analysis at this point, then it appears that 
good proxies to use to relate the capital structure to performance are total debt to total asset 
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ratio(capital structure) and asset turnover ratio (performance). Next in line is long-term debt to 
the equity market value ratio (as measure of capital structure) versus book value to the market 
value ratio (as measure of performance), and last is the interest cover ratio (as a measure of 
capital structure) versus earnings before interest and tax to the total asset ratio (EBtTA)as a 
measure of performance.  
5.5 Canonical correlation analysis 
It was mentioned in chapters two, three and four that there are competing measures of 
performance and capital structure but researchers, do not come out clear on their choice of 
measures used in building the relationship between capital structure and performance. In 
addition, a good number of studies avoided using more than one dependent variable in 
determining the relationship between capital structure and performance even when it was 
necessary (Lemma & Manga, 2011; Abor&Biekpe, 2009; Abor &Biekpe, 2005; Chen, 2004; Al-
Saran, 2001); in this study by building simultaneous relationships between various indicators of 
both capital structure and performance, canonical correlation help overcomes such limitation by 
allowing for multiple dependent variables. 
 
The canonical correlation is a technique for analysing the relationship between two sets of 
variables, with each set containing more than one variable. Canonical correlation is a variation of 
multiple regressions and correlation analysis in that canonical correlation simultaneously predicts 
multiple dependent variables from multiple independent variables (Wrench, 2013; Tack, 1997; 
Cooley &Lines, 1971). In this study, canonical correlation was used to explain the nature of 
whatever relationships exist between the sets of dependent (capital structure) and independent 
(performance) variables, generally by measuring the relative contribution of each variable to the 
canonical functions (relationships) extracted. At this stage of analysis, the critical assumption is 
that researcher has little a-prior knowledge about relationships among the sets of variables. The 
canonical correlation as a statistical tool was developed to handle multiple dependent variables 
by Hotelling (1935, 1936). The application of canonical correlation in research is found in 
Garson (2014), Wolfgangand Léopold (2007), Cooley and Lohnes (1971), and Mardia, 
Kent&Bibby (1979), and the theoretical underpinnings are in Kshirsagar (1972). 
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The canonical correlation analysis as a statistical tool was used to determine the extent to which 
a set of the capital structure indicators was related through a set of performance indicators 
(Garson, 2014; Wolfgang& Léopold, 2007; Afifi, Clark & May, 2004; Tacq, 1997). There were 
six capital structure indicators and seven performance indicators employed to generate canonical 
correlation coefficients. 
5.5.1 Canonical correlations – capital structure and performance 
Canonical correlation captures canonical dimensions of the study variables, and the analysis 
generated coefficients to the following model: 
 
Capital Structure* = α1InCovR + α2LtD/EQMV + α3LtD/EQBV +α4TDtTA + α5EQBVtTD + 
α6EQMVtTD………………………………………………………………………Equation 5.1, 
and,  
Performance* = β1BtM +β2EBtTA +β3ROA + β4ROE + β5RPS + β6GrSales + 
β7AssTurn…………………………………………………………………………….Equation 5.2 
The coefficients α and β are generated through the canonical correlation analysis. 
Where: 
For capital structure variables: InCovR is the interest cover ratio; LtD/EQMV is long-term debt 
to the equity market value ratio; LtD/EQBV is long-term debt to the equity book value ratio; 
TDtTA is total debt to total asset ratio; EQBVtTD is the equity book value to the total debt ratio; 
and EQMVtTD is the equity market value to total debt; for performance variables: BtM is the 
book to market value; EBtTA is earnings before tax and interest to total assets; ROA is the return 
on total assets; ROE is return on equity; RPS is the return per share; GrSales is growth in sales; 
and AssTurn is the asset turnover ratio. 
The canonical correlations from capital structure and performance indicators are presented in 
Table 5.5. The first canonical variates and their correlation are the sample canonical 
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correlationcoefficient for the first pair of canonical variates.  The residuals are then analysed to 
find a second pair of canonical variates whose weights are chosen to maximise the correlation 
between second pair of canonical variates, using only the variance remaining after the variance 
due to the first pair of canonical variates has been removed from the original variables.  This 
continues until a "significance" cutoff is reached or the maximum number of pairs (which equals 
the smaller of m and p, in this case six (6), the number of capital structure variables) is reached 
(Wuensch, 2013). 
 
Canonical correlation is Pearson's correlations of the pairs of canonical variates. The number of 
canonical dimensions is equal to the number of variables in the smaller set; in our case, capital 
structure has fewer variables (six) against performance seven variables; therefore, the result is six 
canonical dimensions.  Presented in Table 5.5 are eigen value of INV(E)*H, which are equal to 
CanRsq/(1 CanRsq), where CanRsq is the corresponding squared canonical correlation; and for 
each eigen value is the difference from the next eigen value, the proportion of the sum of the 
eigen values, and the cumulative proportion are computed. 
The first canonical correlation is the greatest possible multiple correlations with the classes that 
can be achieved using a linear combination of the quantitative variables of performance and 
capital structure. The first pair of variates, a linear combination of the capital structure 
measurements and a linear combination of the performance measurements, has a correlation 
coefficient of 0.583528, almost 60 percent; and this value represents the highest possible 
correlation between any linear combination of capital structure measurements and performance 
measurements.  This correlation is associated with a Wilks' Lambda of p<0.0001 and therefore, 
statistically significant. The second pair has a correlation coefficient of 0.5459910, the third pair 
0.395833, almost 40 percent, the fourth pair 0.182562, the fifth pair 0.142839 and the sixth 
pair0.063478.The first canonical correlation in this case, 0.583528are always of most interest, 
and normally thehighest value. 
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Table 5.5: Canonical Correlation Analysis – Capital Structure and Performance Variables 
  Canonical Adjusted Approxi
-    mate 
Squared Eigen values of Inv(E)*H Test of H0: The canonical correlations in the current r
ow and all that follow are zero 
Correlation Canonical Standard Canonical = CanRsq/(1-CanRsq) 
    Correlation Error Correlation Eigen-   
value 
Differe
nce 
Propor- 
tion 
Cumul
ative 
Likelihood Approxi- 
mate 
Num      
DF 
Den     D
F 
Pr > F 
        Ratio F Value 
1 0.583528 0.566502 0.0248 0.340504 0.5163 0.0916 0.4353 0.4353 0.368168 18.45 42 3263.3 <.0001 
2 0.545991 0.544825 0.0264 0.298106 0.4247 0.2389 0.3581 0.7933 0.558257 14.57 30 2786 <.0001 
3 0.395833 0.388425 0.03172 0.156684 0.1858 0.1513 0.1566 0.95 0.795359 8.26 20 2312.6 <.0001 
4 0.182562 . 0.03636 0.033329 0.0345 0.0137 0.0291 0.979 0.943133 3.44 12 1847 <.0001 
5 0.142839 . 0.03684 0.020403 0.0208 0.0168 0.0176 0.9966 0.97565 2.89 6 1398 0.008 
6 0.063478 . 0.03746 0.004029 0.004  0.0034 1 0.995971 1.42 2 700 0.243 
(Source: Author) 
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5.5.2 Adjusted canonical correlation 
Adjusted canonical correlations are asymptotically less biased than the raw correlations and 
may be negative (Lawley, 1959). The adjusted canonical correlations are presented in Table 
5.5. If an adjusted canonical correlation is close to zero, or if it is greater than the previous 
adjusted canonical correlation, as in the case of canonical correlation number 4, 5 and 6, then 
it is reported as missing. A missing value is also displayed if an adjusted canonical correlation 
is larger than a previous adjusted canonical correlation.  In this study, the first three adjusted 
canonical correlations appear to have information. 
5.5.3 Squared canonical correlation 
The squared canonical correlations are the proportion of the variance in the canonical variate 
of one set of variables (capital structure measurements) explained by the canonical variate of 
the other set of variables (performance measurements). The squared canonical correlations are 
presented in Table 5.5. Squared canonical correlation is squares of canonical correlation such 
that in the case of the first canonical correlations, the squared canonical correlation is 
(0.583528*0.583328) or 0.340504. 
5.5.4  Tests of overall information content of the six canonical correlation 
Multivariate tests evaluate the significance of canonical roots (Rao, 1973). To confirm the 
overall information content of the six canonical correlations, the null hypothesis is that the 
canonical correlations in the current row and all that follow are zero. The resulting statistics 
reported and interpreted are:Eigen value, Likelihood Ratio, Approximate F Value and Pr>F. 
In addition, the following multivariate statistics and F Approximations are reported: Wilks' 
Lambda, Pillai's Trace, Hotelling-Lawley Trace, and Roy's Greatest Root (see Table 5.6). 
5.5.5 Eigen values 
Eigen values referred to as canonical roots or squared canonical correlation coefficients 
provide an estimate of the amount of shared variance between the respective canonical 
variates of dependent and independent variables. Therefore, an Eigen value is the proportion 
of variance accounted for by the correlation between the respective canonical variates. Eigen 
values of E
-1
 H, is equal to ρ2/ (1-ρ2), and ρ2 are the corresponding squared canonical 
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correlation and are interpreted as the ratio of between-class variations to pooled within-class 
variation for the corresponding canonical variable are reported and presented in Table 5.5. 
The sizes of the eigen values are related to the tests of the correlations. The largest Eigen 
value is equal to (largest squared canonical correlation)/ (1-largest squared canonical 
correlation; that is, (0.340504)/ (1- 0.340504) = 0.5163 almost 52 percent. Largest Eigen 
values are associated with lower p-values; the interpretation is that large Eigen values are 
more likely to be different from zero. 
 
5.5.6 Likelihood ratio 
The likelihood ratio tests the hypothesis that the current canonical correlation, and all smaller 
ones are equal to zero in the population; these are reported and presented in Table 5.5. The 
likelihood ratio for the hypothesis that all canonical correlations equal zero is Wilks‘ lambda, 
and is calculated as the product of the values of (1-canonical correlation
2
).In this case  
(1 - 0.583528
2)
*(1- 0.545991
2
)*(1 - 0.395833
2
)* (1 - 0.182562
2
)*(1 - 0.1428392)* (1 - 
0.0634782) = 0.368168.  
The rests of the likelihood ratios are second, which is 0.55825737; the third is 0.79535899; 
the fourth is 0.94313251; the fifth is 0.97564981, and the sixth is. 0.99597055. The lower the 
canonical correlation (see the sixth) the higher the chance that it is zero. 
5.5.7 Approximate F – value 
The approximate F - value is associated with the various tests, such as likelihood ratio or one 
of the four multivariate tests; these are reported and presented in Table 5.5. The first 
approximate F value of 18.45 corresponds to the test that all six canonical correlations are 
zero, but since the p-vale is small (0.0001), you would reject the null hypothesis at the 0.05 
level. The second approximate F value of 14.57 corresponds to the test that both the second, 
and the third canonical correlations are zero; nevertheless, since the p-value is small (0.0001), 
the null hypothesis was rejected at the 0.05 level. 
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The interpretation of this statistic depends on test being taken, such that for the likelihood 
ratio tests, the F values are approximate. For Roy's Greatest Root, the F value is an upper 
bound. For the likelihood tests, the F values are testing the hypotheses that the given canonical 
correlation, and all smaller ones are equal to zero in the population. For the multivariate tests, 
the F values are testing the hypothesis that all three canonical correlations are equal to zero in 
the population.  
5.5.8 Pr>F 
The p-value reported and presented in Table5.5 is the significance value of the statistic that 
tested the acceptability of the model, in this case whether the canonical correlation might have 
information content or not. The null hypothesis that capital structure variables and 
performance variables are not linearly related is rejected if the p-value is less than the 
specified alpha which is narrowly 0.05. The p-values associated with the likelihood ratio test 
of the first second third fourth and fifth canonical correlation, suggests that we reject the 
hypothesis that they are zero, but the p-value associated the likelihood ratio test of the sixth 
canonical correlation on its own is 0.2434 (see Table5. 5) fail to reject the hypothesis that the 
sixth canonical correlation is zero. 
5.5.9 Multivariate statistics and F approximations 
Multivariate statistics presented in Table 5.6 are from the test that to establish whether the 
canonical correlation is zero; andwhether a linear relationship exists between performance and 
capital structure. While the six canonical correlations are presented in Table 5, the 
multivariate statistics are presented in Table 5.6. 
The first multivariate statistic presented in Table 5.6 is Wilks Lambda. It is the product of the 
values of (1- canonical correlation squared) or 0.368168 and is equal to the likelihood ratio 
(see Table 5.6). The F-value is 18.45 and P-value 0.0001, so we reject the null hypothesis that 
overall, the canonical correlations are zero. 
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Table 5.6: Multivariate Statistics and F Approximations – Capital Structure and 
Performance 
Multivariate Statistics and F Approximations 
S=6; M=0; N=346.5 
Statistic Value F Value Num DF Den DF Pr > F 
Wilks' Lambda 0.36816824 18.45 42 3263.3 <.0001 
Pillai's Trace 0.85305588 16.57 42 4200 <.0001 
Hotelling-Lawley Trace 1.18617427 19.59 42 2169 <.0001 
Roy's Greatest Root 0.51631048 51.63 7 700 <.0001 
NOTE: F Statistic for Roy's Greatest Root is an upper bound. 
(Source: Author) 
The second, Pillars trace is the sum of the squared of the six canonical correlations: 
 (0.583528
2)
 + (0.545991
2
) + (0.395833
2
) + (0.182562
2
) + (0.142839
2
) + (0.063478
2
) 
=0.853056.  
This multivariate statistic has an F value =16.5, p=0.0001 confirm that the canonical 
correlation are not zero.  
Hotelling-Lawley trace is similar to Pillar Trace and also tests whether the canonical 
correlations are zero. The last statistic in Table 5.6 is Roy‘s greatest root, and because it is 
based on maximum values, it reports the largest Eigen values. This statistic F-value of 51.63 
is the highest because it is based on maximum value, and p-value is 0.0001. Again, we reject 
the hypothesis that canonical correlations are zero. 
5.6 Raw canonical coefficients 
The raw correlation coefficient is the proportion of the canonical variates accounted for by a 
particular variable. The canonical correlations provided dimensions that performance and 
capital structure indicators had in common. The first canonical variate in one set of variables 
is the linear combination of those variables that has the highest multiple correlations among 
the variate in the other set. The raw canonical coefficients or weights are the linear weights 
used to produce the canonical variates from the raw scores; and inside canonical variates are 
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raw canonical coefficients(Garson, 2014; Wolfgang& Léopold, 2007; Afifi, Clark& May, 
2004). 
5.6.1 Raw canonical coefficients for the capital structure measurements 
The canonical variables are ―identified‖ from the original variables. The raw canonical 
correlations for the capital structure measurements with the original variables are presented in 
Table 5.7. In Table 5.7 the capital structure canonical variables are defined as: kCapital1, 
kCapital2, kCapital3, kCapital4, kCapital5 and kCapital6. 
 
The raw and standardised coefficients are used to create the canonical variates. These are 
provided for each pair of variates created, regardless of the correlation‘s size or statistical 
significance. The raw canonical coefficients define the linear relationship between capital 
structure variables and capital structure canonical variate. If we assume that the canonical 
variate is a response variable, then they can be interpreted the same way we interpret 
regression coefficients; that is, a one-unit increase in the total debt to the total asset ratio 
(TDTtA) leads to 3.8687516129 unit increase in the first variate, kCapital1, and a one unit in 
long-term debt to equity market value (LtD-EQMV) leads to -0.45545833 (have been 
suppressing effect) decrease in first variate that is, with other predictors held constant. 
 
Table 5.7: Raw Canonical Coefficients for the Capital Structure Measurements 
 
  kCapital1 kCapital2 kCapital3 kCapital4 kCapital5 kCapital6 
InCovR 0.0060622 -0.0378254 0.0529303 0.0348394 -0.0415082 0.0210368 
LtD_EQMV -0.4554583 0.3586378 0.4449917 0.2242054 0.3882595 0.0415637 
LtD_EQBV -0.1115936 -0.1556706 -0.9166719 0.8781786 -0.3530679 0.1225675 
TDtTA 3.8687516 0.7941498 0.4787701 0.0971854 0.2598198 3.1057248 
EQBVtTD -0.0359823 0.0377962 -0.0340007 -0.0819363 -0.0686235 0.3105754 
EQMVtTD 0.0400763 -0.0806187 -0.0000690 0.0399870 0.1125196 -0.0155947 
(Source: Author) 
In summary, the capital structure measurement coefficients for equation 5.1 used to calculate 
the first canonical correlation coefficients as presented in table 5.7 are as follows: 
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Capital Structure* = 0.0060622InCovR - 0.4554583LtD/EQMV- 0.1115936LtD/EQBV + 
3.8687516TDtTA- 0.0359823EQBVtTD + 0.0400763EQMVtTD …………..equation 5.3 
5.6.2    Raw canonical coefficients for the performance measurements 
The raw canonical coefficients for performance measurements variables are presented in Table 
5.8. The results in Table5.8indicated that a one-unit in the earnings before the tax to total 
assets (EBtTA) leads to -1.82911 changes in the first performance variate performance1, but 
one-unit   in asset turnover (AssTurn) leads to 0.862746474 increase in the first variate. 
Table 5.8: Raw Canonical Coefficients for the Performance Measurements 
 
  Performance1 Performance2 Performance3 Performance4 Performance5 Performance6 
BtM -0.155149 0.142737 0.197165 -0.050575 0.072815 -0.149584 
EBtTA -1.829111 -7.078360 3.151180 2.670612 2.532129 -2.430364 
ROTA_ 0.829710 0.915320 0.432744 -1.720172 0.714421 1.612171 
ROE -0.070157 0.476036 0.845153 -1.073417 -2.160849 -0.385655 
RPS -0.099650 0.061197 0.122737 0.586003 -0.056807 0.533085 
GrSales 0.065039 -0.016074 0.223551 0.092800 -0.129110 0.259217 
AssTurn 0.862746 0.317774 0.405455 0.267628 -0.000137 -0.348667 
(Source: Author) 
In summary, the coefficients for equation 5.2used to calculate the first canonical correlation 
coefficients as presented in table 5.8 are as follows: 
Performance* = - 0.155149BtM-1.829111EBtTA + 0.829710ROA - 0.070157ROE - 
0.099650RPS + 0. 065039GrSales + 0.862746AssTurn……………………….…Equation 5.4 
5.7 Standardisedcanonical coefficients for the capital structure measurements 
The raw canonical coefficients do not always have equal variance, are not measured in the 
same units and therefore, cannot be compared. The raw coefficients must be standardised to 
allow for a meaningful comparison and interpretation. Standardising raw coefficients require 
multiplying the raw coefficients with the standard deviation of the related variable(Hair, 
Anderson, Tatham & Black, 2010). The standardised canonical coefficients from the capital 
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structure measurements showing how one standard deviation increases in a capital structure 
indicator impacted on the capital structure variate are presented in Table 5.9. 
 
The canonical coefficients are interpreted in a manner analogous to the interpretation of 
standardised regression coefficients. As an example, for the variable equity market value to 
total debt (EQMVtTD), an increase of one standard deviation in this variable led to a 0.3182 
increase in the first capital structure variate. For the long-term debt to equity market value 
(LtD_EQMV) an increase of one standard deviation in this variable led to a decrease of -
0.5900) therefore, has a suppressing effect onfirst capital structure variate. 
 
Table 5.9: Standardised canonical coefficients for the capital structure measurements 
  kCapital1 kCapital2 kCapital3 kCapital4 kCapital5 kCapital6 
InCovR 0.0707 -0.4412 0.6175 0.4064 -0.4842 0.2454 
LtD_EQMV -0.5900 0.4645 0.5764 0.2904 0.5029 0.0538 
LtD_EQBV -0.0907 -0.1266 -0.7453 0.714 -0.287 0.0996 
TDtTA 1.0158 0.2085 0.1257 0.0255 0.0682 0.8155 
EQBVtTD -0.1468 0.1542 -0.1387 -0.3343 -0.28 1.2672 
EQMVtTD 0.3182 -0.6401 -0.0005 0.3175 0.8934 -0.1238 
(Source: Author) 
5.8 Standardised canonical coefficient for performance measurements 
The standardised canonical coefficients for performance measurements are presented in Table 
5.10. A one-unit  increase in one standard deviation in book value to market value would lead 
to a -0.4924 decrease in the first performance1 (see Table 5.10). However, a one-unit increase 
in one standard deviation in the asset turnover ratio would lead to a 0.7953increase in the first 
performance1. 
These canonical structure coefficients, measure the simple linear correlation between an 
original variable in the dependent or independent set and the set‘s canonical variate; and are 
interpreted as factor loading in assessing the relative contribution of each variable to each 
canonical function. 
 
127 
 
Table 5.10: Standardised Canonical Coefficients for the Performance Measurements 
  Performance1 Performance2 Performance3 Performance4 Performance5 Performance6 
BtM -0.4924 0.453 0.6257 -0.1605 0.2311 -0.4747 
EBtTA -0.2571 -0.9948 0.4429 0.3753 0.3559 -0.3416 
ROTA_ 0.352 0.3883 0.1836 -0.7298 0.3031 0.6839 
ROE -0.0302 0.2051 0.3641 -0.4624 -0.9309 -0.1661 
RPS -0.1272 0.0781 0.1567 0.748 -0.0725 0.6804 
GrSales 0.036 -0.0089 0.1237 0.0514 -0.0715 0.1435 
AssTurn 0.7953 0.2929 0.3738 0.2467 -0.0001 -0.3214 
(Source: Author) 
 
5.9 Canonical loading 
Canonical loading are correlations between the variables and their own variate as well as with 
the other variate. This sheds light on the structure of the coefficients. The two canonical 
loadings in this study are correlations between the capital structure measurements and their 
canonical variables and correlations between the performance measurements and their 
canonical variables. 
5.9.1 Correlation between capital structure measurements and their canonical 
variables 
The correlations between each capital structure variable and capital structure canonical variate 
was relied in deciding whether the variates are combining with the variables (indicators) in a 
way to represent a particular idea (See Table 5.11). The first variate for capital structure (K 
Capital 1) is highly positively correlated with the total debts to the total asset ratio (TDTtA) 
(0.748), but moderately negatively correlated with the equity book value to the total debt ratio 
(EQBVtTD)(-0.462). The correlation between long-term debt to equity market value 
(LtD_EQMV) and kCapital1 is -0.320 but uncorrelated or lowly correlated with other 
variables. Therefore, the first variate captures much of the shared variance between the total 
debt to the total asset ratio, equity book value to total debt ratio and long-term debt to equity 
market value. 
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Table 5.11: Correlations between the capital structure measurements and their 
canonical variables 
  kCapital1 kCapital2 kCapital3 kCapital4 kCapital5 kCapital6 
InCovR -0.036 -0.525 0.614 0.339 -0.468 0.113 
LtD_EQMV -0.320 0.588 0.331 0.535 0.366 0.150 
LtD_EQBV -0.065 0.184 -0.529 0.811 -0.120 0.100 
TDtTA 0.748 0.565 0.105 0.306 0.046 0.120 
EQBVtTD -0.462 -0.371 -0.167 -0.348 0.119 0.697 
EQMVtTD -0.062 -0.716 -0.084 0.010 0.655 0.218 
(Source: Author) 
Using correlation coefficients as a measure of relationship and in a sense effect, the 
correlation for the equity market value to debt (EQMVtTD)with the second capital structure 
variatewas -0.716;the correlation for long-term debt to equity market value (LtD_EQMV) 
with the second capital structure variate was 0.5880;and the correlation for the interest cover 
ratio (InCovR) with the second capital structure variatewas -0.525.It appears that when a 
composite index of measures of capital structure is constructed, the dominating variable is the 
total debt to the total asset ratio. Therefore, the variable used to predict firm performance was 
the total debt to the total asset ratio. 
5.9.2 Correlation between the performance measurements and their canonical 
variables 
The results presented in Table 5.12 show that asset turnover ratio (AssTurn) of 0.8102 and 
book value to the market value ratio (BtM) of-0.5386 is highly correlated with the first 
performance variate (Performance1). The correlation between return on total assets (ROTA) 
correlation with first variate is low (0.2343), yet a number of studies use this ratio as an 
indicator of performance. The correlation between the second variate with the book value to 
the market value ratio (BtM) is 0.5654; but its correlation with earnings before tax and interest 
and tax to total assets is -0.7765. It emerges that BtM is a strong performance indicator. The 
other variables are not correlated with the variate, and this is not surprising given that a 
number of these variables are lowly correlated. Therefore, asset turnover ratio and book value 
to the market value ratio are a useful ratio in predicting the capital structure. 
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Table 5.12: Correlations between the performance measurements and their canonical 
variables 
  Performance1 Performance2 Performance3 Performance4 Performance5 Performance6 
BtM -0.5386 0.5654 0.4469 0.0398 0.341 -0.2677 
EBtTA 0.0662 -0.7765 0.5978 -0.1065 0.1111 0.0707 
ROTA_ 0.2343 -0.1382 0.4505 -0.5438 0.3203 0.5616 
ROE -0.0159 -0.2130 0.4399 -0.2565 -0.8215 0.0833 
RPS -0.1964 0.1866 0.3811 0.6039 -0.1878 0.5935 
GrSales -0.0130 -0.0391 0.2144 0.0194 -0.0873 0.1816 
AssTurn 0.8102 0.1837 0.3385 0.3169 0.048 -0.3015 
(Source: Author) 
In summary, the results in Tables 5.10, 5.11 and 5.12 show that to build a meaningful 
relationship between firm performance and capital structure on the NSE researchers should 
employ the following variables; asset turnover ratio and book value to the market value ratio 
as indicators of performance and the total debt to the total asset as an indicator of capital 
structure. The choice of book value to market value is based on its suppressing effect and 
therefore, as a control variable. 
5.10 Correlations between the capital structure measurements and the 
canonical variables of the performance measurements 
 
The canonical cross‐loadings, an alternative to canonical loadings, is a procedure correlating 
each variable directly with the other canonical variate (Dillon &Goldstein, 1984).As an 
example, if performance variate is a response variable, then the capital structure indicators are 
the predictor variables or independent variables. The results from the correlations between 
each capital structure indicator and canonical variates of performance are presented in Table 
5.13. 
 
The first variate is always the most important; in this case, Performance1 is the initial variate. 
The highest correlation of 0.4365 is between that the total debt to the total asset ratio (TDtTA) 
and first performance variate (Performance1). The correlation betweenthe equity book value 
to total debt (EQBVtTD) and the first performance variate (Performance1) is -0.2695; while 
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the correlation between interest cover ratio (InCovR) and the first performance variate 
(Performance1) is -0.0209 and has a suppressing effect.  
 
Table 5.13: Correlations between the capital structure measurements and the 
canonical variables of the performance measurements 
 
Performance1 Performance2 Performance3 Performance4 Performance5 Performance6 
InCovR -0.0209 -0.2867 0.2428 0.0619 -0.0668 0.0072 
LtD_EQMV -0.1866 0.3208 0.1311 0.0977 0.0522 0.0095 
LtD_EQBV -0.0379 0.1006 -0.2092 0.1481 -0.0171 0.0063 
TDtTA 0.4365 0.3084 0.0414 0.0559 0.0066 0.0076 
EQBVtTD -0.2695 -0.2026 -0.0661 -0.0636 0.017 0.0442 
EQMVtTD -0.0362 -0.3907 -0.0333 0.0019 0.0936 0.0139 
(Source: Author) 
The correlation between long-term debt to equity book value (Ltd-EQBV) and first 
performance variate (Performance1) is-0.0379; and the correlation between the equity market 
value to total debt (EQMVtTD) and first performance variate (Performance1) of -0.0362 was 
almost uncorrelated to first performance variate.  
5.11 Correlations between the performance measurements and the 
 canonical variables of the capital structure measurements 
 
The correlations between the performance measurements and the canonical variables of the 
capital structure measurements allowed for identification of performance indicators that 
explained the amount of debt used by firms sampled. The correlations between each 
performance indicator and the opposite canonical variates of the capital structure required to 
identify performance indicators are as presented in Table 5.14. The highest reported 
correlation is between the asset turnover ratio(AssTurn) with the first capital structure 
covariate (kCapital1); that is, 0.4728; therefore, the appropriate indicator to predict usage of 
debt (capital structure) is the asset turnover ratio.  
 
The book value to the market value ratio has the highest correlation (0.3087) with second 
capital structure canonical variate. However,the correlation between the book value to the 
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market value ratio with the first capital structure covariate was -0.3143. The book value to the 
market value ratio suppressed the relationship between capital structure, and performance 
used as a control variable is to validate the findings. 
 
Table 5.14: Correlations between the performance measurements and the canonical 
variables of the capital structure measurements 
  kCapital1 kCapital2 kCapital3 kCapital4 kCapital5 kCapital6 
BtM -0.3143 0.3087 0.1769 0.0073 0.0487 -0.017 
EBtTA 0.0386 -0.424 0.2366 -0.0194 0.0159 0.0045 
ROTA_ 0.1367 -0.0754 0.1783 -0.0993 0.0458 0.0356 
ROE -0.0093 -0.1163 0.1741 -0.0468 -0.1173 0.0053 
RPS -0.1146 0.1019 0.1509 0.1103 -0.0268 0.0377 
GrSales -0.0076 -0.0214 0.0849 0.0035 -0.0125 0.0115 
AssTurn 0.4728 0.1003 0.134 0.0579 0.0069 -0.0191 
(Source: Author) 
In Table 5.11, the dominant capital structure indicator is the total debt to the total asset ratio 
because it has the highest correlation with first capital variate (0.748). Therefore, to establish 
the relationship between performance and capital structure; the relevant indicators are: the 
asset turnover ratio and the book value to the market value ratio as indicators of performance; 
and the  debt to the total asset ratio as an indicator of capital structure. 
5.12 Canonical redundancy analysis 
The canonical redundancy analysis results are presented in Table 5.15 and 5.16. Canonical 
redundancy measured how redundant one sets of variables are given the other set of variables 
(Stewart & Love, 1968). Redundancy analysis captured the percentage of variance accounted 
for from the two sets of variables, capital structure and performance. Therefore, canonical 
redundancy analysis was conducted to determine standardised variances of the dependent and 
independent variables that wereexplained by their own or the opposite canonical variate. Raw 
variances of capital structure measurement explained by their own canonical variables by their 
opposite (capital structure) variables are presented in Tables 5.15 and vice versa in Table 5.16. 
Redundancy analysis addressed the questions: How vigorously did the individual measured 
variables on capital structure relate to the variate of capital structure? How vigorously did the 
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individual measured variables on capital structure relate to the opposite variate (performance 
variate)? Identical questions are raised on performance variables. 
 
Table 5.15: Canonical Redundancy - Capital Structure Measurements 
Raw Variance of the Capital Structure  
Measurements Explained by 
Canonical 
Variable 
Their Own Canonical The Opposite 
Number Canonical Variables R-Square Canonical Variables 
  Proportion Cumulative   Proportion Cumulative 
 Proportion  Proportion 
1 0.0192 0.0192 0.3405 0.0065 0.0065 
2 0.3334 0.3525 0.2981 0.0994 0.1059 
3 0.2406 0.5932 0.1567 0.0377 0.1436 
4 0.0851 0.6783 0.0333 0.0028 0.1464 
5 0.2627 0.941 0.0204 0.0054 0.1518 
6 0.059 1 0.004 0.0002 0.152 
(Source: Author) 
 
Table 5.16:  Canonical Redundancy - Performance Measurements 
Raw Variance of the Performance Measurements 
 Explained by 
Canonical 
Variable 
Their Own Canonical The Opposite 
Number Canonical Variables R-Square Canonical Variables 
  Proportion Cumulative   Proportion Cumulative 
  Proportion   Proportion 
1 0.2683 0.2683 0.3405 0.0913 0.0913 
2 0.2514 0.5197 0.2981 0.075 0.1663 
3 0.1842 0.7039 0.1567 0.0289 0.1952 
4 0.0575 0.7614 0.0333 0.0019 0.1971 
5 0.104 0.8654 0.0204 0.0021 0.1992 
6 0.1088 0.9742 0.004 0.0004 0.1996 
(Source: Author) 
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Redundancy analysis showed how much of the average of proportion of variance among the 
variables of one set may be predicted from the variables from the other set. High redundancy 
suggests the ability of independent variable to predict the dependent variable. The first and the 
second canonical covariate for the group explained 1.92 percent and 33.34 percent 
respectively of variability in capital structure variables; while canonical covariate for the 
group explained0.065 percent and 0.994 percent of the opposite canonical variate (See Table 
5.15). The first and the second canonical variate explained 26.83 percent and 25.14 percent 
respectively of the variability in the performance variables (see Table 5.16).  
The degree to which the canonical variate of capital structure explained the variability in 
performance variables and the degree to which canonical variate of performance measure 
explained the variability in capital structure variables are reported Tables 5.15 and 5.16 
respectively. 
In the case of capital structure measurements, though the first canonical variate for the capital 
structure explained0.065 percent of the variability in performance measurements, the 
cumulative variability explained by all the six canonical variates was15.2 percent (see Table 
5.15).In case of performance measurements, though the first canonical variate explained 9.13 
percent of the variability in capital structure, thecumulative variability explained by all the six 
canonical variates was 19.96 percent. The data tell us that the degree of the influence of 
performance on capital structure is higher than the degree of influence of capital structure on 
performance.  
5.13 Validation and diagnosis of findings 
 
The last stage involved a validation of the canonical correlation analyses by splitting the 
sample into estimation and validation samples and the findings between the two samples; no 
varying result was found between the samples. The detailed analysis was therefore, not 
reported. The next step of validation was to use the average for each variable in each company 
in the canonical correlation analysis, and the results were not different from the ones reported 
throughout this chapter.  
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5.14 Discussion of findings 
The previous studies that investigated into the relationships between capital structure, and 
performance used OLS regression model as a statistical tool for analysis. However, OLS 
cannot handle multiple dependent variables. This study used canonical correlation analysis 
because of its in built capability in handling multiple dependent variables. The canonical 
correlation analysis was used to establish a bidirectional relationship between capital structure 
and performance; and to identify the relevant indicators of capital structure and performance. 
From the analysis, it appears that both capital structure and performance variables influence 
each other. Therefore, managers should consider their firms performance in determining the 
amount of debt to inject in the capital structure; and at the same time shareholder as residual 
owners should insist that debt capital is deployed in their firms because of the positive effect 
of debt capital on firm performance. 
The result of canonical analysis showed that the dominant capital structure indicator to be 
used in the subsequent analysis to predict performance is the total debt to the total asset ratio. 
In the case of performance, the two variables that relate to capital structure are book value to 
market value ratio and asset turnover ratio. Therefore, to examine the relationship between 
capital structure and performance, using regression analysis or its variant GEE or its variant 
GLM, we employed one measure of capital structure, the total debt to the total asset ratio, and 
two measures of performance namely asset turnover ratio and book value to market value (and 
ownership structure as a control variably and the model validity indicator). The book value to 
the market value ratio is used because of its suppressing contribution to first variate, its 
positive contribution to the second variates and because of its visibility. To calculate book 
value to the market value ratio, one needs book value and market value of a share, and the two 
statistics are readily available. 
The emergence of book value to market value ratio and asset turnover ratio as indicators of 
performance though surprising, is what the data used for this study tells us come top as 
contributing to a composite measure of performance; and is a challenge to studies that employ 
other indicators of performance such as return on assets (ROA). Intuitively the tentative 
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finding that market to book value is negatively correlated to amount of debt employed by the 
firm suggest that investors who think debt adds value to a firm might demand more shares of a 
firm that have just issued debt, there by pushing the market price of a share up while the book 
value remained unchanged. 
At this stage into this study, the data supported the hypothesis that efficient and profitable 
firms use more debt (Margaritis & Psilaki, 2010).  The hypothesis that capital structure 
influenced firm performance was marginally supported by the data; and this found support in 
the arguments advanced by Cheng and Tzeng (2011) and, Margaritis &Psillak (2007; 2010). 
5.15 Theoretical and practical implications of the findings 
In a number of studies, ROA and ROE are used as measures of performance to assess the 
relationship between performance and capital structure. The contribution to this study is that, 
by relying on the power of canonical correlation analysis method, the data employed identifies 
asset turnover ratio and book value to market values and not return on assets (ROA) or return 
on equity (ROE) as measures of performance to employ in studying the relationship between 
capital structure and performance and that the appropriate measure of usage of debt is the total 
debt to the total asset. It adds to the theory of choice of variables to employ in study of capital 
structure. The theory is that the choice of indicators of both capital structure and performance 
is contingent on the data employed and could vary from country to country. Furthermore, in 
terms of theory, it contributes to the debate on bi-directional relationship between capital 
structure and performance. However, the degree of the influence of performance on capital 
structure is more pronounced than the degree of influence of capital structure on performance 
tells us that firm performance is a critical variable in capital structure choices, yet the debt 
capital role in moderating manager‘s excesses as suggested in the literature.  
 
The analysis provides insights into the structure of the different variable sets (capital structure 
and performance) as they relate to dependence in relationship; this is of practical and 
conceptual significance and opening a window for further studies. Managers are informed that 
asset turnover ratio best relate positively to borrowing levels, and that performance and capital 
136 
 
structure are important concepts in managing firms. In addition, book value to market value 
has a suppressing effect on the level of borrowing. The message to researchers is that future 
studies into the relationship between capital structure, and performance should be based on 
their choice of a representative measure of performance and a representative measure of 
capital structure by applying canonical correlation. This is because the choice of variables is 
contingent on the data set employed.   
 
In terms of methodology, the study recognized the complex decisions surrounding the 
relationship between performances and capital structure; and proceeded to use multiple 
dependent variables instead a single dependent variable to assess the bi-directional 
relationship between performance and capital structure. The essence of multivariate 
philosophy is to expose the intrinsic structure and the meaning within, and between capital 
structure and performance variables set of variables through application and interpretation of 
various statistical methods. 
 
Finally and of significance to theory of capital structure debate is that, from the data, the 
degree of the influence of performance on capital structure is higher than the degree of 
influence of capital structure on performance. The theory then is that the debt holders prefer 
firms with good performance (pre lending status) contrary to influencing performance of firms 
(post lending status). 
5.16 Summary of the chapter 
The hypotheses tested: 
H01: Firm performance does not have a significant effect on leverage, and alternative  
H11: Firm performance has a significant effect on leverage; and, 
H02: Leverage does not a significant effect on firm performance; the alternative hypothesis 
being: 
H12: Leverage has a significant effect on firm performance. 
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In this chapter, the use of canonical correlation is demonstrated with a finance application, 
specifically, to identify which performance indicators relate to which capital structure 
indicators.  
 
The canonical correlation analysis was performed to compute canonical coefficients for 
variables (canonical weights) and to establish the overall relationships between the canonical 
variates (canonical correlations).It was also a test to establish if the linear correlations between 
the dependent and independent variables with their respective canonical variate (canonical 
loadings) are statistically significant. 
 
In addition, linear correlation of each observed predictor or predicted variable with the 
opposite canonical variate (canonical cross-loadings) was computed and reported. Squared 
multiple correlations between dependent variables and canonical variates of the performance 
and capital structure were estimated, reported and interpreted. Canonical coefficients were 
normalized to give canonical variables with unit variance to allow meaningful comparison. 
Canonical redundancy analysis was to determine standardised variance of the dependent and 
predictor variables as explained by their own and the opposite canonical variate. 
 
The first statistical significance test was for the canonical correlations of each of the six 
canonical functions. In addition to tests of each canonical function separately, multivariate 
tests of all functions were performed simultaneously. The test statistics reported included 
Wilks‘ lambda; Pillai's trace; Hotelling-Lawley trace, and Roy‘s greatest root. In terms of 
variables, seven (7) indicators of performance and six (6) indicators of capital structure are 
used as input data to assess the relationship between performance and capital structure. 
 
The statistical problem was to identify any relationships between the variates formed for 
performance and capital structure. All the multivariate test statistics indicated that the first 
five canonical functions, taken collectively, are statistically significant at the p<0.01 level; the 
sixth canonical function fails to achieve the significance level at the p<0.05 level. 
 
138 
 
The redundancy index was calculated for the performance and capital structure variate of the 
initial function, and the result presented in Table 5.15 and 5.16. The first canonical variate for 
the capital structure explained 0.065 percent of the variability in performance, but the 
cumulative/proportion explained by all (6) canonical variates was 15.2percent (table 5.15). In 
case of performance measurement, the first canonical variate explained the 9.13 percent of the 
variability in capital structure while the cumulative proportion of measure explained by all the 
six canonical variate was19.96 percent. From the data analysis, it appears that the degree at 
which performanceinfluenced the capital structure is higher than the degree at which capital 
structure influenced performance.  
 
Canonical correlation generated the three basic statistics‘ namely canonical weights 
(standardised coefficients), canonical loadings (structure correlations), and canonical 
cross‐loadings used to understand the relationship between performance and capital structure. 
The results suggested that to build a meaningful relationship between capital structure and 
performance the relevant indicators of performance are book value to market value ratio and 
asset turnover ratio, while the indicator for capital structure is the total debt to the total asset 
ratio. Though canonical  analysis showed substantial relationships of conceptual and practical 
significance, further analysis involving measures other than (for example, regression analysis) 
canonical correlation is recommended to determine the amount of the capital structure 
variable variance accounted for or shared with the performance variables and vice versa. 
 
The conclusion is that capital structure and performance are not independent of one another 
and that first, the null hypothesis that firm performance does not have effect on leverage is 
rejected; and second the null hypothesis that leverage does not have effect on firm 
performance is also rejected. The data supports the conclusion that a bidirectional relationship 
between capital structure and debt capital exists. However, the degree of the influence of 
performance on capital structure is more pronounced than the degree of influence of capital 
structure on performance.  
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 A further analysis on the bi-directional relationship between performance and capital 
structure was presented in chapter six. Thefinding in this chapter was that a bi-directional 
relationship existed between capital structure and performance. An important aspect in chapter 
six is the proof that the relationship between capital structure and performance is independent 
of the statistical model employed. 
 
Though bi-directional relationship between capital structure and performance is confirmed by 
the data, the limitation in this chapter is that it does not tell us whether performance is 
informed by level of leverage or if leverage is informed by level of performance. In Chapter 6, 
the generalised linear model (GLM) procedure was used to examine the relationship between 
capital structure and performance by taking into account the levels of performance and level 
of leverage. 
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CHAPTER 6 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND 
PERFORMANCE USING GENERAL LINEAR MODEL (GLM) 
6.0 Introduction 
In chapter 5, canonical correlation derived indicators of capital structure and two indicators of 
performance are identified as appropriate in building the relationship between performance 
and capital structure (leverage). The reason for canonical analysis is based on the assumption 
that choice of performance or capital structure indicator is specific to a data sampled and 
should not be arbitrary. The two indicators of performance identified are book value to market 
value and asset turnover and for capital structure or leverage, the indicator is total debt to the 
total assetratio (also known as the debt ratio). It is these indicators that are used throughout 
this chapter to evaluate the relationship between performance and capital structure. 
The debate in chapter 5 on whether performance affects capital structure and vice versa, is 
only informative on two issues: that there is a correlation between performance and capital 
structure and that there is a restriction on the relationship in terms of the performance and 
capital structure indicators. In chapter five (5) the data together with the model reject return of 
assets (ROA) as a performance indicator, but pick the book value to market value and asset 
turnover as indicators of performance and total debt to total asset as an indicator of capital 
structure or leverage. 
The canonical correlation, just like ordinary least regression (OLS), will not enable us to 
establish whether, for example, the effect of capital structure on performance matter between 
different capital choices (or capital structure levels) or whether the effect of performance on 
capital structure matter across distinct performance levels. Yet of significance to managers 
would be whether poor performance is explained in terms of capital structure choices (levels) 
or usage of debt is explained in terms of level of performance. This chapter addresses this 
issue by employing the general linear model (GLM). GLM is an improvement on OLS studies 
that focus only on the test of significance of predictor coefficients but do not compare levels 
of performance to levels of leverage and vice versa. 
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In this chapter, we present the findings on the bi-directional relationship between capital 
structure and performance, by taking into consideration levels of performance and levels of 
capital structure. The two hypotheses to be addressed are: first the influence of performance 
on capital structure (debt ratio) and two the influence of capital structure on performance in an 
emerging economy framework.  The first hypothesis analyses the effects of performance on 
capital structure taking into account two competing hypothesis (Berger & Bonaccorsi di Patti, 
2006). The two competing hypotheses are profitability (return) – risk hypothesis; and 
franchise – value hypothesis. The profitability (return) – risk hypothesis stipulates that 
profitable firms have lower expected bankruptcy costs thus are able to employ more debt than 
comparable firms that are less profitable. While under the franchise – value hypothesis, the 
proposition is that profitable firm will employ less debt to protect the firm from debt induced 
liquidation. The first hypothesis being: 
H01: Firm performance does not have a significant effect on leverage, and alternative  
H11: Firm performance has a significant effect on leverage. 
 
In the second hypothesis, we assess the role of debt capital on reducing agency costs, and in 
so doing, improving performance (Dobbin & Jung, 2010:30; Christian, Karl & Francis, 
2009:3246; Zwiebel, 1996: 1197; Jensen& Meckling, 1976). If leverage mitigates agency 
costs, then one expects leverage to improve firm performance. It is also possible that high 
levels of leverage increase agency cost thus impairing firm performance. It is not clear 
whether this is the case on the NSE. Therefore, the second hypothesis is: 
H02: Leverage does not have a significant effect on firm performance; the alternative 
hypothesis being: 
H12: Leverage has a significant effect on firm performance. 
 
This chapter is organized as follows: in section 6.2, is background information on the 
generalised linear model(GLM); in section 6.3 is the level of measurement requirement and 
sample size requirement in section 6.4 is the assumption of normality; in section 6.5 is 
research questions guiding the analysis; in section 6.6 is the influence of book value to market 
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value (performance) on  the total debt to the total asset ratio (capital structure);  in section 6.7 
is the influence of the asset turnover ratio (performance) on  total debt to total asset ratio 
(capital structure);  in section 6.8 is the influence of the total debt to the total asset 
ratio(capital structure) on book value to market value(performance) and section 6.9 is the 
influence of the total debt to the total asset ratio(capital structure) on the asset turnover  ratio 
(performance), in  section 6.10 is the discussion of findings; in 6.11 is the theoretical and 
practical significance of the findings; and in section of 6.12 is the summary of the chapter. 
6.1 General linear model 
The general linear model (GLM) procedure is used to provide regression analysis and analysis 
of variance for level measured variables (Rutherford, 2011). For the first hypothesis, the GLM 
is used to test the null hypothesis about the effect of performance and ownership structure on 
the means of different groupings of the debt ratio; for the second hypothesis, GLM is used to 
test the hypothesis regarding the effect of capital structure and ownership structure on the 
means of various groupings of performance.  
The GLM allowed for investigation of interaction between independent variables. In this 
GLM model, the dependent variable which could be an indicator of capital structure or 
performance, depending on hypothesis being tested, is a covariate, but the independent 
variables can be any level that defines groups; that is, dichotomous, nominal, ordinal, or 
grouped interval. In this study, all independent variables are grouped variables(Rutherford, 
2011). 
6.2 Level of measurement requirement and sample size requirement 
The measurements used in this study are the book value to the market ratio, asset turnover 
ratio, and the total debt to the total asset ratio; at one level, the variables are continuous and in 
the next level, the variables are rank-ordered then grouped. Grouping is frequently used for 
inferring the association between two variables (Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter & Li, 2005; Lys & 
Sabino, 1992). However, before using GLM, there are conditions to be met: first is the level 
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of measurement requirement and sample requirements; and second, is the assumption of 
normality of the data (Rutherford, 2011; Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter &Li, 2005).  
Under GLM procedure, the dependent variable can be at the interval level or continuous; that 
is, when the capital structure (the total debt to the total asset ratio) is the predicted variable, it 
is a covariate but when used as the independent variable it converted into a factor (grouped 
data of two or more categorical groups) the same applies to performance indicators and 
ownership structure. The results of grouping for the variables are presented in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics of grouped performance and capital structure indicators 
 
Level of Book to Market Ratio Mean          StDev.        Number 
Positive Growth <1 0.252 0.221 198 
No Growth =1 0.931 0.280 288 
Negative Growth > 1 3.995 4.913 222 
Total 1.702 3.174 708 
 Ownership Structure 
   Shareholdings 20percent to 50percent 34.409 8.772 276
Shareholdings 51percent to 100percent 64.434 11.373 437 
Shareholdings Below 20percent 14.821 2.523 15 
Total 52.029 18.594 728 
Total Debt to Total Assets    
High Debt ratio   0.45 to 2.03956 0.675 0.226 257 
Medium Debt ratio  0.3515 to 0.44781 0.399 0.027 125 
Low Debt ratio 0  to 0.34278 0.196 0.091 326 
Total 0.406 0.263 708 
Lev Asset Turnover Ratio 
   Low 0.073 - 0.6882 0.4545 0.1513 234
Medium 0.6926 - 1.1073 0.8917 0.1192 234 
High 1.114 - 10.1856 2.0581 1.0653 232 
Total 1.1321 0.9192 700 
(Source: Author) 
 
The information provided in Table 6.1 confirms the adequacy of the sample size. Although 
the larger your sample size, the better, for GLM, there must be more cases for each group than 
the number of dependent variables being analysed. The large numbers of cases within each 
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category of the independent variable ensure a reasonably stable mean for each cell when 
analysing observational data. 
 
The book value to market value compares the book value to market value of investment in a 
share that is, and is interpreted in terms of positive growth; no growth and negative growth 
(see Table 6.1 above).  A book value to market value of less than one (1) means the market 
value is greater than one and indicates growth in a firm share. A book value to market value of 
less than one suggests that the book value is higher than the market value and interpreted as a 
decline in growth. The book value to market value mirrors the business condition in firms 
over a period of time. 
Table 6.1 shows that out of total cases of 851, a total of 708 cases are included into the 
analysis.  Out of 708 cases included into the analysis, only 198 cases had market values 
greater than book values (positive growth), 288 cases report no growth; for 222 cases, the 
book values are greater than market values (negative growth). Therefore, a total of 510 (288 + 
222) had no growth and negative growth; and this does not augur well for the managers of the 
firms listed on the NSE. However, the average growth factor (positive growth stocks), (book 
to market value is 0.252) is a high 3.968 or 397 percent. 
Ownership structure in this study captures the percentage of shares held by top shareholders, 
in each firm over the period 1990 to 2012. There is evidence of concentrated ownership in the 
firms (see Table 6.1), that is, 437 cases out of 728 cases over 23 years, show shareholding of 
over 51percent, this gives such a single shareholder an absolute control and is evidence of 
absence of dispersed ownership. The concentration of ownership is confirmed by the structure 
of ownership where only 15 cases show the ownership below 20 percent and that the average 
shareholding is 52.029 percent (see Table 6.1). 
The grouping of capital structure is presented in Table 6.1 above. For capital structure (the 
total debt to the total asset ratio)the total ratio, there are three measurement levels, high debt 
ratio ranging from 0.45 to 2.03956, with a mean of 0.6746 and a standard deviation of 0.2262, 
relating to 257 cases out of 708 cases; medium debt ratio ranging from 0.3515 to 0.44781, 
with a mean of 0.3987anda standard deviation of 0.0266, relating to 125 cases out of 708 
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cases; and low debt ratio ranging from 0 to 0.34278, with a mean of 0.1963 and a standard 
deviation of 0.0908, relating to 326 cases out of a 708 cases (see Table 1).  
The standard deviation showed that the level of dispersion of grouped levels is highest for a 
high debt ratio, that is, firms classified as using substantial amounts of debt to finance their 
total assets. The mean of the levels is different from a high 0.6746 to 0.3987and 0.1963 for 
high, medium and low use of debt respectively. On average, the firms listed on the NSE use 
40.565percent debt capital to finance their assets. However, the standard deviation of 
26.2571percent showed substantial variation in the use of debt by firms' overtime. The debt 
ratio is a measure of the relative obligations of shareholders in a company; and debt to the 
asset ratio of greater than 0.5 indicates that equity position by owners is less than 50percent; 
while a debt ratio of one or more mean that the firm is technically insolvent and there were 
few such cases. 
The asset turnover ratio measures the relationship between total assets and total sales, and is 
calculated as total sales divided by total assets, and the results are presented in Table 6.1 
above. This ratio measures the intensity of usage of assets to generate sales. It is sales that 
generate cash flows that a firm requires for financing operations and investment in assets. The 
asset turnover indicates the rate at which a firm generates the turnover (sales) from asset base. 
To group the cases, the indicators are ranked and divided into three equal groups, and this 
explains why there are almost 234 cases within each group.  The average asset turnover ratio 
is 1.1321, and this ratio emerges from canonical analysis as a superior indicator of 
performance in building a relationship between performance and capital structure. 
 
6.3 The assumption of normality 
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) assumes that the dependent variable is normally distributed 
within groups. The test of normality is based upon the criteria that the skewness and kurtosis 
of the dependent variable fall within the range from -1.0 to +1.0. If the dependent variable 
satisfies these criteria for skewness and kurtosis, then data meets the normality condition. The 
146 
 
results are in Table 6.2 below. However, these tests will not apply to grouped data; and this is 
by the name of engaging in methodological pluralism (Horton, 1978). 
Table 6.2: Test of Normality for Dependent Variables 
 
 
 
N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Std. 
Error Statistic 
Std. 
Error 
Total Debt to 
Total Assets 
708 0.000 2.040 0.40565 0.2626 1.426 0.092 4.168 0.183 
Book to Market 
Ratio 
708 -1.690 42.890 1.70161 3.1735 7.873 0.092 81.358 0.183 
Asset Turnover 
Ratio 
700 0.073 10.186 1.13213 0.9192 2.933 0.092 16.303 0.185 
Valid N (list 
wise) 
700 
                
(Source: Author) 
 
Skewness is a measure of the asymmetry of a distribution the normal distribution is symmetric 
and has a skewness value of zero (0). A distribution with a significant positive skewness has a 
long right tail and lack normal distribution. A distribution with a significant negative 
skewness has a long left tail. As a guideline, skewness value that is more than twice its 
standard error is taken to indicate a departure from symmetry. Kurtosis is a measure for the 
extent to which observations cluster around central point. For a normal distribution, the value 
of the kurtosis statistic is zero. Positive kurtosis indicates that the observations cluster more 
and have longer tails than those in the normal distribution, and negative kurtosis indicates that 
the observations cluster less and have shorter tails. 
 
If the criteria for normality are not satisfied, then we include a statement about the violation of 
this assumption in the discussion of the results. However, there is general consensus that 
violations of this assumption do not seriously affect the probabilities needed for statistical 
decision making, especially when the number of cases for each cell are equal (Horton, 1978). 
Furthermore, theF test is robust to non-normality, if the non-normality is caused by skewness 
rather than by outliers. We test for the normality but do remove the outliers to improve the 
normality of the variable, for fear of loss of information. The total debt to the total asset ratio, 
the book value to market value ratio and asset turnover ratio is tested for normality at a 
covariate level. 
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6.4 Research questions guiding the analysis 
Since at one stage of analysis, a variable is dependent variable and in the next stage of 
analysis, the same variable is an independent variable, the research questions guiding the 
analysis are put in broad terms. Therefore, in wide terms, the research questions to be 
answered, using the general linear model (GLM) is: 
i. What are the main effects of the independent variables?  
ii. What are the interactions among the independent variables?  
 
6.5 Influence of performance on capital structure 
The first hypothesis is about the influence of performance on capital structure; however, we 
seekthe answer for the questions: ―What are the main effects of the performance and 
ownership structure as independent variables on capital structure as the dependent variable?‖ 
and, ―What are the interactions among the independent variables, namely performance with 
ownership structure?‖ 
 
In answering the questions we established whether members within the dependent variable 
(capital structure), defined by independent variables (performance and ownership structure), 
account for a substantial amount of the differences in average within the dependent (capital 
structure) variable. At this stage of modeling, the dependent variable capital structure (the 
total debt to the total assets) is a covariate but the independent variables, performance and 
ownership structures are categorical variables (factors) or grouped variables.  The hypothesis 
and the model to be tested are: 
 
H01: Firm performance does not have a significant effect on leverage, and alternative  
H11: Firm performance has a significant effect on leverage. 
 
Capital Structure = αi + βiPerformancei + βi ControlVariablesi+ ɛi 
Whereα, β parameters to be estimated and ɛ is the error term 
148 
 
6.5.1 Influence of book value to market value on the debt ratio 
First, the book value to market value is used as an indicator of performance, it is independent 
variable. The total debt to the total asset ratio which is the indicator of capital structure is the 
dependent variable. The question then is, ―Does the book value to market value (performance) 
have an impact on the total debt to the total asset ratio (capital structure)structure?‖ The test is 
whether the average of the total debt to the total asset ratio, between the growth firms (the 
book value to the market value ratio < 1), no-growth firms(the book value to the market value 
ratio = 1), and negative growth firms (the book value to the market value ratio >1)   are 
significantly (statistically) different. In Table 6.3, the dependent variable is the total debt to 
the total asset ratio, and the independent variables are book value to market value and 
ownership structure.  The two sub hypotheses are: 
The null hypothesis H0: µpositive growth≠ µnegative growth≠µno growth-the population 
means for positive growth, negative growth and no growth, with respect to the total debt to the 
total asset ratio(capital structure) as the dependent variables are not equal taking into account 
ownership structure. 
The alternative hypothesis H1: µpositive growth = µnegative growth = µno growth- the 
population means for positive growth, negative growth and no growth, with respect to total 
debt to the total asset ratio(capital structure)as the dependent variables are equal taking into 
account ownership structure. 
The null hypothesis H0: σ
2
positive growth≠σ2negative growth≠ σ2no growth - the population 
variances for positive growth, negative growth and no growth, with respect to the total debt to 
the total assetratio (capital structure) as the dependent variable are not equal. 
The alternative hypothesis H1: σ
2
positive growth = σ2negative growth = σ2no growth - the 
population variances for positive growth, negative growth and no growth, with respect to the 
total debt to the total asset ratio(capital structure) as the dependent variable are equal. 
Table 6.3 provides statistics for each combination of factors in the model, performance (book 
to market ratio) and ownership structure (shareholdings). The N column in Table 6.3 shows 
that there are unequal cell sizes. Over the year majority of firms offered is either zero growths 
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(288) or no growth (222), with those with growth totaling 198. The standard deviation does 
not appear homogenous if we take interaction into account. 
Table 6.3: Performance (Book to Market Ratio) On capital structure - dependent 
variable: Total debt to total assets 
  
Categorised Ownership 
Structure 
Level of Book Value to Market 
Value Ratio Mean Std. Deviation N 
Shareholdings 20percent to 
50percent 
Positive Growth <1 0.41626 0.210122 75 
No Growth =1 0.36274 0.268151 129 
Negative Growth > 1 0.32865 0.319771 69 
Total 0.36883 0.269185 273 
Shareholdings 51percent to 
100percent 
Positive Growth <1 0.45341 0.320123 113 
No Growth =1 0.42027 0.223603 154 
Negative Growth > 1 0.42004 0.231942 153 
Total 0.42910 0.255703 420 
Shareholdings Below 20percent Positive Growth <1 0.38884 0.331983 10 
No Growth =1 0.47985 0.060441 5 
Total 0.41918 0.271785 15 
Total Positive Growth <1 0.43608 0.283402 198 
No Growth =1 0.39553 0.244356 288 
Negative Growth > 1 0.39163 0.265067 222 
Total 0.40565 0.262571 708 
(Source: Author) 
 
The result showed that firms with positive growth, (where market values exceed book value) 
on average financed 43.6percent of their assets with debt capital. No-growth firms on average 
financed39.55percent of their assets with debt capital; and negative growth firms on average 
use the least amount, financed39.16percent of their assets with debt. There appears to be no 
performance effect on capital structure because for each class of performance, the debt usage 
is approximately 40 percent (positive g <1 = 43.608 percent; no-growth percent; and negative 
g > 1 = 39.163 percent). 
 
Firms in which the largest shareholder held 20 percent to 50 percent of the share capital on 
average financed36.883 percent of their assets with debt capital; firms in which the largest 
shareholder held more than 51 percent (51 percent to 100 percent) of the share capital on 
average financed42.910 percent of their assets with debt capital. Firms in which the largest 
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shareholder held below 20 percent of the share capital on average financed 41.918 percent of 
their assets with debt capital. 
Ownership structure combined with performance has insignificant influence on capital 
structure. Firms in which the largest shareholder held 20 percent to 50 percent of the share 
capital coupled with a positive growth on average financed 41.626 percent of their assets with 
debt capital; firms in which the largest shareholder held below 20 percent of the share capital 
coupled with positive growth on average financed38.884 percent of their assets with debt 
capital. Firms in which the largest shareholder held more than51 (51 percent to 100 percent) 
of the share capital coupled with positive growth financed 45.341 percent of their assets with 
debt capital. 
Firms in which the largest shareholder held 20 percent to 50 percent of the share capital 
coupledwith no-growth financed36.274percent of their assets with debt capital; firms in which 
the largest shareholder held below 20 percent of the share capital coupled with no-growth on 
average financed 47.985 percent of their assets with debt capital. Firms in which the largest 
shareholder held more than51 percent (51 percent to 100 percent) of the share capital coupled 
with no-growth on average financed 42.027 percent of their assets with debt capital. 
Firms in which the largest shareholder held 20 percent to 50 percent of the share capital 
coupled with negative growth on average financed 36.883 percent of their assets with debt 
capital; firms in which the largest shareholder held below 20 percent of the share capital 
coupled with negative growth appeared not to use debt to finance their assets. Firms in which 
the largest shareholder held more than51 percent (51 percent to 100 percent) of the share 
capital coupled with negative growth on average financed 42.004 percent of their assets with 
debt capital. 
6.5.2 Homogeneity of variance test – book value to market value on debt ratio 
This test confirmed if the differences in capital structure (the total debt to the total asset ratio) 
by performance (book to market ratio), ownership structure (shareholdings) and interaction 
term (ownership structure*book to market ratio) are statistically significant. The analysis of 
variance assumes that the variance of the dependent variable is homogeneous across all the 
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cells formed by the factors (independent variable). It is important testing the equality of means 
across groups and equality of variances across groups Levene‘s (1960) test for equality of 
variance across groups for meaningful interpretation of the findings. The result is in Table 6.4. 
 
Table 6.4: Levene’s test of equality error variances: Department Variable:  Total 
Debt to Total Assets 
F df1 df2 Sig. 
1.752 7 700 0.094 
(Source: Author) 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + OwnStrCa + LeBtM + OwnStrCa * LeBtM 
The significance result for homogeneity of variance is >0.05; that is, 0.094, (see Table 6.4) 
which shows that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across the groups. 
6.5.3 Interpretation of the relationship – book value to market value ratio on 
debt ratio 
On using GLM, and if the relationship between the predicted variable (debt ratio as a capital 
structure indicator) and independent variable (grouping variable - the book value to the market 
value ratio as a performance indicator) is confirmed, is an affirmation that distinct categories 
of the independent variable (performance, that is, positive growth, no growth, negative 
growth) are linked to the different average scores on the dependent variable (capital structure). 
The statement is correct if the relationship is statistically significant in the ―Tests of Between-
Subjects Effects." The results of tests between subject variables with  total debt to the total 
asset ratio as dependent variable and book value to market value as predictor variable and 
ownership structure being a control variable are presented in Table 6.5 below. Since there is 
more than one independent variable for this analysis, the entries for the ―Corrected Model‖ 
and the variable will not be identical. 
 
The common language effect size is designed to communicate the meaning of an effect size, 
in plain English, to enable those with little statistic‘s knowledge understand it‘s the meaning. 
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This effect size was proposed and named by McGraw and Wong (1992), and it is used to 
describe the difference between groups. The core concept of the common language effect size 
is the notion of a pair, defined as a score in the group one paired with a score in group two 
(Kerby, 2014; Ken & Kristopher, 2012). 
 
Table 6.5 contains the results from the analysis of variance. It includes the sums of squares, F 
values, and significance levels and Partial Eta Squared. The intercept term in this ANOVA is 
a test of whether the grand mean is different from zero. Because all the dependent variable 
scores are marginally positive, the grand mean is different from zero. Therefore, the test of the 
intercept is not of interest to us. 
 
SS corrected model = SSOwnStrCa + SSLeBtM + SSOwnStrCa * LeBtM 
                    1.008a  =  0.606 +  0.201+   0.127 
 
Table 6.5: Tests of Between-Subjects Effects - Dependent Variable: Total Debt to 
Total Assets 
 
 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
Df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 1.008
a
 7 .144 2.111 0.040 0.021 
Intercept 21.926 1 21.926 321.526 0.0001 0.315 
OwnStrCa 0.606 2 0.303 4.444 0.012 0.013 
LeBtM 0.201 2 0.100 1.472 0.230 0.004 
OwnStrCa * 
LeBtM 
0.127 3 0.042 0.620 0.602 0.003 
Error 47.735 700 0.068 
   
Total 165.245 708 
    
Corrected Total 48.743 707 
    
a. R Squared = .021 (Adjusted R Squared = 0.011) 
(Source: Author) 
 
The significance value for ownership (OwnStrCa) is 0.012, is significant at <0.05; therefore, 
affect capital structure, but there is no effect of book value to market value (p = 0.230) on 
capital structure. The null hypothesis that "the mean total debt to a total asset ratio was not 
equal across all categories of the book value to market ratio" is rejected. There is also no 
discriminating effect of interaction term (OwnStrCa * LeBtM) on capital structure. However, 
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ownership structure (OwnStrCa) has an effect, significance = 0.12; that is, the hypothesis that 
―the mean total debt to the total asset ratiowas notequal across all categories of ownership 
structure (OwnStrCa)‖ is not supported by data; and the overall corrected model, F value = 
2.11 and p-value of 0.040 are significant. Effect size should only be interpreted if the 
relationship is significant. However, this does not tell us the component of variables that 
behaves differently.  
 
In Table 6.5, is presented Partial Eta-squared. This is the ratio of variance explained in the 
dependent variable by a predictor while controlling for other predictors. This makes Partial 
Eta-squared analogous to the r-squared (r
2
). Partial Eta-squared is a biased estimator of the 
variance explained by the model for the population. Partial Eta-squared estimates only the 
effect size in the sample. The Partial Eta Squared as a measure of effect is presented in Table 
6.5. Partial Eta Squared is reported as trivial, small, moderate, or large. 
Another measure used in power analysis when comparing two independent proportions is 
Cohen's d (Cohen, 1992). The interpretation of Cohen‘s criteria for effect size is:  less than .01 
= trivial; 0.01 up to 0.06 = small; 0.06 up to 0.14 = moderate; 0.14 or greater = large (Field, 
2009). On the basis of preceding scale, except for the intercept, all other partial eta squares are 
either trivial or small. The statement that "membership in categories defined by book value to 
market value class identification accounts for a reasonable amount of the differences in the 
total debt to the total asset ratio" is not supported by the data. 
6.5.4 Estimated Marginal Means - Book value to market value on debt ratio  
Taylor (2011) explained estimated marginal mean as follows,  ―estimated marginal means are 
obtained by inserting appropriate values into a regression equation to obtain predicted values, 
and that they are especially useful for answering questions like 'how would the groups 
compare if all subjects had the same value on (same covariate)." Taylor (2011) asserted that 
because standard errors can be obtained for the predicted values, it is possible to assess the 
significance of differences between groups, while holding other variables constant. The 
estimated marginal means is the mean response for each factor, adjusted for any other 
variables within the model (Ho, 2006). The result from the comparison of estimated marginal 
means of the total debt to the total asset ratio (as dependent variable) for groups within the 
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book value to the market value ratio (as the predictor variable) while holding ownership 
structure constant is presented in Table 6.6. 
 
The results were that firms in which the largest shareholder held between 20 percent to 50 
percent of the share capital coupled with a positive growth on average financed 41.6 percent 
of their assets with debt; firms in which the largest shareholder held more than51 percent (51 
percent to 100 percent) of the share capital coupled with positive growth on average financed 
45.3 percent of their assets using debt; and firms in which the largest shareholder held below 
20 percent of the share capital coupled with positive growth firms on average financed 45.3 
percent of their assets using debt. 
 
Table 6.6: Categorised ownership structure * Level of book value to market value ratio- 
Dependent variable :Total debt to total assets ratio 
 
Categorised Ownership 
Structure 
Level of Book to 
Market Ratio Mean 
Std. 
Error 
95percent Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Shareholdings 20 percent to 50 
percent 
Positive Growth <1 0.416 0.030 0.357 0.475 
No Growth =1 0.363 0.023 0.318 0.408 
Negative Growth > 1 0.329 0.031 0.267 0.390 
Shareholdings 51percent to 
100percent 
Positive Growth <1 0.453 0.025 0.405 0.502 
No Growth =1 0.420 0.021 0.379 0.462 
Negative Growth > 1 0.420 0.021 0.379 0.461 
Shareholdings Below 20percent Positive Growth <1 0.389 0.083 0.227 0.551 
No Growth =1 0.480 0.117 0.251 0.709 
Negative Growth > 1 .
a
 . . . 
Source: Author 
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The results showed that firms in which the largest shareholder held 20 percent to 50 percent of 
the share capital coupled with no growth on average financed 36.3 percent of their assets with 
debt. Firms in which the largest shareholder held more than 51 percent (51 percent to 100 
percent) of the share capital coupled with no growth on average financed 42.0 percent of their 
assets using debt; and firms in which the largest shareholder held below 20 percent of the 
share capital coupled with no growth on average financed 48.0 percent of their assets using 
debt. 
 
The results showed that firms in which the largest shareholder held 20 percent to 50 percent of 
the share capital coupled with negative growth, on average finance 36.3 percent of their assets 
with debt. Firms where a top shareholder holds 51 percent to 100 percent of the shares (have 
been absolute control) coupled with negative growths are expected to finance 42.0 percent of 
their assets using debt. Firms where a top shareholder holds below 20 percent of the shares 
(dispersed ownership) coupled negative grow the firms in are expected to finance 48.0 percent 
of their assets using debt. 
 
In conclusion, there appeared to be small differences in capital structure amongst positive 
growth firms, no growth, firm and negative growth firms depending upon the ownership 
structure and performance otherwise, the difference in performance (growth in BtM ratio) 
would remain constant for three different shareholdings. 
 
6.5.5 Post Hoc Analysis- Book value to market value on total debt to total assets 
Post hoc multiple comparison tests are necessary if differences exist among the means to 
determine, which means differ (Field, 2009; Ho, 2006). This is critical to the study because 
the objective during this stage is to establish the impact of performance (book to market ratio) 
on capital structure (total debt to total assets) taking into account the different performance 
levels (positive growth, no growth and negative growth). Since the variable book value to 
market value (LeBtM) as an indicator of performance, and that it is not significant, however, 
for robustness we need not look at the post-hoc tests. Post hoc tests are done and presented in 
Table 6.7.  
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The post-hoc analysis procedure examines the data for patterns that were not specified prior to 
the analysis; that is, data dredging. The concern in post-hoc analysis is to find patterns and/or 
relationships between subgroups; in this case within performance (book to market ratio) 
groups with respect to level of usage of debt, which otherwise remain undetected and 
undiscovered if the researcher relied only upon a priori statistical method (Klocockars & 
Hancock, 2000). This analyses the probability that the significant effects will seem to have 
been discovered among subgroups within a population when none actually exist. The test of 
between subjects determines the significance as a factor but not how the levels within a factor 
differ.  
 
The post-hoc tests show the differences in the model for predicated means for each pair of 
factor levels (performance – book to market ratio) that is, it is a range test. For such an 
analysis, Turkeys range test denoted turkey HSD is appropriate (Lowry, 2008). The result of 
post-hoc analysis is in Table 6.7. In Table 6.7, the first column shows that the post-hoc test is 
Turkey HSD. The next two columns (i) and (j) display the pair of factor levels being tested-
levels of the book to market ratio.  The third column is the mean difference between, i and j. 
For level of significance the cutoff point is 0.05 and there do not appear to be significant 
differences in the debt ratio, that is, between the total debt to the total asset ratio of positive 
growth, no growth and negative growth. 
 
The post-hoc test suggests that performance, measured as the book to the market value ratio 
have no influence upon the total debt to the total asset ratio (capital structure). Nevertheless, 
post hoc test does not account for the levels of other factors thus ignoring the possibility of an 
interaction effect between performance and ownership structure.  
6.5.6 Interpretation of the Post Hoc Effects - Book value to market value on total 
debt to total assets ratio 
The next three statements are possible interpretation of the post-hoc effects. Each one should 
be verified independently for significance in terms of pair-wise comparisons, and the results 
presented in Table 6.7. The preview to this analysis, that is the means and standard deviations 
are as presented in Table 6.1. 
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The first statement was that a group within the book value to the market value ratio 
categorised as ―positive growth (<1) (with a mean of 0.25182 and a standard deviation of 
0.220624) used more debt than the other group within the book value to the market value ratio 
categorised as no growth (=1) (with a mean of 0.93066 and a standard deviation of 0.280132). 
However, the difference of -0.04054between the two groups has a p-value of 0.213 is not 
statisticallysignificant (see Table 6.7). 
 
The second statement was that a group within the book value to the market value ratio 
classified as ―no growth (=1) (with mean of 0.93066 and a standard deviation of 0.280132) 
used more debt than the other group within the book value to the market value ratio classified 
as negative growth (>1) (with a mean of 3.99482 and a standard deviation of 4.912579). The 
difference of 0.00390 between the two groups is associated with a p-value of 0.191, which is 
greater than the critical value of 0.05; the difference is not significant (see Table 6.7). 
 
The third statement was that a group within the book value to the market value ratio classified 
as ―positive growth (<1) (with a mean of 0.25182 and a standard deviation of 0.220624) used 
more debt than the other group within the book value to the market value ratio classified as 
negative growth (>1) (with a mean of 3.99482 and a standard deviation of 4.912579).The 
differenceof-0.04444betweenthe two groups are associated with a p-value of 0.985, which is 
greater than the critical value of 0.05; therefore, the difference is not significant. 
 
Table 6.7: Multiple Comparisons - Total debt to total assets ratio by level of book to 
market ratio Tukey HSD 
 
(I) Level of Book to 
Market Ratio 
(J) Level of Book to 
Market Ratio 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
95percent 
Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Positive Growth <1 No Growth =1 -0.04054 0.024108 0.213 -0.01608 0.09717 
Negative Growth > 1 0.04444 0.025526 0.191 -0.01551 0.10440 
No Growth =1 Positive Growth <1 -0.04054 0.024108 0.213 -0.09717 0.01608 
Negative Growth > 1 0.00390 0.023323 0.985 -0.05088 0.05868 
Negative Growth > 1 Positive Growth <1 -0.04444 0.025526 0.191 -0.10440 0.01551 
No Growth =1 -0.00390 0.023323 0.985 -0.05868 0.05088 
Based on observed means. The error term is Mean Square (Error) = 0.068. 
(Source: Author) 
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6.5.7 Homogenous Subsets Test – Total debt to total assets ratio withbook to 
market ratio 
The final test is the homogenous subsets' test; in this case, Tukey's HSD (honest significant 
difference test) test is appropriate because the interest to the researcher is to find means that 
are significantly different from each other (Kinnear& Gray, 1999). The homogeneous subsets' 
output is generated along with post hoc tests and show, which pair of groups has significantly 
distinct means on the dependent variable. Subset output would not be interpreted if the main 
effect was not significant.  
 
In this case, the pairs of groups are based on book value to market value(performance) as the 
independent variable,  that is, negative growth > 1, no-growth  =1 and positive growth <1 as 
groups – grouping levels) and the total debt to the total asset ratio(capital structure) as the 
dependent variable. The groups are listed in order of ascending means. The means that are 
listed under each subset comprise a set of means that are not significantly different from each 
other. 
 
Table 6.8: Tukey HSD
a,,b,,c
Total debt to total assets ratioby level of book to 
market ratio 
Level of Book to Market Ratio N 
Subset 
1 
Negative Growth > 1 222 0.39163 
No Growth =1 288 0.39553 
Positive Growth <1 198 0.43608 
Sig. 
 
0.162 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
 Based on observed means. 
   The error term is Mean Square (Error) =0.068. 
 a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 230.287. 
b. The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean of the group sizes is used. Type I 
error levels are not guaranteed. 
Source: Author 
For each grouping variable, there are variations in capital structure (debt ratio), and the result 
in Table 6.8, show that cases of negative growth > 1 has a debt ratio 0.39163, case of no-
growth  =1, have a debt ratio of 0.39553,while cases of positive growth <1 has a debt ratio of 
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0.43608. If we ignore the statistical test of significance, and from the ranking, it appears that 
performance has some influence on capital structure. This is because cases of improved book 
value to market value are associated with more use of debt. But given that means are all listed 
under one subset, and with a p-value of 0.162, it follows that the set of means are not 
statistically significantly different from each other. Furthermore, because all  scores for the 
amount of debt used (see subset 1 in Table 6.8 above) across different levels of growth can be 
rounded to 40 percent, confirm no difference in total debt to the total asset ratio(capital 
structure) if the book value to market value is used as a grouping variable. 
6.5.8 Summary - Book value to market value ratio on total debt to total 
 assets ratio 
The question was, ―Does the book value to market value (performance) have an impact on the 
total debt to the total asset ratio (capital structure)? To answer this question, statistical tests 
were done and results presented. When the book value to the market value ratio is employed as a 
performance indicator, the tests of between-subjects effects and the post-hoc test did not reveal 
differences in capital structure across performance levels. The multiple comparisons and 
homogenous subset's test failed to reveal a difference in capital structure between 
performance levels. Therefore, the two null hypothesis: 
Null hypothesis:  H0: µ positive growth ≠µ negative growth ≠ µ no growth- the population 
means for positive growth, negative growth and no growth, with respect to the total debt to the 
total asset ratio(capital structure) as the dependent variables, are not equal taking into account 
ownership structure is not supported by the data; and  
Null hypothesis:  H0: σ
2
 positive growth≠σ2 negativegrowth≠σ2no growth - the population 
variances for positive growth, negative growth and no growth, with respect to the total debt to 
the total assetratio (capital structure) as the dependent variables, are not equal is not equal 
taking into account ownership structure is not supported by the data. In conclusion, the book 
value to the market value ratio (as a performance indicator) has no effect on the total debt to 
the total asset ratio (capital structure) or does not explain usage on debt capital firms. 
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6.6 Influence of asset turnover ratio (performance) on total debt to 
 total assets ratio (capital structure) 
The asset turnover ratio was the first ranked indicator of performance as per canonical 
correlation analysis (see chapter five). Asset turnover ratio shows the rate at which managers 
used firm assets to generate revenue (sales). At this stage of analysis, the question then is, 
―Does the asset turnover ratio (as a performance indicator) have influence on the total debt to 
the total asset ratio (capital structure)?  In answering this question, the asset turnover ratio is 
the predictor variable while the total debt to the total asset ratio is the predicted variable. The 
two sub hypotheses on mean and variance are: 
 
Null hypothesis H0: µ low asset turnover ratio ≠ µmedium asset turnover ratio≠ µ high asset 
turnover ratio- the population means for the low asset turnover ratio; medium asset turnover 
ratio and high asset turnover ratio with respect to the total debt to the total asset ratio(capital 
structure) are not equal taking into account ownership structure. 
Alternative hypothesis H1: µlow asset turnover ratio= µmedium asset turnover ratio = µhigh 
asset turnover ratio-the population means for low asset turnover ratio, medium asset turnover 
ratio and high asset turnover ratio with respect to the total debt to the total asset ratioas a 
dependent variable (capital structure) taking into account ownership structures are equal; and 
 
Null hypothesis H0: σ
2 
low asset turnover ratio ≠ σ2mediumasset turnover ratio≠ σ2high asset 
turnover ratio- the population variances for low asset turnover ratio, medium asset turnover 
ratio and high asset turnover ratio with respect to the total debt to total asset ratio as a 
dependent variable (capital structure) and taking into account ownership structures are not 
equal. 
Alternative hypothesis H1: σ
2 
low asset turnover ratio= σ2 mediumasset turnover ratio= σ2 high 
asset turnover ratio- the population variances for low asset turnover ratio, medium asset 
turnover ratio and high asset turnover ratio with respect to the total debt to total asset ratio as a 
dependent variable (capital structure) and taking into account ownership structures are equal. 
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6.6.1 Descriptive statistics - influence of asset turnover ratio on debt ratio 
The different classes of asset turnover ratio and the total debt to the total asset ratio are 
presented in Table 6.1. The data presented in Table 6.1 confirm that both levels of 
measurement requirement and sample size requirement are satisfied. The statistics for each 
combination of factors in the model, performance (asset turnover ratio) and ownership 
structure (shareholdings) are presented in Table 6.9. The N column in Table 6.9 shows that for 
the variable asset turnover ratio, there are equal cell sizes, except for high level, which is 232, 
the rests are 234. This is not the case for ownership structure. 
 
Table 6.9:  Performance (Lev Asset Turnover Ratio) on capital structure - 
Dependent variable: Total debt to total assets 
 
Categorised Ownership Structure 
Lev Asset Turnover Ratio Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
N 
Shareholdings 20percent to 
50percent 
Low 0.073 - 0.6882 0.21975 0.171092 116 
Medium 0.6926 - 1.1073 0.39050 0.168437 83 
High 1.114 - 10.1856 0.57820 0.334240 74 
Total 0.36883 0.269185 273 
Shareholdings 51percent to 
100percent 
Low 0.073 - 0.6882 0.34727 0.255778 116 
Medium 0.6926 - 1.1073 0.39237 0.183122 142 
High 1.114 - 10.1856 0.53606 0.280333 154 
Total 0.43338 0.256300 412 
Shareholdings Below 20percent Low 0.073 - 0.6882 0.05043 0.034182 2 
Medium 0.6926 - 1.1073 0.51884 0.235918 9 
High 1.114 - 10.1856 0.37930 0.270803 4 
Total 0.41918 0.271785 15 
Total Low 0.073 - 0.6882 0.28151 0.226391 234 
Medium 0.6926 - 1.1073 0.39657 0.181080 234 
High 1.114 - 10.1856 0.54680 0.298641 232 
Total 0.40790 0.263214 700 
Source: Author 
In Table 6.9, the dependent variable is the total debt to the total asset ratio, and the 
independent variables are asset turnover ratio and ownership structure. The result showed that 
firms with a low asset turnover, on average financed 28.151 percent of their assets with debt. 
Firms with the medium asset turnover ratio financed 39.657 percent of their assets with debt; 
and firms with a high asset turnover ratio financed 54.68 percent of their assets with debt. The 
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data confirmed that, in this market, on the average firm financed 40.790 percent of their assets 
using debt capital. 
On examination of the asset turnover ratio (performance) there appears to be a performance 
effect(asset turnover effect) on capital structure. In table 6.9, the variation in the total debt to 
the total asset ratio (capital structure) is easily visible across asset turnover ratio levels. 
Therefore, the NSE data confirms that low usage of debt is associated with low asset turnover 
ratio (performance) and that firms with a debt ratio above 54.68 percent outperform those with 
the medium and low debt ratio. 
Firms in which the largest shareholder held 20 percent to 50 percent of the share capital on 
average financed 36.883 percent of their assets with debt capital; firms in which the largest 
shareholder held more than 51 percent (51 percent to 100 percent) of the share capital on 
average financed 42.1 percent of their assets with debt capital. Firms in which the largest 
shareholder held below 20 percent of the share capital use the highest amount of the debt, that 
is, financed 49.918 percent of their assets with debt capital.  
It appeared that ownership structure has influence on capital structure. Firms in which the 
largest shareholder held 20 percent to 50 percent of the share capital coupled with a low asset 
turnover ratio on average financed 21.975 percent of their assets with debt capital; firms in 
which the largest shareholder held more than 51 percent (51 percent to 100 percent) of the 
share capital coupled with a low asset turnover ratio on average financed 34.727percent of 
their assets with debt capital. Firms in which the largest shareholder held below 20 percent of 
the share capital coupled with a low asset turnover ratio financed 5.043percent of their assets 
with debt capital. Therefore, it appears that ownership structure combined with performance 
has significant influence on capital structure. 
Firms, in which the largest shareholder held 20 percent to 50 percent of the share capital, 
coupled a medium asset turnover, on average financed 39.050 percent of their assets with debt 
capital. Firms in which the largest shareholder held more than 51 percent (51 percent to 100 
percent) of the share capital, coupled with a medium asset turnover ratio on, average financed 
39.237 percent of their assets with debt capital. Firms in which the largest shareholder held 
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below 20 percent of the share capital coupled with a medium asset turnover ratio, financed 
51.884 percent of their assets with debt. 
Firms, in which the largest shareholder held 20 percent to 50 percent of the share capital, 
coupled a high asset turnover ratio, on average financed 57.820percent of their assets with 
debt capital. Firms in which the largest shareholder held more than 51 percent (51 percent to 
100 percent) of the share capital, coupled with a high asset turnover ratio, on average financed 
53.606 percent of assets with debt capital. Firms in which the largest shareholder held below 
20 percent of the share capital,coupled with high asset turnover ratio, finance 37.930 percent 
of their assets with debt capital. 
When the asset turnover ratio is used as an indicator of performance, the data on the NSE 
support the performance risk hypothesis, that is, more profitable, or that more efficient firms 
use more debt. The data fail to confirm the franchise value hypothesis that stipulates that firms 
might prefer to lower the total debt to the total asset ratio to reduce their exposure to financial 
risk. Therefore, the data support the hypothesis that the population means for low asset 
turnover ratio, medium asset turnover ratio and high asset turnover ratio with respect to total 
debt to total assets ratios (capital structure) are not equal taking into account ownership 
structure. 
6.6.2 Homogeneity of Variance Test - Asset turnover ratio on total debt to total 
assets ratio 
The homogeneity of variance test is to confirm if the differences in variances in capital structure 
(total debt to total assets) by performance (across categories of the asset turnover ratio), 
ownership structure (shareholdings) and interaction term (ownership structure*asset turnover 
ratio) were statistically significant. Levene‘s (1960) test for equality of variance is a criterion 
for satisfying this assumption, and the result presented in Table 6.10. 
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Table 6.10:  Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances
a
 - 
Dependent Variable: Total Debt to Total Assets 
F df1 df2 Sig. 
5.888 8 691 0.0001 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of 
the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
Design: Intercept + OwnStrCa + Lev Asset Turnover Ratio + OwnStrCa * Lev Asset 
Turnover Ratio.  
(Source: Author) 
The significance level for homogeneity of variance of 0.0001 confirmed that the error 
variance for the dependent (the total debt to the total asset ratio- capital structure) variable is 
not equal across the groups (asset turnover ratio). Therefore, the assumption to the ANOVA 
test has not been met. The data reject the hypothesis that the population variances for low 
asset turnover ratio, medium asset turnover ratio and medium asset turnover ratio with respect 
to the total debt to the total dependent variable are equal. 
6.6.3 Interpretation of the relationship – Asset turnover ratio on total  debt to 
total asset ratio 
The results of ―Tests of Between-Subjects Effects‖ presented in Table 6.11 help in confirming 
if the relationship between the asset turnover ratio and the total debt to the total asset ratio is 
statistically significant. The dependent variable is the total debt to the total asset ratio, with the 
predictor variables being asset turnover ratio and ownership structure as a control. The 
statistical test confirmed a relationship between the predicted variable (capital structure) and 
predictor variable (performance); and that the different categories of the independent variable 
performance (asset turnover ratio levels - low, medium, and high) are linked to the different 
average scores on the dependent variable (capital structure).  
 
In the model in table 6.11, the values of intercept, the asset turnover ratio (LeAssTurn) and 
interaction term (OwnStrCa * LeAssTurn) are statistically significant because their 
significance level is greater than the cut off level of <0.05; therefore, these variables had an 
effect on capital structure. Ownership structure (OwnStrCa) (p = 0.126) has no effect on 
capital structure. 
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Table 6.11:  Tests of Between-Subjects Effects - Dependent Variable: 
Total Debt to Total Assets 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
Df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 9.638
a
 8 1.205 21.461 0.0001 0.199 
Intercept 12.695 1 12.695 226.141 0.0001 0.247 
OwnStrCa .233 2 0.117 2.076 0.126 0.006 
LeAssTurn 1.013 2 0.507 9.026 0.0001 0.025 
OwnStrCa * 
LeAssTurn 
1.215 4 0.304 5.411 0.0001 0.030 
Error 38.790 691 0.056 
   
Total 164.896 700 
    
Corrected Total 48.428 699 
    
a. R Squared = 0.199 (Adjusted R Squared = 0.190) Source: Author 
The overall corrected model, F value = 21.46 and p-value of 0.0001 are statistically 
significant. The null hypothesis that "the mean total debt to the total asset ratio (capital 
structure) was not equal across all categories of the asset turnover ratio" is supported by data. 
However, this does not tell us which component of the asset turnover ratio, whether low, 
medium and high, behaves differently.  
Effect size is a quantitative measure of the strength of a phenomenon. The partial eta squared 
measure of effect size on the relationship between asset turnover ratio and total debt to the 
total asset ratio is presented in Table 6.11. Based on Cohen's criteria for effect size, except for 
the intercept, all other partial eta squares are small, but much higher than in the case of the 
book value to the market value ratio.  The statement that "membership in categories defined 
by asset turnover ratio categories accounts for a reasonable amount of the differences in 
average total debt to the total asset ratio" is therefore, marginally supported. 
6.6.4 Estimated marginal means – asset turnover ratio on total debt to total 
assets ratio 
The result from the comparison of estimated marginal means of total debt to the total asset 
ratio (as dependent variable) for groups within asset turnover ratio (as the predictor variable) 
while holding ownership structure constant is presented in Table 6.12. The results are that 
firms in which the largest shareholder held 20 percent to 50 percent of the share capital, 
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coupledwith a low asset turnover ratio, on average financed 22.0 percent of their assets with 
debt capital. Firms in which the largest shareholder held more than 51 percent (51 percent to 
100 percent) of the share capital, coupled with a low asset turnover ratio, on average financed 
34.7 percent of their assets using debt capital; and firms in which the largest shareholder held 
below 20 percent of the share capital, coupled with a low turnover ratio, on average financed 5 
percent of their assets using debt capital. 
 
The results are that firms in which the largest shareholder held 20 percent to 50 percent of the 
share capital, coupledwith a medium asset turnover ratio, on average financed 39.1 percent of 
their assets with debt capital.Firms in which the largest shareholder held more than 51 percent 
(51 percent to 100 percent) of the share capital, coupled with a medium asset turnover ratio, 
on average financed 39.2 percent of their assets using debt capital. Firms in which the largest 
shareholder held below 20 percent of the share capital, coupled with a medium turnover ratio, 
on average financed 51.9 percent of their assets with debt capital. 
Table 6.12: Estimated means  based on categorised ownership structure * Lev Asset 
Turnover Ratio –Dependent Variable: Total Debt to Total Assets 
 
Categorised Ownership Structure Lev Asset Turnover Ratio Mean 
Std. 
Error 
95percent 
Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Shareholdings 20percent to 
50percent 
Low 0.073 - 0.6882 0.220 0.022 0.177 0.263 
Medium 0.6926 - 1.1073 0.391 0.026 0.339 0.442 
High 1.114 - 10.1856 0.578 0.028 0.524 0.632 
Shareholdings 51percent to 
100percent 
Low 0.073 - 0.6882 0.347 0.022 0.304 0.390 
Medium 0.6926 - 1.1073 0.392 0.020 0.353 0.431 
High 1.114 - 10.1856 0.536 0.019 0.499 0.574 
Shareholdings Below 20percent Low 0.073 - 0.6882 0.050 0.168 -0.279 0.379 
Medium 0.6926 - 1.1073 0.519 0.079 0.364 0.674 
High 1.114 - 10.1856 0.379 0.118 0.147 0.612 
Based on observed means, the error term is Mean Square (Error) = .056. The mean difference 
is significant at the 0.05 level. 
Lev = Level 
Source: Author 
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Firms in which the largest shareholder held 20 percent to 50 percent of the share capital, 
coupledwith a high asset turnover ratio, on average financed 57.8 percent of their assets with 
debt capital. Firms in which the largest shareholder held more than 51 percent (51 percent to 
100 percent) of the share capital, coupled with a high asset turnover ratio, on average financed 
53.6 percent of their assets with debt capital; and firms in which the largest shareholder held 
below 20 percent of the share capital, coupled with a high turnover, on average financed 37.9 
percent of their assets with debt capital. There appeared to be differences in capital structure 
among low, medium and high asset turnover firms, taking into account into account 
ownership structure as the control variable. 
6.6.5 Interpretation of the post hoc effects – asset turnover ratio on total debt to 
total assets ratio 
The next three statements are possible interpretation of the post-hoc effects. Each one is 
verified independently for significance in terms of pair-wise comparisons, andthe results 
presented in Table 6.13. The preview to the analysis is the means and standard deviations 
presented in Table 6.1. 
 
The first statement was that a group within asset turnover ratio, that was categorised as a low 
asset turnover ratio (with mean of 0.4545 and a standard deviation of 0.1513) used more debt 
than the other group within the asset turnover ratio, that was categorised as a medium asset 
turnover ratio (with a mean of 0.8917 and a standard deviation of 0.1192). The difference 
between the groups the means of -0.11506, had a p-value of 0.0001, is statistically significant. 
 
The second statement was that a group within asset turnover ratio categorised as a medium 
asset turnover ratio (with a mean of 0.8917 and a standard deviation of 0.1192) used more 
debt than the other group within the asset turnover ratio categorised as a high asset turnover 
ratio (with a mean of 2.0581 and a standard deviation of 1.0653). The difference between the 
group means of -0.15023 has a p-value of 0.0001, is statistically significant. 
 
The third statement was that a group within asset turnover ratio categorised as a low asset 
turnover ratio (with a mean of 0.4545 and a standard deviation of 0.1513) used more debt 
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thanthe other group within the asset turnover ratio categorisedas ahigh asset turnover ratio 
(with a mean of 2.0581 and a standard deviation of 1.0653).However, the difference of 
0.26529between the groups with a p-value of 0.0001, which is less than the critical value of 
0.05 is statistically significant. 
 
The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. Therefore, the null hypothesis that the 
population means for low asset turnover ratio (performance), medium asset turnover ratio and 
medium asset turnover ratio with respect to the total debt to total assets ratios as the dependent 
variable (capital structure) are not equal taking into account ownership structure is supported 
by the data. As a result, when the asset turnover ratio is used as an indicator of performance, 
performance affects debt usage. 
 
 
 
Table 6.13: Multiple Comparisons - Total debt to total assets ratio byLev asset turnover 
ratioTukey HSD 
(I) Lev Asset Turnover 
Ratio 
(J) Lev Asset Turnover 
Ratio 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
95percent 
Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Low 0.073 - 0.6882 Medium 0.6926 - 1.1073 -.11506
*
 0.021904 0.0001 -0.16650 -0.06361 
High 1.114 - 10.1856 -.26529
*
 0.021951 0.0001 -0.31685 -0.21373 
Medium 0.6926 - 1.1073 Low 0.073 - 0.6882 .11506
*
 0.021904 0.0001 0.06361 0.16650 
High 1.114 - 10.1856 -.15023
*
 0.021951 0.0001 -0.20179 -0.09867 
High 1.114 - 10.1856 Low 0.073 - 0.6882 .26529
*
 0.021951 0.0001 0.21373 0.31685 
Medium 0.6926 - 1.1073 .15023
*
 0.021951 0.0001 0.09867 0.20179 
 
Based on observed means, the error term is Mean Square (Error) = 0.056. *.  
Source: Author 
6.6.6 Homogenous Subsets Test – Total debt to total assets ratio withasset 
turnover ratio 
In this case, the groups are derived from the asset turnover ratio (performance), and the asset 
turnover ratios are the independent variable, (that is, low asset turnover ratio, medium asset 
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turnover ratio and highasset turnoverratio as groups – grouping levels). The derived groups 
are used to predict total debt to the total assetratio (capital structure) andto establish if there 
are significant capital structure variations between the groups. The results are presented in 
table 6.14. 
Table 6.14: Homogenous Subset Total debt to total assets ratio Tukey 
HSD
a,,b,,c 
 
Lev Asset Turnover Ratio N 
Subset 
1 2 3 
Low 0.073 - 0.6882 234 0.28151 
  
Medium 0.6926 - 1.1073 234 
 
0.39657 
 
High 1.114 - 10.1856 232 
  
0.54680 
Sig.   1.000 1.000 1.000 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.  Based on observed means, the error 
term is Mean Square (Error) = 0.056. 
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 233.330.b. The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic 
mean of the group sizes is used. Type I error levels are not guaranteed.c. Alpha = 0.05.Source: 
Author 
The means that are listed under each subset comprise a set of means that are not significantly 
different from each other. But in this case, as shown in Table 6.14, the means are under 
different subsets; because each group is under a different subset. We conclude that the total 
debt to the total asset ratio for groups within the asset turnover ratio is significantly distinct. 
Poor asset turnover ratios are associated with low usage of debt. That group financed only 
28.151 percent of the assets with debt capital.  Cases of a high asset turnover ratio are 
associated with more usage of debt, as that group financed 54.68 percent of the assets with 
debtcapital. The null hypothesis that the population means and variance for low asset turnover 
ratio (performance), medium asset turnover ratio and medium asset turnover ratio with respect 
to the total debt to the total assetratio (capital structure) are not equal taking into account 
ownership structure is supported by the data. 
 
6.6.7 Summary – Asset turnover ratio on total debt to total asset ratio 
The question was, ―Does the asset turnover ratio (performance) have an impact on total debt 
to the total asset ratio (capital structure)? To answer this question, a number of statistical tests 
were done and results presented. Using the asset turnover ratio as a performance indicator, the 
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tests of between-subjects effects and the post-hoc test revealed a difference in capital structure 
across performance levels. The multiple comparisons and homogenous subset's test reveal a 
difference in capital structure between performance levels. Therefore, the two null hypothesis: 
Null hypothesis H0: µlow asset turnover ratio ≠ µmedium asset turnover ratio ≠µhigh asset 
turnover ratio- the population means for low asset turnover ratio, medium asset turnover ratio 
and high asset turnover ratio with respect to the total debt to the total assetratio (capital 
structure) as the dependent variables are not equal taking into account ownership structure is 
supported by the data; and 
Null hypothesis H0: σ
2 
low asset turnover ratio ≠σ2 medium asset turnoverratio ≠σ2 medium 
asset turnover ratio- the population variances for low asset turnover ratio, medium asset 
turnover ratio and high asset turnover ratio with respect to the total debt to the total asset ratio 
(capital structure) as the dependent variable are not equal taking into account ownership 
structure is supported by the data. Therefore, when asset turnover is used as a performance 
indicator, performance affects the amount of debt employed by firms. 
6.7 Influence of capital structure on performance 
The impact of capital structure on performance is addressed in this section. This seeks an 
answer to the question: ―What are the main effects of the capital structure and ownership 
structure as independent variables on performance as the dependent variable?‖ and, ―What are 
the interactions among the predictor variables, namely capital structure with ownership 
structure?‖ In answering this question, capital structure and ownership structure is the 
predictor variable while performance is the predicted variable. The hypothesis is: 
H02: Leverage does not have significant effect on firm performance; the alternative 
hypothesis: 
H12: Leverage has a significant effect on firm performance. 
 
Performancei = αi + βiCapitalStructurei + βiControlVariablesi+ Ɛi 
Whereα, β parameters to be estimated and Ɛ are is the error term 
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6.7.1 Influence of total debt to total asset ratio (capital structure) on book 
 value to market value performance 
In chapter two, it was pointed out that debt capital can moderate manager‘s excesses thus 
enhancing performance; therefore, we start the analysis by assessing the impact of capital 
structure on performance. The total debt to the total asset ratio, an indicator of capital structure, is 
used to predict the book value to market value, an indicator of performance. The question to be 
answered is, ―Does the total debt to the total asset ratio (capital structure) have an impact on 
book value to the market value ratio (performance)? The sub hypothesis is that: 
Null hypothesis H0: µhigh debt ratio≠ µmedium debt ratio ≠ µlow debt ratio- the population 
means for firms with the high debt ratio, medium debt ratio, and low debt ratio, with the book 
value to the market value ratio asthe dependent variable (performance) withownership 
structure as a control variable is not equal. 
Alternative hypothesis H1: µ high debt ratio = µ medium debt ratio = µ low debt ratio- the 
population means for firms with the high debt ratio, medium debt ratio, and low debt ratio, 
with the book value to the market value ratio as the dependent variable (performance) with 
ownership structure as a control variable is equal. 
Null hypothesis H0: σ
2 
high debt ratio≠ σ2 medium debt ratio ≠σ2 low debt ratio- the 
population variances for firms with high debt ratio, medium debt ratio, and low debt ratio, 
with the book value to the market value ratio as the dependent variable (performance) with 
ownership structure are notequal. 
Alternative hypothesis H1: σ
2 
high debt ratio = σ2 medium debt ratio = σ2 low debt ratio- the 
population variance for firms with high debt ratio, medium debt ratio, and low debt ratio, with 
the book value to the market value ratio as the dependent variable (performance) with 
ownership structure as a control variable is equal. 
6.7.2 Descriptive Statistics - Influence of debt ratio on book to market ratio 
The basic statistics for each combination of factor and covariate in the model, capital structure 
(debt ratio levels) and ownership structure (shareholdings) as the predictor variable with the 
book to market value as the independent variable are in Table 6.15. The N column in Table 
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6.15 shows that there are unequal cell sizes. During the period of this study majority of firms, 
326 out of 708 cases had a low debt ratio; 125 out of 708 cases had the medium debt ratio, and 
257 out of 708 cases had a high debt ratio. 
 
The result showed that firms with a high debt ratio have on average the highest book value to 
the market value ratio (growth) of 1.4860; and that not much difference in the book value to 
the market value ratio between the medium debt ratio (with the book value to the market value 
ratio of 2.1149) and a low debt ratio (with the book value to the market value ratio of 1.7131), 
that is, if rounded to one decimal point, (see total section in Table 6.15). At this point, the best 
performance is associated with a high debt ratio. 
 
Table 6.15:    Descriptive statistics capital structure (debt ratio) on performance - 
Dependent variable: Book value to market value ratio 
 
Categorised Ownership Structure 
Categorised Total Debt to Total 
Assets 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
N 
Shareholdings 20percent to 50percent High Debt ratio   0.45 to 2.03956 0.9682 0.8330 87 
Medium Debt ratio  0.3515 to 
0.44781 
1.1944 1.0135 41 
Low Debt ratio 0  to 0.34278 1.3274 1.1492 145 
Total 1.1929 1.0466 273 
Shareholdings 51percent to 
100percent 
High Debt ratio   0.45 to 2.03956 1.8161 2.2310 162 
Medium Debt ratio  0.3515 to 
0.44781 
2.6017 6.2202 82 
Low Debt ratio 0  to 0.34278 2.0722 3.9269 176 
Total 2.0768 3.9891 420 
Shareholdings Below 20percent High Debt ratio   0.45 to 2.03956 0.4325 0.3062 8 
Medium Debt ratio  0.3515 to 
0.44781 
1.0250 0.3889 2 
Low Debt ratio 0  to 0.34278 0.2600 0.1720 5 
Total 0.4540 0.3556 15 
Total High Debt ratio   0.45 to 2.03956 1.4860 1.8870 257 
Medium Debt ratio  0.3515 to 
0.44781 
2.1149 5.1052 125 
Low Debt ratio 0  to 0.34278 1.7131 3.0096 326 
Total 1.7016 3.1735 708 
Source: Author 
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It appears that ownership structure has influence on performance. Firms in which the largest 
shareholder held 20 percent to 50 percent of the share capital, on average had a book value to 
the market value ratio of 1.1929. Firms in which the largest shareholder held more than 51 
percent (51 percent to 100 percent) of the share capital on average had the lowest book value 
to the market value ratio of 2.0768; and firms in which the largest shareholder held below 20 
percent of the share capital on average had the highest book value to market value of 0.4540. 
The best performance is associated with dispersed shareholding; and it is possible that the 
shares of such trade frequently. 
Firms in which the largest shareholder held 20 percent to 50 percent of the share capital, 
coupled withhigh debt ratio, had an average book value to the market value ratio of 
0.9682.Firms in which the largest shareholder held below 20 percent of the share capital, 
coupled with a high debt ratio had anaverage book value to the market value ratio of 0.432; 
and firms in which the largest shareholder held more than 51 percent (51 percent to 100 
percent) of the share capital, coupled with high debt ratio, had an average book value to the 
market value ratio of 1.8161. The best bet then would be a firm where shareholding is 
dispersed (shareholdings below 20 percent) with a substantial amount of debt in capital 
structure. 
Firms, in which the largest shareholder held 20 percent to 50 percent of the share capital, 
coupledmedium debt ratio, had an average book value to market value of 1.1944. Firms in 
which the largest shareholder held below 20 percent of the share capital, coupled with a 
medium debt ratio, had an average book value to the market value ratio of 1.0250; and firms 
in which the largest shareholder held more than 51 percent (51 percent to 100 percent) of the 
share capital, coupled with a medium debt ratio, had an average book value to the market 
value ratio of 2.6017. The best bet then would be a firm where shareholding is dispersed 
(shareholdings below 20 percent) with the medium amount of debt in capital structure. 
Firms in which the largest shareholder held 20 percent to 50 percent of the share capital, 
coupled with a low debt ratio, hadan average book value to the market value ratio of 1.3274. 
Firms in which the largest shareholder held below 20 percent of the share capital, coupled 
witha low debt ratio, had an average book value to the market value ratio of 0.2600; and firms 
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in which the largest shareholder held more than 51 percent (51 percent to 100 percent) of the 
share capital, coupled witha low debt ratio, had an average book value to the market value 
ratio of 2.0722. The best bet then would be a firm where shareholding is dispersed 
(shareholdings below 20 percent) with a low amount of debt in capital structure. 
6.7.3 Homogeneity of variance test – total debt to total assets ratio on  book 
value ratio to market value ratio 
The homogeneity of variance test confirms the differences in variances in performance (book 
value ratio to the market value ratio) predicted by capital structure (across categories of the 
total debt to the total asset ratio), ownership structure (shareholdings) and interaction term 
(ownership structure*total debt to the total asset ratio). The analysis of variance assumes that 
the variance of the dependent variable is homogeneous across all the cells formed by the 
factors (independent variable). This tests the equality of means across groups and equality of 
variances across groups to establish if a difference exists or not. Levene‘s (1960) test for 
equality of variance is a criterion for satisfying this assumption, and the result presented in 
Table 6.16. 
 
Table 6.16: Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances a Dependent Variable: 
Book to Market Ratio 
 
F df1 df2 Sig. 
6.042 8 699 0.0001 
Source: Author 
The significance result for homogeneity of variance is <.05, which shows that the error 
variance of the dependent variable is not equal across the groups, that is, the assumption of the 
ANOVA test has not been met. 
6.7.4 Interpretation of the Relationship – Total debt to total assets ratioonbook 
value to market value ratio 
The confirmation of a relationship between the predicted variable (the book value to the 
market value ratio as a performance indicator) and predictor variable (grouping variable - total 
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debt to the total asset ratio as a capital structure indicator) is an affirmation that distinct 
categories of the independent variable (the groups within the total debt to the total assetratio 
are: ratio - high debt ratio, medium debt ratio, and low debt ratio) are linked to the different 
average scores within the dependent variable (the book value to the market value ratio - 
performance). The statement is correct if the relationship is statistically significant in the 
―Tests of Between-Subjects Effects." The results of tests between subject variables with the 
book value to the market value ratio as dependent variable and total debt to the total asset ratio 
as predictor variable and ownership structure as a control variable are presented in Table 6.17. 
Since there is more than one independent variable for this analysis, the entries for the 
―Corrected Model‖ and the variable will not be identical. 
 
Table 6.17: Tests of Between-Subjects Effects - Dependent Variable: Book value to 
market value ratio 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares 
Df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 194.580
a
 8 24.323 2.455 0.013 0.027 
Intercept 153.427 1 153.427 15.485 0.0001 0.022 
OwnStrCa 150.905 2 75.453 7.615 0.001 0.021 
TDtTAca 3.824 2 1.912 0.193 0.825 0.001 
OwnStrCa * TDtTAca 9.838 4 2.459 0.248 0.911 0.001 
Error 6925.827 699 9.908 
   
Total 9170.405 708 
    
Corrected Total 7120.407 707 
    
Source: Author 
The significance value of intercept, ownership structure (OwnStrCa) values (ownership) are 
significant (<0.05), therefore, these variables have effect on the book value to the market 
value ratio (performance) (see Table 6.17). However, there is no effect of the total debt to the 
total asset ratio (TDtTAca) (p = 0.825) on the book value to the market value ratio 
(performance). The nullhypothesis that "the mean book value to the market value ratio was 
not equal across all categories of the total debt to the total asset ratio‖ is not supported by the 
data. The result showed that there is no effect of interaction term (OwnStrCa * TDtTAca), (p 
= 0.911) on the book value to the market value ratio (performance). However, ownership 
structure (OwnStrCa) has effect (p = 0.001) on book value to the market value ratio 
(performance); therefore, the hypothesis that ―the mean book value to market value was equal 
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across all categories of ownership structure (OwnStrCa)‖ is not supported by the data. The 
overall corrected model, F value = 2.455 and p-value of 0.013 are statistically significant. 
The interpretation of Cohen‘s criteria for effect size is:  less than .01 = trivial; 0.01 up to 0.06 
= small; 0.06 up to 0.14 = moderate; 0.14 or greater = large (Field, 2009). Based on preceding 
scale, except for the intercept, all other partial eta squares are either trivial or small. On the 
basis of Cohen's criteria, all partial eta squares are trivial. The statement that membership in 
categories defined by total debt to total asset ratio class identification accounts for the 
differences in the average book value to the market value ratio is not supported by the data. 
6.7.5 Estimated marginal means – total debt to total assets ratio on book value to 
market value ratio 
The estimated marginal means that is the mean response for each factor, adjusted for any other 
variables within the model (Ho, 2006). The result from the comparison of estimated marginal 
means of the book value to the market value ratio (as dependent variable) for groups within 
the total debt to the total asset ratio (as the predictor variable) while holding the ownership 
structure constant is presented in Table 6.18. 
 
In interpreting the results, negative growth meant the book value per share is greater than the 
market value per share; positive growth meant that the market value per share is greater than 
the book value per share; and no-growth meant the book value per share is equal to the market 
value per share. The results were that firms in which the largest shareholder held 20 percent to 
50 percent of the share capital, coupled with a high debt ratio, and on average had a positive 
growth (0.968). Firms in which the largest shareholder held more than 51 percent (51 percent 
to 100 percent) of the share capital, coupled with a high debt ratio, on average had a negative 
growth (1.816); and firms in which the largest shareholder held below 20 percent of the share 
capital coupled with a high debt ratio on average had a positive growth (0.432).  
The result showed that firms in which the largest shareholder held 20 percent to 50 percent of 
the share capital, coupled with a medium debt ratio on average had a negative growth (1.194). 
Firms in which the largest shareholder held more than 51 percent (51 percent to 100 percent) 
of the share capital, coupledwith a medium debt ratio, on average had a negative growth 
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(2.602); and Firms in which the largest shareholder held below 20 percent of the share capital, 
coupledwith the medium debt ratio, on average had insignificant growth (1.025). 
Firms in which the largest shareholder held 20 percent to 50 percent of the share capital 
coupled with a low debt ratio had a negative growth of 1.327; firms in which the largest 
shareholder held more than 51 percent (51 percent to 100 percent) of the share capital coupled 
with a low debt ratio on average had a negative growth of 2.072. Firms in which the largest 
shareholder held below 20 percent of the share capital coupled with a low debt ratio on 
average had a positive growth of 0.260. 
 
Table 6.18: Categorised Ownership Structure * Categorised total debt to total 
assets ratio- Dependent variable: Book value to market value ratio 
Categorised Ownership 
Structure 
Categorised Total Debt to 
Total Assets 
Mean 
Std. 
Error 
95percent 
Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Shareholdings 20percent to 
50percent 
High Debt ratio   0.45 to 
2.03956 
0.968 0.337 0.306 1.631 
Medium Debt ratio  0.3515 to 
0.44781 
1.194 0.492 0.229 2.160 
Low Debt ratio 0  to 0.34278 1.327 0.261 0.814 1.841 
Shareholdings 51percent to 
100percent 
High Debt ratio   0.45 to 
2.03956 
1.816 0.247 1.331 2.302 
Medium Debt ratio  0.3515 to 
0.44781 
2.602 0.348 1.919 3.284 
Low Debt ratio 0  to 0.34278 2.072 0.237 1.606 2.538 
Shareholdings Below 
20percent 
High Debt ratio   0.45 to 
2.03956 
0.432 1.113 -1.753 2.618 
Medium Debt ratio  0.3515 to 
0.44781 
1.025 2.226 -3.345 5.395 
Low Debt ratio 0  to 0.34278 0.260 1.408 -2.504 3.024 
Source: Author 
However, at the 95 percent confidence interval the means of book value to market value ratios 
by shareholdings below 20 percent and by all levels are not statistically significant because 
the lower bound is negative while the upper bound is positive. This is not the case for the 
other categorised capital structure and all levels of debt. In conclusion, there are small 
insignificant differences in book value to market value between high debt ratio firms, medium 
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debt ratio and low debt ratio firms; even so, the difference remained constant for the three 
types of shareholdings, and there is no interaction effect. 
6.7.6 Interpretation of the post hoc effects - total debt to total asset ratio 
 (capital structure) on the book value to market value ratio (performance) 
The next three statements are possible interpretation of the post-hoc effects. Each one should 
be verified independently for significance in pair-wise comparisons as presented in Table 
6.19. The preview to this analysis, that is the means and standard deviations are as presented 
in Table 6.1. 
 
The first statement was that a group within the total debt to the total asset ratio, that was 
categorised a ―high debt ratio‖ (with mean of 0.54680 and standard deviation of 0.298641), 
performed better than (showed a better book value to the market value ratio) the other group 
categorised as a ―medium debt ratio‖ (with a mean of 0.39657 and standard deviation of 
0.181080).However, the difference between the two groups‘ means (-0.629) is statistically 
insignificant (p-value = 0.160). 
 
The second statement was, a group within the total debt to the total asset ratio categorised as 
―medium debt ratio‖ (with a mean of 0.39657 and standard deviation of 0.181080) post a 
better performance (showed a better book value to market ratio) those classified as ―low debt 
ratio‖ (mean of 0.28151, standard deviation of 0.226391). The groups' mean difference of 
0.402has a p-value of0.446, which is greater than the critical value of 0.05. The difference is 
not statistically significant. 
. 
The third statement was, a group within the total debt to the total asset ratio categorised as 
―low debt ratio‖ (with a mean of 0.28151 and a standard deviation of 0.226391) post a better 
performance (book value to market ratio) than those classified as ―high debt ratio‖ (with a 
mean of 0.54680 and a standard deviation of 0.298641).  The groups' mean difference of 
0.227 has a p-value of 0.663, which is greater than the critical value of 0.05. The difference is 
not statistically significant. 
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The 95percent confidence intervals reported to have been negative lower bound and positive 
upper bound, confirming that the differences in the means are by chance. Therefore, as far as 
the data in this study, there are no visible differences in performance across different 
categories of debt levels. If we stop the study at this point, then the conclusion is that debt 
capital has no influence on performance; therefore, debt capital fails to reinforce corporate 
governance. 
 
Table 6.19: Multiple Comparisons Book to Market RatioTukey HSD 
 
(I) Categorised Total Debt 
to Total Assets 
(J) Categorised Total Debt 
to Total Assets 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
95percent 
Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
High Debt ratio   0.45 to 
2.03956 
Medium Debt ratio  0.3515 to 
0.44781 
-0.629 0.343 0.160 -1.435 0.177 
Low Debt ratio 0  to 0.34278 -0.227 0.263 0.663 -0.844 0.390 
Medium Debt ratio  0.3515 to 
0.44781 
High Debt ratio   0.45 to 
2.03956 
0.629 0.343 0.160 -0.177 1.435 
Low Debt ratio 0  to 0.34278 0.402 0.331 0.446 -0.376 1.180 
Low Debt ratio 0  to 0.34278 High Debt ratio   0.45 to 
2.03956 
0.227 0.263 0.663 -0.390 0.844 
Medium Debt ratio  0.3515 to 
0.44781 
-0.402 0.331 0.446 -1.180 0.376 
Source: Author 
6.7.7 Homogenous subsets test – total debt to total assets ratiowith book value to 
market value ratio  
The final test is the homogenous subsets' test; in this case, Tukey's HSD (honest significant 
difference test) test is appropriate because the interest to the researcher is to find means that 
are significantly different from each other (Kinnear & Gray, 1999). The homogeneous subsets' 
output is generated along with post hoc tests and show, which pair of groups has distinct 
means on the dependent variable. Subset output would not be interpreted if the main effect 
was not significant. In this case, the pairs of groups are based on total debt to the total asset 
ratio (capital structure), the independent variable; that is, high debt ratio, low debt ratio and 
medium debt ratio as groups are the grouping levels) and the book value to the market 
value(performance) is dependent variable. The groups are listed in order of their ascending 
means (see Table 6.20).  
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Table 6.20: Book value to market value Tukey HSDa,,b,,c 
 
Categorised Total Debt to Total Assets N 
Subset 
1 
High Debt ratio   0.45 to 2.03956 257 1.48599 
Low Debt ratio 0  to 0.34278 326 1.71313 
Medium Debt ratio  0.3515 to 0.44781 125 2.11488 
Sig. 
 
0.113 
Source: Author 
However, given that means are all under one subset, the means are not significantly different 
from each other. The p-value of 0.113, is greater than 0.05, confirmed no difference in book 
value to market value (performance) if the total debt to the total asset ratio (capital structure) 
is used as a discriminating variable. 
6.7.8 Summary – Influence of total debt total asset ratio (capital structure) on 
book value to market ratio value (performance) 
The question was, ―Does total debt to total assets ratio (capital structure) affects the book 
value to the market value ratio (performance)? To answer this question, a number of statistical 
tests were done and results presented. However, using the total debt to the total asset (capital 
structure indicator) as a predictor variable, the tests of between-subjects effects and the post-
shock test did not confirm differencesin performances across categories of capital structure 
(the total debt to the total asset). 
 
The estimated marginal means revealed no interaction between the debt ratio and ownership 
structure in a manner that propel firms to better performance. Multiple comparisons and 
homogenous subsets test showed no difference in performance across capital structure levels. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis H0: µ high debt ratio≠µ medium debtratio ≠ µlow debt ratio-the 
population means for firms with high debt ratio, medium debt ratio, and low debt ratio, with 
the book value to the market value ratio asthe dependent variables (performance) are not equal 
taking into account ownership structure is not supported by the data; and 
The null hypothesis H0: σ
2  
high debtratio ≠ σ2 medium debt ratio ≠ σ2 low debt ratio- the 
population variances for firms with high debt ratio, medium debt ratio, and low debt ratio, 
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with the book value to the market value ratio as the dependent variables (performance) are not 
equal taking into account ownership structure is not supported by the data. In conclusion, the 
total debt to the total asset ratio (capital structure) has no influence on the book value to the 
market value ratio (performance). 
6.8 Influence of total debt to total assets ratio on asset turnover ratio 
This is a further assessment the impact of capital structure on performance; the total debt to the 
total asset ratio (capital structure) is used to predict the asset turnover ratio (performance). The 
question to be answered is, ―Does the total debt to the total asset ratio (capital structure) have 
an impact on the asset turnover ratio (performance)? The sub hypothesis is that: 
Null hypothesis H0: µhigh debt ratio≠ µmedium debt ratio≠ µlow debt ratio- the population 
means for firms grouped into high debt ratio, medium debt ratio, and low debt ratio, with the 
asset turnover ratio as the dependent variable (performance) with ownership structure as 
control variables not equal. 
Alternative hypothesis H1: µ high debt ratio = µ medium debt ratio = µ low debt ratio- the 
population means for firms with the high debt ratio, medium debt ratio, and low debt ratio, 
with the asset turnover ratio as the dependent variable (performance) with ownership structure 
as a control variable is equal. 
Null hypothesis H0: σ
2
high debt ratio≠ σ2medium debt ratio ≠ σ2low debt ratio- the 
population variances for firms with high debt ratio, medium debt ratio, and low debt ratio, 
with the asset turnover ratio as the dependent variable (performance) with ownership structure 
as a control is not equal. 
Alternative hypothesis H1: σ
2
high debt ratio = σ2medium debt ratio = σ2low debt ratio- the 
population variance for firms with high debt ratio, medium debt ratio, and low debt ratio, with 
the asset turnover ratio as the dependent variable (performance) with ownership structure as a 
control variable are equal. 
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6.8.1 Descriptive Statistics –Total debt to total assets ratio (capital structure) on 
asset turnover ratio (performance) 
The descriptive statistics for each combination of factors in the model, capital structure (debt 
ratio levels) and ownership structure (shareholdings) with the asset turnover ratio as an 
independent variable are presented in Table 6.21. The N column in Table 6.21 shows that 
there are unequal cell sizes. Over the years' majority of firms' show low debt ratio in 318 out 
of 700 cases, those classified as of a medium debt ratio are 125 out of 700 cases, and case 
classified as a high debt ratio is equally large, 257 out of 700. 
 
It appears capital structure (total debt ratio) has a discriminating effect on performance (assets 
turnover ratio) (see total section on Table 6.21). The data in Table 6.21 showed that firms with 
a high debt ratio have on average an asset turnover ratio of 2.32; and there was sizable 
difference in the average asset turnover ratio between firms with medium debt ratio (2.21) and 
firms with a low debt ratio (1.66), the average ratio for all cases being two (2). 
Ownership structures marginally influenced the asset turnover ratio. Firms in which the 
largest shareholder held between 20 percent to 50 percent of the share capital on the average 
had an asset turnover ratio of 1.85, firms in which the largest shareholder held more than 51 
percent (51 percent to 100 percent) of the share capital on average had an asset turnover ratio 
of 2.09; and firms in which the largest shareholder held below 20 percent of the share capital 
on the average had an asset turnover ratio of 2.13. There may be an interaction effect between 
capital structure and ownership structure, because the mean differences in the asset turnover 
ratio by the debt ratio vary between ownership structures.  
Firms in which the largest shareholder held 20 percent to 50 percent of the share capital 
coupled with a high debt ratio (the total debt to the total asset)had an average asset turnover 
ratio of 2.32; firms in which the largest shareholder held below 20 percent of the share capital 
coupled with a high debt ratio had an average asset turnover ratio of 2.25; and firms in which 
the largest shareholder held more than 51 percent (51 percent to 100 percent) of the share 
capital coupled with a high debt ratio exhibited an average asset turnover ratio of 2.31. These 
averages appear not to be significantly different (see Table 6.21). 
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Table 6.21: Capital structure (debt ratio) on performance Dependent Variable: Asset 
Turnover Ratio 
 
Categorised Ownership Structure Categorised Total Debt to Total Assets Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
Shareholdings 20percent to 
50percent 
High Debt Ratio   0.45 to 2.03956 2.32 0.755 87 
Medium Debt Ratio  0.3515 to 0.44781 2.05 0.773 41 
Low Debt Ratio 0  to 0.34278 1.50 0.708 145 
Total 1.85 0.821 273 
Shareholdings 51percent to 
100percent 
High Debt Ratio   0.45 to 2.03956 2.31 0.784 162 
Medium Debt Ratio  0.3515 to 0.44781 2.28 0.690 82 
Low Debt Ratio 0  to 0.34278 1.79 0.783 168 
Total 2.09 0.805 412 
Shareholdings Below 20percent High Debt Ratio   0.45 to 2.03956 2.25 0.463 8 
Medium Debt Ratio  0.3515 to 0.44781 2.50 0.707 2 
Low Debt Ratio 0  to 0.34278 1.80 0.837 5 
Total 2.13 0.640 15 
Total High Debt Ratio   0.45 to 2.03956 2.32 0.764 257 
Medium Debt Ratio  0.3515 to 0.44781 2.21 0.722 125 
Low Debt Ratio 0  to 0.34278 1.66 0.761 318 
Total 2.00 0.816 700 
Source: Author 
 
Firms in which the largest shareholder held 20 percent to 50 percent of the share 
capital,coupled with a medium debt ratio,had an average asset turnover ratio of 2.05. Firms in 
which the largest shareholder held below 20 percent of the share capital, coupled witha 
medium debt ratio,had an average asset turnover ratio of 2.50; and firms in which the largest 
shareholder held more than 51 percent (51 percent to 100 percent) of the share capital, 
coupled with a medium debt ratio,had an average asset turnover ratio of 2.28(see Table 6.21). 
Firms in which the largest shareholder held 20 percent to 50 percent of the share capital, 
coupled with low debt ratio,had an average asset turnover ratio of 1.50. Firms in which the 
largest shareholder held below 20 percent of the share capital, coupled witha low debt ratio 
had an average asset turnover ratio of 1.80; and firms in which the largest shareholder held 
more than 51 percent (51 percent to 100 percent) of the share capital, coupled with a low debt 
ratio, had an average asset turnover ratio of 1.79. The best bet then would be a firm where 
shareholding is dispersed (shareholdings below 20 percent) with a low amount of debt in 
capital structure (see able 6.21). 
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The best bet for performance sensitive investors would be a firm where shareholding is 
dispersed (shareholdings by the top investors is below 20 percent) and with a medium amount 
of debt in capital structure because at that level, the highest asset turnover ratio of 2.50 is 
posted. This suggests existence of an optimal capital structure. 
6.8.2 Homogeneity of variance test – Total debt to total assets ratio on asset 
turnover ratio 
The homogeneity of variance test confirms the differences in variances in performance (the asset 
turnover ratio) predicted by capital structure (across categories of the total debt to the total 
asset ratio), ownership structure (shareholdings) and interaction term (ownership 
structure*total debt to the total asset ratio). The analysis of variance assumes that the variance 
of the dependent variable is homogeneous across all the cells formed by the factors 
(independent variable). This tests the equality of means across groups and equality of 
variances across groups to establish if a difference exists or not. Levene‘s test for equality of 
variance is a criterion for satisfying this assumption, and the result presented in Table 6. 22. 
 
Table 6.22: Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa - Dependent 
Variable: Lev Asset Turnover Ratio 
F df1 df2 Sig. 
1.674 8 691 0.101 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances, tests the null hypothesis that the error variance 
of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + OwnStrCa + TDtTAca + OwnStrCa * TDtTAca. 
Source: Author 
The significance result for homogeneity of variance is >0.05, which shows that the error 
variance of the dependent variable is equal across the groups, that is, the assumption of the 
ANOVA test has been met. 
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6.8.3 Interpretation of the relationship – Total debt to total assets ratio on asset 
turnoverratio 
The relationship between the predicted variable (the asset turnover ratio as a performance 
indicator) and predictor variable (grouping variable - total debt to the total asset ratio as a capital 
structure indicator), if confirmed, is evidence that distinct categories of the independent 
variable (the independent variable which is the total debt to the total asset ratio or debt ratio 
contained the following groups: ratio - high debt ratio, medium debt ratio, and low debt ratio) are 
linked to the different average scores on the asset turnover ratio(performance). The statement 
is correct if the relationship is statistically significant in the ―Tests of Between-Subjects 
Effects." The results of tests of between-subjects effects are in Table 6.23. 
 
Table 6.23. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects - Dependent Variable : Asset Turnover 
Ratio 
Source: Author 
The data confirmed an effect of total debt to total assets ratio (capital structure) (TDtTAca) (p 
= 0.0001) on the asset turnover ratio (performance). The null hypothesis that "the mean asset 
turnover ratio was not equal across all categories of total debt to total assets‖ is supported by 
data. But, there is no effect of interaction term (OwnStrCa * TDtTAca), (p-value = 0.239). 
Ownership structure (OwnStrCa) has the effect on the asset turnover ratio, p = 0.030. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis that ―the mean asset turnover ratio value is equal across all 
categories of ownership structure (OwnStrCa)‖ is not supported by data. The overall corrected 
model, F value = 16.905 and p-value of 0.0001are statistically significant. On the basis of 
Cohen‘s criteria, all partial eta squares are small. The statement that "membership in 
 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
Df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 76.276
a
 8 9.535 16.905 0.0001 0.164 
Intercept 396.402 1 396.402 702.852 0.0001 0.504 
OwnStrCa 3.978 2 1.989 3.527 0.030 0.010 
TDtTAca 9.797 2 4.898 8.685 0.0001 0.025 
OwnStrCa * TDtTAca 3.115 4 .779 1.381 0.239 0.008 
Error 389.718 691 .564 
   
Total 3258.000 700 
    
Corrected Total 465.994 699 
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categories defined by the total debt to the total asset ratio as class identification accounts for 
the differences in the average asset turnover ratio" is marginally correct. 
6.8.4 Estimated Marginal Means – Total debt to total asset ratio on asset 
turnover ratio 
The estimated marginal means is the mean response for each factor, adjusted for any other 
variables within the model (Ho, 2006). The result from the comparison of estimated marginal 
means of the asset turnover ratio (as the dependent variable) of groups in the total debt to the 
total asset ratio (as the predictor variable) while holding the ownership structure constant is 
presented in Table 6.24. 
 
Table 6.24:Estimated Marginal Means - Categorised ownership structure * categorised 
total debt to total assets, dependent variable: asset turnover ratio 
Categorised Ownership 
Structure 
Categorised Total Debt to Total 
Assets 
Mean 
Std. 
Error 
95percent 
Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Shareholdings 20percent 
to 50percent 
High Debt ratio   0.45 to 2.03956 2.322 0.081 2.164 2.480 
Medium Debt ratio  0.3515 to 0.44781 2.049 0.117 1.819 2.279 
Low Debt ratio 0  to 0.34278 1.503 0.062 1.381 1.626 
Shareholdings 51percent 
to 100percent 
High Debt ratio   0.45 to 2.03956 2.315 0.059 2.199 2.431 
Medium Debt ratio  0.3515 to 0.44781 2.280 0.083 2.118 2.443 
Low Debt ratio 0  to 0.34278 1.786 0.058 1.672 1.899 
Shareholdings Below 
20percent 
High Debt ratio   0.45 to 2.03956 2.250 0.266 1.729 2.771 
Medium Debt ratio  0.3515 to 0.44781 2.500 0.531 1.457 3.543 
Low Debt ratio 0  to 0.34278 1.800 0.336 1.141 2.459 
Source: Author 
The results are that firms in which the largest shareholder held 20 percent to 50 percent of the 
share capital, coupledwithhigh debt ratio on average had an asset turnover ratio of 2.322. 
Firms in which the largest shareholder held more than51 percent (51 percent to 100 percent) 
of the share capital, coupledwith a high debt ratio, had an asset turnover of 2.315; and firms in 
which the largest shareholder held below 20 percent of the share capital, coupledwith a high 
debt ratio, are in that period expected turnover is 2.250.  
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The results are that firms in which the largest shareholder held 20 percent to 50 percent of the 
share capital, coupled with a medium debt ratio, had on average an asset turnover ratio of 
2.049. Firms in which the largest shareholder held more than 51 percent (51 percent to 100 
percent) of the share capital, coupled with a medium debt ratio, had an asset turnover of 
2.280; and firms in which the largest shareholder held below 20 percent of the share capital, 
coupled with a medium debt ratio, are in that period expected turnover is 2.500.  
The results are that firms in which the largest shareholder held 20 percent to 50 percent of the 
share capital, coupled with a low debt ratio, hadon average an asset turnover ratio of 1.503. 
Firms in which the largest shareholder held more than 51 percent (51 percent to 100 percent) 
of the share capital coupled with a low debt ratio had an asset turnover of 1.786; and firms in 
which the largest shareholder held below 20 percent of the share capital, coupled with a low 
debt ratio, hadon average an asset turnover ratio of 0.336.  
Therefore, there are differences in the asset turnover ratios between high debt ratio, medium 
debt ratio and low debt ratio firms. However, depending upon the ownership structure and 
capital structure the difference remained constant for three different shareholdings, and there 
was no interaction effect. 
The 95percent confidence interval of the difference provides an estimate of the boundaries 
between which the true mean difference lies in 95 percent of all possible random samples of 
all firms similar to the ones included in this study. Since their confidence intervals lie entirely 
above 0.00, you can safely say that for all categories of debt the estimated asset turnover 
marginal means are significantly different. 
6.8.5 Interpretation of the Post Hoc Effects – Debt Ratio on Asset Turnover ratio 
The next three statements are possible interpretation of the post-hoc effects. Each one is 
verified independently for significance in the table of pair-wise comparisons, and the results 
presented in Table 6.25. The preview to this analysis, that is the means and standard 
deviations are as presented in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.25: Multiple comparisons asset turnover ratio - Tukey HSD 
 
(I) Categorised Total Debt to Total Assets 
(J) Categorised Total 
Debt to Total Assets 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
95percent 
Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
High Debt Ratio   0.45 to 2.03956 Medium Debt Ratio  
0.3515 to 0.44781 
0.11 0.082 0.391 -0.09 0.30 
Low Debt Ratio 0  to 
0.34278 
0.66* 0.063 0.0001 0.51 0.81 
Medium Debt Ratio  0.3515 to 0.44781 High Debt Ratio   0.45 
to 2.03956 
-0.11 0.082 0.391 -0.30 0.09 
Low Debt Ratio 0  to 
0.34278 
0.55* 0.079 0.0001 0.36 0.74 
Low Debt Ratio 0  to 0.34278 High Debt Ratio   0.45 
to 2.03956 
-0.66* 0.063 0.0001 -0.81 -0.51 
Medium Debt Ratio  
0.3515 to 0.44781 
-0.55* 0.079 0.0001 -0.74 -0.36 
Source: Author 
The first statement was, a group within the total debt to the total asset ratio that was 
categorisedas a ―high debt ratio‖ (with a mean of 0.54680 and a standard deviation of 
0.298641) outperformed (showed a better asset turnover ratio) the other group categorised as a 
―medium debt ratio‖ (with a mean of 0.39657 and a standard deviation of 0.181080). The 
mean difference between the groups (0.11, p-value = 0.391) is not statistically significant. 
 
The second statement was, a group within the total debt to the total asset ratio that was 
categorised as ―medium debt ratio‖ (with a mean of 0.39657 and a standard deviation of 
0.181080), outperformed (showed a better asset turnover ratio) the other group categorisedas 
a―low debt ratio‖ (with a mean of 0.28151 and a standard deviation of 0.226391).The mean 
difference between the two groups (0.55, p-value=0.0001) is statistically significant. 
 
The third statement was, a group within the total debt to the total asset ratio that was 
categorised as ―low debt ratio‖ (with a mean of 0.28151 and a standard deviation of 0.226391) 
out performed (showed a better asset turnover ratio) the other group categorised as a ―high 
debt ratio‖ (with a mean of 0.54680 and a standard deviation of 0.298641). The mean 
difference between the two groups (-0.66, p-value =0.0001) is statistically significant. 
Based on preceding findings, capital structure (the total debt to the total asset ratio) has a 
discriminating effect on performance (asset turnover ratio).  This is unlike the case when the 
book value to market value is a performance indicator. 
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6.8.6 Homogenous Subsets Test – Asset turnover ratiobytotaldebt to total assets 
ratio 
The pairs of groups are extracted from the total debt to the total asset ratio (capital structure). 
The total debt to the total asset ratio is the independent variable. The groups are high debt 
ratio, low debt ratio and medium debt ratio. The asset turnover ratio (performance) is the 
dependent variable. The groups asset turnover ratio means are listed in an ascending order of 
means (see Table 6.26). The asset turnover groups are significantly different as between low 
debt ratio and high debt ratio and low debt and medium debt. Therefore, cases of a high debt 
ratio   are associated with a high asset turnover.  
 
Table 6.26: Tukey HSDa,,b,,c - Asset turnover ratio 
Categorised Total Debt to Total Assets N 
Subset 
1 2 
Low Debt ratio 0  to 0.34278 318 1.66 
 
Medium Debt ratio  0.3515 to 0.44781 125 
 
2.21 
High Debt ratio   0.45 to 2.03956 257 
 
2.32 
Sig. 
 
1.000 0.328 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
 Based on observed means, the error term is Mean Square (Error) = 0.564. 
Source: Author 
From the resulted presented in Table 6.26, there is evidence that debt ratios have a 
discriminating effect, that is, different debt levels are associated with different levels of 
performance if the performance measure is the asset turnover ratio. Firm or cases with a low 
debt ratio are associated with the lowest asset turnover ratio. 
6.8.7 Summary – Influence of total debt to total assets ratio on asset turnover 
ratio 
The question was, ―Does asset the total debt to the total asset ratio (capital structure) have an 
impact on the asset turnover ratio (performance)? To answer this question, a number of 
statistical tests were done and results presented. Using the total debt to the total asset as the 
capital structure indicator and predictor variable, the tests of between-subjects effects and the 
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post-shock test revealed differences inthe asset turnover ratio (performances) across cate-
0.66gories of capital structure (the total debt to the total asset). 
 
The null hypothesis H0: µ high debtratio ≠ µ medium debt ratio ≠ µlow debt ratio-the 
population means for firms with high debt ratio, medium debt ratio, and low debt ratio, with 
the asset turnover ratio as the dependent variables (performance) are not equal taking into 
account ownership structure is supported by the data. 
 
The null hypothesis H0: σ high debtratio ≠ σ medium debt ratio ≠ σ low debt ratio-the 
population variance for firms with high debt ratio, medium debt ratio, and low debt ratio, with 
the asset turnover ratio as dependent variable (performance)taking into account ownership 
structures are notequal is alsosupported by the data. In conclusion, the total debt to the total 
asset ratio (capital structure) has influence on the asset turnover ratio (performance). 
 
6.9 Discussion of Findings 
 
The first hypothesis addressed in this chapter is the influence of performance on capital 
structure (debt ratio); and the second hypothesis is the influence of capital structure on 
performance. The idea is to establish the effect of performance on capital structure and effect 
of capital structure on performance at different levels of performance and/or different levels of 
capital structure while considering ownership structure. This requires the use of GLM instead 
of OLS. 
 
The first hypothesis (effect of performance on leverage) is based on two theories, namely: 
return - risk hypothesis and franchise value hypothesis. The return - risk hypothesis stipulates 
that more profitable firms use more debt because that group of firms generates sufficient cash 
to reduce the probability of bankruptcy; while the franchise value hypothesis states that more 
efficient firms may choose to use less debt to avoid exposure to financial distress and 
bankruptcy (Margaritis & Psilaki 2010; Berger& Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006). 
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The second hypothesis was the influence of debt on performance; this thesis stipulates that 
debt capital can have a positive or negative influence on performance (Cheng & Tzeng, 2011; 
Margaritis & Psillak, 2008). The efficiency hypothesis is anchored on the agency cost model 
of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986) and discussed in Mishkin (2010: 174-175) 
and in Tirole (2006). The efficiency hypothesis suggests that debt capital plays a disciplinary 
role that reduces managerial dissipations, the final results being enhanced performance. The 
argument is that the use of debt capital commits managers to pursue strategies with greater 
vigor than they would without the threat of financial distress (Berk &DeMarzo, 2011:531; 
Hennessy & Livdan, 2009; Haris & Raviv 1988).At the same time, debt capital might impact 
adversely on performance due to excessive risk-taking and asset substitution as suggested by 
Jensen (1986); and due to debt overhang and underinvestment as in Myers (1977).A detailed 
discussion on the negative effect of debt on performance is in Berkand DeMarzo(2011:524 – 
526). 
 
In relation to the first hypothesis, the data support the hypothesis that efficient and profitable 
firms employ more debt than comparable firms that are less profitable, possibly because 
profitable firms‘ exposure to financial risk is low (propensity to be bankrupt is low). There is 
no evidence that support the franchise hypothesis, that is, more efficient firms use less debt as 
suggested inAdhari and Rita, (2012), Margaritis and Psillak, (2007), and Lai, Lin and Wen, 
(2005).Such finding confirmed the existence of concentrated equity ownership on the NSE as 
pointed out by He and Matvos (2012:2). On the observation that firms with a low asset 
turnover ratio use less debt, one could also argue that less use of debt impact adversely on 
firm performance, and that debt capital does play a disciplinary role. 
 
However, the data only show statistically significant relationship between capital structure 
and performance if asset turnover ratio and not book value to the market value ratio is the 
performance indicator. By measuring the sales generated per shilling of assets invested in the 
firm, total asset turnover measures the management ability to use assets to generate sales. 
Furthermore, asset use is the primary focus of economic value added, and it is sales that are 
the major source of cash to most businesses (Atkinson, Kaplan, Matsumura &Young, 
192 
 
2007:619). The interpretation is that the lower the total asset turnover ratio, as compared to 
historical data for the firm and industry data, the more sluggish the firm's sales. Too low asset 
turnover ratio may indicate a problem thus making it difficult meeting debt obligations. It is 
also possible that many business problems could be traced to poor management of assets to 
generate sales or to support the service provision.  
 
The surprising result is the inability of the book value to the market value ratio to predict the 
usage of debt. The importance of the book value to the market value ratio is that it captures 
the value the market attributes to an organization as a proportion of its measured assets, and 
we would expect this value to be less than one because firms have resources that do not 
appear in the balance sheet as assets. When this ratio exceeds one, it signals that the market 
believes that the firm‘s liquidation value is higher than its value as a going concern (Atkinson, 
Kaplan, Matsumura & Young, and 2007:620). One would expect debt holders, being risk 
averse, to monitor this ratio to be discriminate among negative growth, no growth and positive 
growth firms. High-growth firms present a greater investment opportunity with more chances 
to generate profits, cash and therefore, have the capacity to service its debt obligations. 
 
In relation to findings on the second hypothesis, the finding of this study is that capital 
structure has influence on firms‘ performance. The findings support the proposition that in 
firms where debt capital is substantial, debt monitoring could encourage managers to avoid 
opportunist‘s activities is supported by the data as is in Cheng and Tzeng (2011) and in Tirole 
(2006). 
 
The data used in this study tell us that capital structure (the total debt tothe total asset ratio) 
levels predict asset turnover ratio (performance) and not book to market ratio. On the question 
as to whether an ideal capital structure existed, a powerful finding supported by the data is 
that, yes an optimum capital structure existed on the NSE, but only if the asset turnover ratio 
is the indicator of performance. The range of optimal capital structure is medium debt ratio 
0.3515 to 0.44781 or in percentage terms from 35.15 to 44.781 percent (section 6.9.5) because 
those firms with the total debt to the total asset ratio from 35percent through 45percent show a 
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better asset turnover ratio (performance) than those firms outside this bracket. Such a finding 
negated the original hypothesis in Modigliani and Miller (1958) that cash flow of a firm's 
asset does not depend on its choice of capital structure  (though Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
argument apply to perfect market),  and the data in this study imply the existence of the best 
capital structure on the NSE. 
 
In conclusion, the data confirmed that there is a bi-directional relationship between capital 
structure and performance. However, the influence of capital structure on performance or the 
influence of performance on capital structure depends on measure of performance employed. 
Managers should take into account performance level in their determination of usage of debt, 
while to benefit from the disciplinary role of debt, shareholders as owners should encourage 
managers to use debt financing. 
6.10 The theoretical and practical implications of the findings 
This analysis makes a theoretical and practical contribution. It demonstrates how competing 
hypotheses, in this case performance- risk hypothesis, franchise- value hypothesis and 
efficiency hypothesis (agency cost hypothesis) dominate each other. Thus the theory 
supported by the data is that efficient and profitable firms use more debt, and that use of debt 
mitigates agency costs. In addition, it provides new empirical evidence, based on data in an 
emerging economy, on the bi-directional relationship between performance and capital 
structure. 
 A number of similar studies at this level use large firms' data in Europe, US and some parts of 
Asia that might not be representative of  countries classified as emerging economies in which 
the supporting institutions are yet to be developed (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 
1999). Margaritis and Psillak (2010:631) writing on the relationship between capital structure 
and performance in France, recommend is that ―In future research, it will be of interest to 
extend this analysis across distinct countries and across different industries as well as to 
examine further aspects of ownership and governance characteristics." 
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In terms of methodology, by using GLM, this study has improved on earlier studies by 
comparing different levels of performance to different levels of capital structure in contrast to 
making inferences based on conditional means (OLS) estimates. OLS cannot tell us, for 
example, whether poor performance is associated with low or high debt ratios. This study 
addressed this problem and report existence of optimum capital structure. In addition, by 
using canonical correlation (chapter 5) and GLM, the findings confirm that the bi-directional 
relationship between capital structures on the NSE is independent of the statistical method 
employed. 
From a practical view point, the analysis pointed out that to determine the bi- directional 
relationship between performance and capital structure; the asset turnover ratio exhibited 
higher information content than book value to market value. In addition, the advice to 
managers would be that the optimum capital structure is medium debt ratio 0.3515 to 0.44781 
or in percentage terms from 35.15 percent to 44.781 percent. The existence of the best capital 
structure reflected managers‘ concern that levered firms incurring financial distress cost that 
reduce shareholder's wealth in the firm, besides financial managers can use this finding to 
evaluate their firm‘s capital structure policy. 
6.11 Chapter Summary 
There are two hypotheses examined in this chapter: 
The first hypothesis being: 
H01:  Firm performance does not have a significant effect on leverage, the alternative 
 hypothesis being, 
H11:  Firm performance has a significant effect on leverage. 
 The second hypothesis being: 
H02:  Leverage does not have a significant effect on firm performance; the alternative 
 hypothesis being: 
H12:  Leverage has a significant effect on firm performance. 
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The general linear model (GLM) procedure provides regression analysis and analysis of 
variance to examine the bi direction relationship between capital structure and performance. 
An elaborate analysis that started with observing level of measurement requirement, sample 
size requirement, the normality test and descriptive statistic to explore the data structure are 
carried, and results presented.    
The research questions guiding the analysis are put in broad terms; and given that the study is 
to establish group differences, the research questions to be answered using GLM is:  What are 
the main effects of the independent variables? What are the interactions among the 
independent variables?  From the preceding broad terms, the research questions are 
operationalised and answered. The specific questions are: What is the influence of book value 
to the market value ratio (as an indicator of performance) on the total debt to the total asset 
ratio (as an indicator of capital structure)? What is the influence of the asset turnover ratio (as 
an indicator of performance) on total debt to the total asset ratio (as an indicator of capital 
structure)? What is the influence of the total debt to the total asset ratio (as an indicator of 
capital structure) on book value to the market value ratio (performance)? What is the influence 
of total debt to the total asset ratio (capital structure) on the asset turnover ratio 
(performance)? 
 
For each question, homogeneity of variance test is relied on to confirm if there are substantial 
differences in the dependent variable as grouped by the independent variable. The analysis of 
variance assumes that the variance of the dependent variable is homogeneous across all the 
cells formed by the factors (independent variable). In addition, Levene‘s (1960) test for 
equality of variance is reported, and the test of between-subjects effects is done and reported. 
The estimated marginal means are used for exploring the interaction effect between 
performance and ownership structure. Post-hoc- multiple comparison tests are done to 
establish whether differences exist among the means, that is, post hoc range tests and pair 
wise multiple comparisons can determine which means differ. The post-hoc effect of each 
question is interpreted. The homogenous subsets' output is generated along with post hoc tests 
and interpreted. 
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In relation to the first hypothesis, the data supports the hypothesis that efficient and profitable 
firms employ more debt than comparable firms that are less profitable, possibly because their 
exposure financial risk is low (propensity to be bankrupt is low). There is no evidence to 
support the franchise hypothesis that more efficient firms use less debt as suggested in 
Margaritis and Psillak, (2008), and Lai, Lin and Wen (2005). However, the data only show 
statistically significant relationship if asset turnover ratio and not the book value to the market 
value ratio is used as a performance indicator to predict usage of debt capital. 
 
In relation to the second hypothesis, that is, on the influence of debt on performance, the 
finding is, after controlling for ownership structure, firms that use more debt outperformed 
those that use less debt. Therefore, the data on the NSE support the efficiency hypothesis that 
the use of debt capital alleviates agency costs so as to improve in firm performance (Mishkin 
2010: 174-175; Margaritis & Psillak, 2007; Tirole, 2006; Lins & Roper, 2004; Jensen, 1986; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Such a finding negated the original hypothesis in Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) that capital structure decision is irrelevant and would imply the existence of an 
optimum capital structure on the NSE. 
 
Studies by Bhagat and Bolton (2008), King and Santor (2008), and Ghosh (2008) implied that 
the use of debt capital has negative effects on firm performance. Schoubben and Van Hulle 
(2006) finding are that the relationship between capital structure and performance depended 
on the depth of the agency problem in a firm. Therefore, the conclusion in this chapter, based 
on the data analysis, is that firm can increase its value more by issuing debt capital and that 
performance levels influence manager‘s decision on the amount of debt to use to finance 
assets. 
 
In the next chapter (7), we examine the extent to which performance and capital structure 
predict the change of CEO. This is because to reverse the decline in performance non 
performing managers must be replaced and that replacing non performing managers is the 
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core of corporate governance; the findings in chapter 7 will strengthen the support the thesis 
that debt played a disciplinary role as implied in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEBT CAPITAL, 
PERFORMANCE, AND CHANGE IN THE CHIEF 
EXECUTIVEOFFICER (CFO) - FINDINGS 
7.1 Introduction 
In chapter six (6) the relationship between capital structure or debt levels and performance 
levels was investigated by subjecting data from non-financial firms listed on the NSE to 
general linear model (GLM). This is an improvement on OLS studies that focus only on the 
test of significance of predictor coefficients but do not use levels of performance to levels of 
leverage and vice versa. The researcher established that performance is explained in terms of 
sub optimal capital structure choices; and that capital structure choice is not independent of 
levels of performance. Though the data confirms a bi-directional relationship between 
performance and capital structure choices, the restriction is that the relationship depends on 
the indicator of performance employed. While the asset turnover ratio confirms a bi-
directional relationship, the book to market ratio fails the test. It emerged that on the NSE 
more efficient (asset turnover ratio as a measure of productivity) firms may use more debt. 
Therefore, the mean efficiency risk hypothesis and not franchise value hypothesis applies, and 
that firms that employ debt capital reported improved firm performance compared to those 
that used low debt capital. 
This chapter examines the extent to which performance and capital structure predict the 
change of CEO. This is because to reverse a decline in performance non performing managers 
must be replaced and that replacing non performing managers is the core of corporate 
governance. The findings will support or negate the thesis that debt plays a disciplinary role in 
addition to supporting or not supporting the thesis that CEOs are replaced in response to poor 
performance. The focus in this chapter is whether the two concepts, performance and capital 
structure play, at firm level and over period influence change of CEO. Therefore, panel data is 
appropriate and this explains why at this stage of this study generalised estimating equation 
(GEE) model was used. 
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In this chapter, the finding on the relationship between debt capital, performance, and change 
in CEO is presented. This chapter is arranged as follows: in section, 7.2 are performance and 
capital structure indicators; in section, 7.3 are data structure and the generalised estimating 
equations (GEE) Model; in section, 7.4 are the hypothesis to be tested; in section7.5, isa 
comment on data is presented; in section, 7.6 are model information; in section, 7.7are the 
correlated data summary; in section, 7. 8 are variables of the study - categorical variable 
information; in section 7.9goodness of fit of the model are presented; in section, 7.10 are the 
results, interpretation of results and discussion of results; in section, 7.11 are ownership 
structure and change of CEO; in section7.12,the effect of  performance on change of CEO is 
presented; in section, 7.13 are about debt capital and change in CEO; in section,7.14 are the 
change in CEO, performance and debt capital (interaction effect); section 7.15 is the summary 
of findings; in section,7.16are the theoretical and practical significance of the findings; and 
7.16 are the summary of the chapter. 
7.2 Selecting indicators of performance and capital structure 
In chapter five (5) canonical correlations were used to cross match indicators of performance 
with capital structure indicators. The analogy is like a patient who needed blood infusion, and 
such a patient‘s blood must be cross matched with the donated blood to avoid the infusion 
crisis.  It emerged that, from the data, out of a battery of both measures of performance and 
capital structure, two measures of performance namely book to market ratio and asset turnover 
ratio and a measure of level of borrowings namely total debt to total assets, emerged as 
describing the relationship between capital structure and performance. 
The originality in this study is at three levels; first, it is an attempt to address the naivety in 
similar studies that use return on asset (ROA) or other measures of performance without 
probing what the data tell us about competing indicators of performance and capital structure. 
Second it uses same data set to test bi-directional relationship between capital structure and 
performance. Third is the grouping of firm characteristics, namely performance, level of 
borrowing and ownership structure, and the use of GML, GEEother than OLS, in addition to 
data from an emerging economy to model the relationship between firm performance and 
capital structure. 
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The findings in chapter 5 are used in chapter 6 at two levels, first in terms of identifying 
variables to be used in chapter six (6) and in terms of lending credibility to finding in chapter 
6.  The findings in chapter five are expected to conceptually be similar to those as a proof that 
the bi-directional relationships between performance and capital structure are independentof 
the statistical model. In chapter 5 two indicators of performance namely book to market ratio 
and asset turnover ratio, and an indicator of level of borrowing, the total debt to the total asset 
ratio are selected as useful in determining whether a relationship between performance and 
capital structure exists using data of firms listed on the NSE.  
The asset turnover ratio (as an indicator of performance) predicted thetotal debt to the total 
asset ratio, i.e. level of borrowing; equally, the total debt to the total asset ratio predicted the 
asset turnover ratio level, i.e. performance.However, the book to market ratio (as a 
performance indicator) was not useful in predicting the total debt to the total asset ratio (as an 
indicator of level of debt) and total debt to the total asset ratio was not functional in predicting 
book to market ratio. 
The originality in chapter 6 is the grouping of firm characteristics, namely, levels of 
performance, levels of borrowing and level‘s ownership structure, and subjecting the data to 
generalised linear models to model the relationship between firm performance and capital 
structure (Lys & Sabino, 1992). In statistics, the generalised linear model is a flexible 
generalization of ordinary linear regression that allows for response variables that have error 
distribution models other than a normal distribution. The data in this study is largely not 
normally distributed, and it would be inappropriate to subject it to ordinary linear regression 
as is done in some similar studies.  
In both chapter 5 and 6, the research's confidence in the relationship between performance and 
capital structure is natured to give direction to the influence of both performance and capital 
structure on change on chief executive officer CEO or the contribution of capital structure and 
performance to corporate governance. To recap, to the extent that capital structure impact on 
performance, or that firm performance influenced the amount of debt capital is a result of 
choices made by CEO, the CEO must hold accountable for the choices or decisions made.   
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This chapter (chapter 7) presents the findings on the relationship between debt capital, 
performance, and change in CEO, using GEE. Theories are presented in chapter 2 and three to 
the effect that shareholder can mitigate free rider problems of corporate control, but this can 
be strengthened by debt holders. Furthermore, it is not clear why CEOs are replaced or 
replaced on the NSE. A rational argument is that managers are replaced due to poor 
performance.  However, shareholders may fail to replace managers even in the face of poor 
performance, in which case we need to reinforce disciplinary systems in firms. Replacing non 
performing managers signifies effective corporate governance. A finance theory emerges if it 
is proved that debt capital propelled replacement of non-performing CEOs. Therefore, in this 
chapter the final objectives of this study, namely: whether poor performance causes changes 
of CEO; whether the level of debt cause change of CEO; and levels of debt level and 
performance (interaction effect) cause change of CEO are addressed. This is based on the 
statement of the problem that ―It is not clear why CEOs are replaced or replaced on the NSE. 
One suggestion is that managers are replaced due to poor performance.  Another is that debt 
holders influence the replacement of CEO and that replacing non performing managers 
signifies effective corporate governance.‖ 
7.3 Data Structure and the generalised estimating equations (GEE) model 
The panel data is used in this section; this requires special tools of analysis. The data relied on 
contains repeated binary measures of the change in CEO status and periodic indicators of 
capital structure and performance for each sampled company, for each year from 1990 to 
2012. In addition, industry, along with a fixed recording of whether or not the level of debt 
capital was high, low or medium or categorised into quartiles, and whether or not the level of 
performance good, average or poor are captured. Because the analysis includes between 
group's effects as well as within subject effects, generalised estimating equation's (GEE) 
isan appropriate tool of analysis. 
The GEE procedure extends the generalised linear model to allow for analysis of repeated 
measurements or other correlated observations, such as clustered data (Diggle, Heagerty, 
Liang & Zeger, 2002; Hardin & Hilbe, 2003; McCullagh & Nelder, 1989). In this section of 
the study GEE is used to fit a repeated measures logistic regression to study effects of 
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performance with the capital structure, with ownership structure on change of CEO. With 
repeated data, there are within subject variables and correlation and between subject variables 
and correlation. The combination of values of the within-subject variables defines the ordering 
of measurements within subjects. In addition, GEE takes into account the dependency of 
observations by specifying a working correlation structure and take care of models for 
repeated categorical response data, and thus generalize models for matched pairs. The very 
crux of GEE is instead of attempting to model the within-subject covariance structure, treat it 
as a nuisance and simply model the mean response.  
In GEE a response variable can be either continuous or categorical. In this study, the focus 
was on a categorical variable 𝞓CEO = (CEOij). Change in CEO is a response variable for each 
firmi, measured at different occasions (each year as a time point), j = 1, 2... 23i); and each 
𝞓CEO i can be a binomial or multinomial response. In this case 𝞓CEO is a binomial response. 
Data collected on a pre-determined number of units (firms listed on the NSE), then classified 
according to two levels of a categorical variable, result into a binomial sampling. The 
predictor variables' X = (X1, X2... Xk) which is a set of explanatory variables, can be discrete, 
continuous, or a combination. Xi is ni × k matrix of covariates. In this chapter, there are four 
predictor variables: the total debt to the total asset ratio at two levels (at factor and covariate 
levels) as the capital structure indicator; asset turnover ratio (at factor and covariate levels) as 
the performance indicator; book to market ratio (at factor and covariate level) as indicators of 
performance time of measurement (year) as trial variable, industry, ownership structure. 
7.4 Hypothesis 
Three hypotheses are tested in this chapter. These are the third, fourth and fifth hypotheses. 
7.4.1 The third hypotheses test the effect of performance on change of  CEO 
H03: Firm performance does not have a significant effect on Change of CEO. 
H13:  Firm performance has a significant effect on Change of CEO. 
7.4.2 The fourth hypothesis test the effect of leverage on change of CEO 
H04: Leverage does not have a significant effect on change of CEO. 
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H14:  Leverage has a significant effect on change of CEO. 
 
The relationship is modeled in the equation below: 
∆CEOi = αi + βiPerformancei + βiCapitalStructurei+ βiOwnership Structurei+ 
Ɛi………………………………………………………………………..…Equation 7.1 
∆CEOi= Logit p = log (probability of Change in CEO)/1 – probability of Change in 
CEO)  
7.4.3 The fifth hypotheses test the combined effect of leverage and 
 performance on change of CEO 
H05: Leverage and performancedoes nothave a significant effect on Change of CEO 
H15:  Leverage and performance has a significant effect on Change of CEO. 
 
The relationship is modeled in the equation below: 
∆CEOi = αi + βiPerformancei + βiCapitalStructurei+ βi (Performance X CapitalStructure) i 
+βiControlVariablesi+ Ɛi…………………………………………………………Equation 7.2 
∆CEOi= Logit p = log (probability of Change in CEO)/1 – probability of Change in CEO)  
Whereα, β parameters to be estimated and Ɛ is the error term. 
7.5 Data used in the study 
The data used in this section of the study was extracted from annual reports and stock market 
recordsfrom NSE. The analysis covered 23 years. There were851 cases in total, but 157 cases 
were excluded; therefore, 694 were used for analysis. The changein CEO was the dependent 
variable. Theresponse variables were: categorised ownership structure, categorised the total 
debt to the total assetratio (as an indicator of level of borrowing), categorised book to market 
ratio (as indicator of performance), and the asset turnover ratio (as indicator of performance). 
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 The categorization of variables is as follows: for change in CEO, 0 represented no change in 
CEO while 1 represented change in CEO. The categories ownership structure:  shareholdings 
20 percent to 50 percentare labeled1; shareholdings 51percent to 100percent is labeled 2, and 
shareholdings below 20percent is labeled 3. The classification of total debt to total assets: high 
leverage   0.45 to 2.03956 is labeled 1; medium leverage 0.3515 to 0.44781 is labeled2, and 
low leverage 0 to 0.34278 is labeled3. The classification of level of the book to market ratio: 
positive growth <1 is labeled 1; No-growth =1 is labeled2, and negative growth > 1 is 
labeled3; and the classificationof the asset turnover ratio: low 0.073 - 0.6882 are labeled 1, 
medium 0.6926 - 1.1073 are labeled2, and high 1.114 - 10.1856 are labeled3. 
7.6 Model Information 
The aim is to model the probability that a CEO is replaced based on capital structure and 
performance and ownership structure scores. The model information is presented in Table 1, 
and in it is a summarised modeling selection, which is useful for making sure the procedure fit 
the specified model. The event variable change in CEO is a random variable. The model 
information specifies the distribution of the dependent variable. Year is the variable 
specifying the number of trial occurring in a subject; that is, in each company sampled. The 
subject effects are company serial number and industry. 
Table 7.1: Model information 
 
Events Variable 
Change Of CEO 
Trials Variable Year 
Probability Distribution Binomial 
Link Function Logit 
Subject Effect 
1 
Company Serial 
Number 
2 Industry 
Working Correlation Matrix 
Structure 
Unstructured 
Source: Author 
The ability to specify a non-normal distribution and non-identity link function is the essential 
improvement of the generalised linear model over the general linear model. The choice the 
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probability distribution is guided by a priori theoretical considerations or which combination 
seems to fit best. Change of CEO is a Bernoulli random variable with a ‗success‘ (Yi = 1) if 
CEOi is replaced and a ‗failure‘ (Yi = 0) if CEOi is not replaced, therefore, the probability 
distribution is binomial. Binomial distribution is appropriate only for variables that represent a 
binary response or number of events. The link function used is logit link and is proper only 
with the binomial distribution (Berkson, 1944; Fisher & Yates; 1938). Logit link to predict the 
probability of change in CEO is (used when μ is bounded between 0 and 1 as when data are 
binary), specified as follows: 
 
                      = 𝞓CEO= αi + βiPerformancei + βiCapitalStructurei+  
βiOwnershipStructurei+ Ɛi……………………………………………………………………………………………..Equation 7.3 
Whereα, β parameters to be estimated and Ɛ is the error term 
There are two subject effects, the company which is captured by company serial number and 
the industry in which company is in. Working correlation matrix structure represents the 
within-subject dependencies. Its size is determined by the number of measurements and thus 
the combination of values of within-subject variables. The specified structure is unstructured, 
that is, a completely general correlation matrix and the other structures appeared less 
informative. 
7.7 Correlated data summary 
Correlated data summary that provides information concerning the repeated measures 
specification is presented in Table 7.2. There are two variables that identify the subjects, 
company serial number and industry. There are two variables, company serial number and 
industries that identify the subjects. 
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Table 7.2 Correlated data summary 
 
Number of Levels 
Subject 
Effect 
Company Serial 
Number 
37 
Industry 3 
Number of Subjects 37 
Number of Measurements per 
Subject 
Minimum 5 
Maximum 23 
Correlation Matrix Dimension 23 
Source: Author 
The minimum and maximum number of measurements per subject does not equal the number 
of levels of the within-subject effect. This tells there is incomplete information for each 
subject that is, the variable change in CEO is not recorded for each company, and this is 
because some firms were either delisted from NSE or were listed after 1990, which is the base 
year of this study. The dimension of the correlation matrix should equal the product of the 
levels of the within-subject effects, twenty three (23).  
7.8 Variables of the study - Categorical variable information 
The test at this stage is to establish whether a firm with high debt and/ or report woeful 
performance has a higher propensity to replace a CEO. Therefore, it is necessary categorizing 
both debt and performance into low, average and high or poor, average and good to create 
categorical variables (factors). Categorical variable information for the variables is presented 
in Table 7.3. 
For predictor variable, the categorization is created out of interval variable and is therefore, 
ordinal. The dependent and independent variables are categorical variables. For dependent 
variable, change in CE0, we see that change in CEO was witnessed 115 times out of a 
possible 1.38 million times; that is, taking into account individual influence of all the 
predictor variable for each company over the period of the study. Overall, the propensity to 
replace CEO on the NSE appeared to be low (see Table 7.3). 
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Table 7.3: Categorical variable information 
 
 
N Percent 
Dependent Variable Change of  CEO 
Events 115 0.0% 
Non-Events 1389231 100.0% 
Total 1389346 100.0% 
Factor 
Categorised Ownership 
Structure 
Shareholdings 20% to 50% 272 39.2% 
Shareholdings 51% to 100% 407 58.6% 
Shareholdings Below 20% 15 2.2% 
Total 694 100.0% 
Categorised Total Debt to 
Total Assets 
High Leverage   0.45 to 
2.03956 
253 36.5% 
Medium Leverage  0.3515 to 
0.44781 
123 17.7% 
Low Leverage 0  to 0.34278 318 45.8% 
Total 694 100.0% 
Level of Book to Market Ratio 
Positive Growth <1 197 28.4% 
No Growth =1 282 40.6% 
Negative Growth > 1 215 31.0% 
Total 694 100.0% 
Lev Asset Turnover Ratio 
Low 0.073 - 0.6882 234 33.7% 
Medium 0.6926 - 1.1073 228 32.9% 
High 1.114 - 10.1856 232 33.4% 
Total 694 100.0% 
a. Trials variable: Year – This is number of times each subject is observed, in this case number of years of 
observation. 
Source: Author 
7.9 Goodness of fit 
To achieve robust results, an appropriate model must be selected. The typical concept of the 
likelihood function does not apply to GEE; therefore, it is not meaningful calculating the usual 
goodness of fit statistics (Hardin & Hilbe, 2003). Accordingly, information criteria based on a 
generalization of the likelihood are computed. The Quasi-likelihood under Independence 
Model Criterion (QIC) can be used to choose between correlation structures, given a set of 
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model terms. The working correlation matrix represents the within-subject dependencies, and 
it is possible to specify four possible structures described as follows:   
 Independent in which the repeated measurements are uncorrelated and for the data in 
this analysis, it‘s Corrected Quasi-likelihood under Independence Model Criterion 
(QICC) value of -819152.695; 
 Autoregressive of first order, AR(1) in which repeated measurements have a first-
order autoregressive relationship and for the data in this analysis its Corrected Quasi-
likelihood under Independence Model Criterion (QICC) value of -819010.087;  
 Exchangeable structure that has homogenous correlations between elements and also 
known as a compound symmetry structure and for the data in this analysis its 
Corrected Quasi-likelihood under Independence Model Criterion (QICC) value of -
818621.308; 
 The M-dependent in which consecutive measurements have a common correlation 
coefficient, and for the data in this analysis its Corrected Quasi-likelihood under 
Independence Model Criterion (QICC)  value of -818566.875;  and  
 Unstructured which is a completely general correlation matrix and for the data in this 
analysis, it‘s Corrected Quasi-likelihood under Independence Model Criterion (QICC) 
value of -1109379.352.  
 
The structure that obtains the smaller QIC is "better." The computation of the QICC assumes 
that the distribution, link function, and working correlation matrix specifications are all 
"correct" for the data set. The results are in the bottom of Table 7.4 (a), and were summarised 
in table 7.4 (b) the smallest QIC is the unstructured structure. The result presented in Table 
7.4 (a), indicate that poor fitting models gave incorrect conclusions about the relationships 
(not significant – ns) and tend to underestimate or overestimate the standard errors. This 
justifies the use of the unstructured model to model the relationship. 
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Table 7.4 (a): Goodness of fit of the model 
 M-dependent 
 
 Exchangeable 
 
AR1 
  
Independent 
 
 Unstructured 
 
Parameter β 
Std. 
Error 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
β 
Std. 
Error 
 
Β 
Std. 
Error 
 
β 
Std. 
Error 
 
Si
g. 
S
i
g
. 
Sig
. Sig. Sig. 
(Intercept) -9.705 0.595 * -9.683 0.504 * -9.614 0.559 * -
9.654 
0.521 * -9.627 0.566 0.000 
[OwnStrCa=1] 0.065 0.539 ns 0.051 0.445 n
s 
0.008 0.498 ns 0.042 0.459 ns -2.072 0.721 0.004 
[OwnStrCa=2] 0.443 0.524 ns 0.400 0.425 n
s 
0.368 0.479 ns 0.388 0.438 ns -0.631 0.462 0.171 
[OwnStrCa=3] 0a    0a    0a    0a    0a     
[TDtTAca=1] 0.030 0.182 ns 0.050 0.18 n
s 
0.036 0.187 ns 0.055 0.190 ns 1.233 0.497 0.013 
[TDtTAca=2] 0.049 0.213 ns -0.040 0.232 n
s 
-0.007 0.222 ns 0.010 0.233 ns 1.870 0.561 0.001 
[TDtTAca=3] 0a    0a    0a    0a    0a     
[LeBtM=1] 0.089 0.197 ns 0.148 0.199 n
s 
0.086 0.205 ns 0.099 0.212 ns 0.001 0.385 0.998 
[LeBtM=2] 0.052 0.199 ns 0.087 0.189 n
s 
0.091 0.188 ns 0.112 0.185 ns 0.637 0.246 0.010 
[LeBtM=3] 0a    0a    0a    0a    0a     
[LeAssTurn=1] -0.129 0.176 ns -0.156 0.175 n
s 
-0.180 0.18 ns -
0.184 
0.177 ns 1.114 0.228 0.000 
[LeAssTurn=2] -0.057 0.156 ns -0.064 0.158 n
s 
-0.117 0.17 ns -
0.131 
0.173 ns -0.216 0.225 0.336 
[LeAssTurn=3] 0a     0a     0a     0a     0a   
 (Scale) 1     
  
  1     1     
   
Log likelihood 
-819152.695 
 
-819010.087 
 
-818621.308 
 
-818566.875 
 
-1109379.352 
 0
a
- means reference category; ns = not significant 
Source: Author 
 
Table 7.4 (b):  Goodness of Fit
a
 
 
 
 
Value 
Quasi Likelihood under Independence Model Criterion (QIC)b 1109419.531 
Corrected Quasi Likelihood under Independence Model Criterion (QICC)b 1109379.352 
Events: Change of  CEO 
Trials: Year 
Model: (Intercept), OwnStrCa, TDtTAca, LeBtM, LeAssTurn (details in table 5a above) 
a. Information criteria are in small-is-better form. 
b. Computed using the full log quasi-likelihood function. 
Source: Author 
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7.10 Model results, interpretation of results and discussion 
7.10.1 Test of model effects 
An obvious question of interest would be to determine whether some of the regression 
parameters are different from zero (0), indicating that the particular year or industry to which 
they correspond does not differ from the final firms and year. This may be addressed by 
inspecting the Wald test statistics corresponding to each element of β. To address the issue of 
how specific firms compared, averaged across years, one would be interested in whether the 
appropriate differences in elements of β were equal to zero. For example, if we were 
interested in whether 1990 and 2012 were different in terms of change of CEO, we would be 
interested in the difference β1 – β23. In Table 6 below is the result of testing the global null 
hypothesis: BETA= 0, specifically the Wald Chi-Square Test that at least one of the 
predictors' regression coefficients is not equal to zero in the model. 
 
Table 7.5 Tests of Model Effects 
Source Type III 
Wald Chi-Square df Sig. 
(Intercept) 1433.018 1 0.000 
OwnStrCa 8.981 2 0.011 
TDtTAca 23.460 2 0.000 
LeBtM 10.802 2 0.005 
LeAssTurn 27.884 2 0.000 
Events: Change of CEO; Trials: Year Model: (Intercept), OwnStrCa, TDtTAca, LeBtM, 
LeAssTurn 
Source: Author 
Chi-Square, DF and Pr > ChiSq - These are the Chi-Square test statistic, Degrees of Freedom 
(DF) and associated p-value (PR>ChiSq) corresponding to the specific test that all of the 
predictors are simultaneously equal to zero. We are testing the probability (PR>ChiSq) of 
observing a Chi-Square statistic as extreme as, or more than the observed one under the null 
hypothesis; the null hypothesis is that all of the regression coefficients in the model are equal 
to zero. The DF defines the distribution of the Chi-Square test statistics and is defined by the 
number of predictors in the model. The DF of 2 for each of the predictor variables in table 6 
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indicates the three levels for each predictor variable. Typically, PR>ChiSq is compared to a 
specified alpha (α) level, our willingness to accept a type 1 error, which is typically set at 0.05 
or 0.01; a is 0.05 in this study. The small p-value from the tests of four response variables, 
would lead us to conclude that the regression coefficient in the model is not equal to zero and 
that the response variable influence change in CEO. 
7.10.2 Parameter Estimates 
The results in Table 7.6 do not tell us whether it is firms that performed poorly or whether it is 
firms that had substantial debt in their capital structure that replaced their CEO, while of 
interest in this study is whether debt capital reinforces corporate governance in face of poor 
performance.  
To achieve this objective, sampled firms are placed into categories according to their levels of 
performance and levels of capital structure. The idea is to establish the role of capital structure 
in overall business strategy and its drive for business performance. In Table 7.6, the output 
contains the parameter estimates, empirical standard error estimates, confidence intervals, z 
scores and p-values of categorical variables. The interpretation of the parameters in the 
marginal and random (mixed) effect's model is analogous to the standard logistic regression 
model, but there are differences in how we adjust for the correlations. Therefore, the comment 
would be the typical sentence describing strength, direction, and p-value/confidence limit of 
the association. 
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Table 7.6: Parameter Estimates 
 
 
Parameter ß 
Std. 
Error 
Hypothesis Test 
Exp(ß) 
95% Wald Confidence 
Interval for Exp(B) 
 
Wald Chi-
Square df Sig. Lower Upper 
 
(Intercept) -9.627 0.5662 289.090 1 0.000 6.593E-05 2.173E-05 .000 
Categorised 
Ownership 
Structure 
Shareholdings 20% 
to 50% 
-2.072 0.7205 8.272 1 0.004 0.126 0.031 .517 
 Shareholdings 51% 
to 100% 
-0.631 0.4616 1.871 1 0.171 0.532 0.215 1.314 
 Shareholdings Below 
20% 
0a         1     
Categorised 
Total Debt 
to Total 
Assets 
High Leverage   0.45 
to 2.03956 
1.233 0.4973 6.143 1 0.013 3.430 1.294 9.091 
 Medium Leverage  
0.3515 to 0.44781 
1.870 0.5613 11.103 1 0.001 6.491 2.160 19.501 
 Low Leverage 0  to 
0.34278 
0a         1     
Level of 
Book to 
Market 
Ratio 
Positive Growth <1 0.001 0.3849 .000 1 0.998 1.001 0.471 2.128 
 No Growth =1 0.637 0.2461 6.708 1 0.010 1.892 1.168 3.064 
 Negative Growth > 1 0a         1     
Lev Asset 
Turnover 
Ratio 
Low 0.073 - 0.6882 1.114 0.2276 23.932 1 0.000 3.045 1.949 4.757 
 Medium 0.6926 - 
1.1073 
-0.216 0.2248 0.926 1 0.336 0.805 0.518 1.251 
 High 1.114 - 10.1856 0a         1     
 (Scale) 1               
 
Events (Independent Variable) : Change of  CEO 
Trials: Year. Model: (Intercept), OwnStrCa, TDtTAca, LeBtM, LeAssTurn 
Source: Author. 
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7.10.3 Interpretation of model parameter estimates 
The output presented in table 7.6 is to be interpreted at two levels. The first section in Table 
7.6 shows the log odd ratio (ß).  The ß are the log odd ratio (that is, natural log of (probability 
of changing CEO/ probability of not changing a CEO). If p is the probability of changing a 
CEO the ß is the log (p/1-p). When ß is positive, then the log odds increase relative to the 
reference category and if negative, then it declines relative to the reference category. For a 
given α, ß, there could be values of predictor variables that produce estimated probabilities out 
of range. From this study the coefficients of the model generated as extracted from table 7.6 
is: 
                       = 𝞓CEO= -9.627 - 2.072 Shareholdings 20% to 50% - 0.631Shareholdings 
51% to 100% + 1.233High Leverage   + 1.870Medium Leverage + 0.001Positive Growth 
<1(BtM) + 0.637No Growth =1(BtM) + 1.114Low 0.073 to 0.6882(Asset Turnover Ratio) - 
0.216 Medium 0.6926 to 1.1073 (Asset Turnover 
Ratio)……………………………………………………………………..……..Equation 7.4 
The results in equation four (7.4) are quite informative in terms of factors that might propel 
corporate governance on the NSE.  The constant term of -9.627 is statistically significant; 
remember that the constant term is in part estimated by the omission of predictors from a 
regression analysis; in essence, it serves as a garbage bin for any bias that is not accounted for 
by the terms in the model, and it guarantees that your residuals have a mean of zero (Minitab, 
2014). This means that if the predictor variables ‗coefficients, namely, ownership structure, 
performance and capital structure are all zero; the GEE equation predicts that the probability 
in change in CEO based on these variables is reduced or zero. 
There are two performance indicators in the equation 7.4, the book to the market ratio and the 
asset turnover tell almost the same story, that is, that the probability of replacing a CEO is 
higher when the performance level is average and below. However, the coefficients of book 
value to market value as a predictor variable are statistically insignificant; a low p-value (< 
0.05) indicates that you can reject the null hypothesis. The asset turnover ratio appeared to be 
more informative and supportive of the hypothesis; at a low asset turnover ratio (poor 
performance) the coefficient is + 1.114 and the probability of replacing a non performing 
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
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CEO are higher, while at medium asset turnover ratio is - 0.216 suggesting that the probability 
of replacing CEO reduces as performance improves. 
The role of debt capital in enhancing corporate governance is tested and result captured in 
equation 7.4 and the model confirm that debt might be playing a disciplinary role as long is 
debt is judiciously employed. In equation 4, the probability that debt holders influence change 
of CEO is highest in firms with medium leverage with a coefficient of +1.870; that is, the 
probability is highest in firms that than on average finance 35 percent of their assets with debt. 
 In terms of ownership, in equation 7.4, it is apparent that shareholders are less concerned with 
the replacement of CEO regardless of the level of performance. For example, where an 
individual shareholder had an influencing interest, that is, hold 20 percent to 50 percent of 
equity, the coefficient is - 2.072 (negative) implying that the probability of replacing a CEO is 
reduced. However, even at shareholding of 51percent to 100percent with a coefficient of -
0.631(negative), there is a suppressing effect in replacing a CEO; though with a p-value of 
0.171, this is not statistically significant. 
The second section (column 8) in Table 7.6 captures Exp (ß), specifically inform the 
prediction weights. The interpretation is that, e

represents the change in the odds of the 
outcome (change in CEO) (multiplicatively) by increasing x (independent variable) by one 
unit. In summary: 
•  If  = 0, the odds and probability are the same at all x levels (e

=1) 
•  If > 0 , the odds and probability increase as x increases (e

>1) 
•  If < 0 , the odds and probability decrease as x increases (e

<1) 
 
For the 95% Wald confidence interval for odds ratio, the interpretation is as follows: 
• If entire interval is above 1, conclude positive association 
•  If entire interval is below 1, conclude negative association 
•  If interval contains 1, cannot conclude there is an association 
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The discussions are on the model are presented below. 
7.11 Ownership structure and change of CEO 
The ownership structure refers to equity ownership, specifically percentage of shares held by 
one top shareholder. The result of the impact of ownership structure on change of CEOs on 
the NSE is summarised in Table 7.6. Ownership structure is used in this study to capture the 
extent to which shareholding is dispersed or concentrated. Ownership structure is a control 
variable because the obligation to run the company successfully falls on the shareholders of 
the company. 
Primarily corporate governance is vested in shareholders who delegate this responsibility to 
board of directors who have a fiduciary duty to serve the interests of the corporation rather 
than interests of the firm's management. An examination of shareholding in sampled firms 
revealed concentrated contrary to corporate governance recommended dispersed ownership 
structure. In some firms, an individual shareholder holds over 60 percent of the shares. 
Individual in this case can also be an institutional investor. 
The categorised shareholding captures the largest percentage of share capital in a company 
held by an individual investor in each year. For example, shareholdings of category 20 percent 
to 50percent represent a company in which the top, individual shareholder has influence; that 
is, and based on a principle of majority rule, his or her vote cannot be ignored in passing 
company resolutions. In section 6.3 in chapter 6, we presented table 6.1 and noted that on the 
NSE, in the listed firms sampled, the ownership was in a few hands, that is, there is 
concentrated ownership. For instance, in 407 out of 697 cases presented, one shareholder hold 
above 50 percent of the shares (Table 7.3 above), that is, have total control over the company. 
There is a wide dispersion of ownership in only 15 percent of the cases. One would expect 
decision making in firms with dispersed ownership to be difficult and political (preference 
aggregation rule), and this due to existence of non-dictatorship, unrestricted domain and 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (Arrow, 1950). 
If you take the odds ratio related to categorised shareholding variable, firm in which an 
individual shareholder is classified as belonging to Shareholdings 20 percent to 50 percent 
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(OwnStrCa=1) category exhibit a ß = -2.072 (sig. 0.004; α = 0.05), indicatingthat compared to 
(OwnStrCa=3), firms with one shareholder holding 20percent to 50percent of the shares 
(OwnStrCa=1) are less likely to change CEOs. The same applies to firms in which one 
shareholder hold   51percent to 100 percent, in which ß = -0.631(sig. 0. 171; α = 0.05) is not 
statistically significant.  
 
The deduction from the reported findings is that firms in which an individual shareholder has 
influence or controlling interest are reluctant replacing their CEO, even when performance is 
below average. However, the frequency of CEO replacement is higher in firms where the 
ownership is dispersed. Given that the performance of a number of firms over the period of 
the study was dismal, the failure by shareholders with both influence and control to replace 
non performing CEOs is a dent on corporate governance on the NSE. 
 
 It is possible that such managers are appointed by such influential shareholder, who 
subsequently finds it difficult removing such non performing managers. These findings negate 
the theory that dispersed shareholders are too weak to have unified stand against blundering 
management (Low, Makhija, & Sanders, 2007:2). The finding suggests the existence of 
director primacy theory espoused by Bainbridge (2003); the director primacy theory requires 
directors to act on behalf of the firm and not as agents of shareholders, (Asher, Mahoney 
&Mahoney, 2005), a viewpoint that shareholders are not the only group that is interested in 
the success of the firm (Financial Times. 2009; Lancaster & Lipsey, 1996). 
7.12 Performance and change of CEO 
In this section are the test results and discussions of the third hypothesis: 
H03: Firm performance does not have a significant effect on change of CEO. 
H13:  A firm performance has significant effect on Change of CEO. 
 
The result of the impact of performance on change of CEOs on the NSE is presented in table 
7.6. In chapter 5, the result of the data analysis confirmed two measures of performance to be 
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used in this study, namely book to market ratio and asset turnover ratio. Both measures are 
used to group firms before predicting change in CEO. We start with the predictive power of 
the book value to the market value ratio as an indicator of performance and then use asset 
turnover ratio as the performance indicator to predict usage of debt capital. 
7.12.1 Book value to market value ratio and change of CEO 
The result of the impact of the book to the market ratio of equity on change of CEOs on the 
NSE is summarised and presented in table 7.6. The book value of equity is the sum of the 
retained earnings and other balance sheet entries classified under stock holder's equity, such as 
common stock and capital contributed in excess of par value of a share. The market value of a 
share is the price at which a share can be currently be sold; and in this study it share prices 
reported on the NSE. The book value to the market value ratio (BV/MV or BtM) is the book 
value of shareholder's equity divided by the market value of equity. The interpretation in this 
study is that relatively low values of the ratio, normally above 1, characterize growth stock 
and relatively high values of the ratio normally below 1, characterize value stock (Atkinson, 
Kaplan, Matsumura & Young, 2007; Sharpe, Alexander & Bailey, 1999). 
Fama and French (1992) examined the relationship between BV/MV ratio  and stock return 
and found out that on average the larger the BV/MV ratio the larger the market ratio. In South 
Africa, Auret and Sinclaire (2006:36) conclusion on the importance of BV/MV is that ‗The 
ratio of book-to-market equity can be interpreted as a proxy for some underlying risk relating 
to a particular stock. As such, it is expected to be related to sharing returns accordingto 
risk/return risk/return framework. It turns out that this is the case, and a significant positive 
relationship is found between BTM and stock returns, as predicted‘. Therefore, one would 
expect investors to rely on this ratio when monitoring their firm‘s performance. 
Using the book to market ratio (BV/MVor BtM) the 694 cases are grouped into positive 
growth <1 (LeBtM=1) no-growth =1 (LeBtM=2) and negative growth > 1 (LeBtM=3) (see 
table 7.4). The negative growth > 1 (LeBtM=3) is used as a reference group. For this variable, 
if you take the odds ratio, positive growth <1 (LeBtM=1) firms ß = +.001 (sig. 0.998; α = 
0.05), and with the lower Wald interval at 95% confidence level not above 1, we conclude no 
association; and that the changes in CEO in this group are not different from the reference 
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group(negative growth > 1 (LeBtM=3)); while the growth =1(LeBtM=2)firms ß = +0.637 
(sig. 0.010; α = 0.05), are 1.892 times likely to change CEO compared to firms in the 
reference group (negative growth > 1 (LeBtM=3)). 
Using the book value to the market value ratio variable as a performance indicator, positive 
growth signifies (BtM < 1) well managed firm and there will be no need to replace managers 
in such firms, yet the data analysis tells us that the change in CEO in this group is not 
different from those with negative growth (the reference category).  Given that the 
shareholders are the group to use this ratio this finding supported the assertion that (see 
ownership structure and change of CEO above) that shareholders are less likely to change 
CEO.  
Given the importance of this ratio as a predictor of returns in the finance literature (Pratt & 
Grabowski, 2010:216; Auret & Sinclaire, 2006; Fama & French; 1992) it is surprising that 
with 71.6 percent (%) of cases showing no growth and below, few (only 0.05 percent) 
managers were replaced and one would have expected shareholders to rely on this ratio to 
sack a higher number of CEO, but that appear not to be the case. We justify the use of this 
ratio because it captures fundamental index of firm value, namely the value the capital market 
attaches to a firm's net assets as in Fama and French (1992) to construct a value index for 
asset pricing.  
Furthermore, we expect debt holders to look at this ratio as an indicator of default risk given 
that it is shareholder investment that acts as security for debt holders (Li, Lajbcygier, Guo, & 
Chen, 2007; Vassalou &Xing, 2004). The data confirm that as far as this indicator is concerned 
the replacement of CEO is not performance driven, and the hypothesis that firm performance 
has a significant effect on change of CEO is rejected; it could also mean that those responsible 
for disciplining managers do not look at correct indicators that include the book value to the 
market value ratio. 
7.12.2 Asset turnover ratio and change in CEO 
The result of the impact of the asset turnover on change of CEOs on the NSE is summarised 
and presented in Table 7.6. In chapter 6, the finding was that asset turnover ratio predicts firm 
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usage of debt well, in fact, far much better than the book to market ratio; at the same time, 
total debt to the total asset ratio predicts the asset turnover ratio but not the book value to the 
market value ratio. That link is exploited in this section to look at the impact of performance 
along with the level of debt as variables that influence change of CEO. The asset turnover 
ratio is an efficiency ratio that measures a company's ability to generate sales from its assets 
(Palepu & Healy, 2013). In other words, this ratio shows how efficiently a company can use 
its assets to generate sales, so a higher ratio is preferable to a lower ratio; nevertheless, it has 
been observed that firms with high asset turnover ratios might report low profit margins (Li& 
Nissim, 2014; Penman, 2013; Palepu & Healy, 2013). Therefore, one would expect CEOs 
whose firms post lower asset turnover ratio to be replaced, but that might not be the case if the 
shareholders fail to act. 
 
The asset turnover ratio is grouped into three classes (levels (Le)), namely: Low 0.073 - 0.688 
(LeAssTurn=1); Medium 0.6926 - 1.1073(LeAssTurn=2) and High 1.114 - 10.1856 
(LeAssTurn=3).For this variable, if you take the odds ratio, low asset turnover ratio  
(LeAssTurn=1) firms ß = +1.114 (sig. 0. 000; α = 0.05), with the positive sign and  entire 
Wald interval at 95 percent confidence level above 1, we conclude positive association; and 
confirm that those firms in this group (see ex(ß ) in table 7.6)) are 3.045 times likely to change 
CEO compared to firms in reference group (High asset turnover (LeAssTurn=3)); while the 
medium asset turnover ratios (LeAssTurn=2) firms ß = -0.216 (sig. 0.336; α = 0.05), therefore, 
the change in CEO in this group  is not different from the reference group (high asset turnover 
(LeAssTurn=3)).  
The data confirm that as far as the asset turnover ratio as an indicator of performance is 
concerned, replacement of CEO is performance driven andthe hypothesis that firm 
performance has a significant effect on change of CEO is accepted. Specifically, the data 
supports the hypothesis that low asset turnover ratio is associated with change in CEOs on the 
NSE. 
A close examination of this ratio suggests it as a measure of the productivity of a company‘s 
assets with respect to generating sales, that is, total asset is the input while sale is the output. It 
is the CEO that packages use of firm's assets and therefore, responsible to low asset turnover 
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ratios. Studies have verified the explanatory power of asset turnover and profit margin for 
forecasting profits (Amir, Kama & Livnat, 2011; Soliman, 2008). 
7.13 Debt capital and change in CEO 
The central theme in this study was to empirically determine the perceived role of debt as a 
corporate governance variable. This is achieved by examining the effect of debt capital on 
change of CEO. This is based on the observation that even with usual organizational controls 
managers have acted against the interest of investors; and there is a need to develop additional 
controls (Adams, Hermalin & Weisbach, 2010; Ravina& Sapienza, 2010:964; Gordon, 2007). 
Leverage ratios are used to investigate the firm‘s use of debt. Financial leverage measures the 
amount of financing other than equity, including short and long-term debt (May, 
2010:294).The total debt to the total asset ratio measures the proportion of total assets 
financed by debt.  In this, section is the test results and discussions of the fourth hypothesis: 
H04: Leverage does not have a significant effect on change of CEO. 
H14:  Leverage has a significant effect on change of CEO. 
 
The results of the impact of debt capital on change of CEOs on the NSE are presented in 
Table 7.6. The analysis of collected data reported in chapter 5 (canonical correlation) showed 
that the total debt to the total asset ratio is the best indicator of the debt level from competing 
indicators of debt usage. The 694 cases are grouped using total debt to total asset ratio and 
presented in Table 7.3. The categorisations are: high leverage (0.45 to 2.03956) is labeled as 
TDtTAca=1; medium leverage 0.3515 to 0.44781 is labeled as TDtTAca=2; and low leverage 
0 to 0.34278 labeled as TDtTAca=3. The low leverage labeled as TDtTAca=3 is the reference 
group. 
For this variable, if you take the odds ratio, high leverage (TDtTAca=1) firms ß = +1.233 (sig. 
0. .013; α = 0.05), and that with the positive sign and  entire Wald interval at 95% confidence 
level above 1, we conclude positive association; and confirm that those firms in this group 
(see ex(ß ) in table 7.6 are 3.430 times likely to change CEO compared to firms in reference 
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group (low leverage (TDtTAca=3)); while the medium leverage (TDtTAca=2) firms ß = 
+1.870 (sig. 0.001; α = 0.05), are 6.491 times likely to change CEO compared to firms in the 
reference group (low leverage (TDtTAca=3)). 
The data confirmed replacement of CEO is debt capital driven; and the hypothesis that firm 
debt capital has a significant effect on change of CEO is supported by the data. Specifically, 
the finding suggests that medium leverage ratio is associated with change in CEOs on the 
NSE. 
The findings are in line with the two theoretical prescriptions discussed in chapter 2, namely; 
the use of debt capital alleviates agency costs resulting into improved performance; and the 
theory of using debt capital to tame managers. The data confirm the proposition that debt 
capital influence replacement of CEOs. The implication is that if managers are being replaced 
as a result of poor corporate performance, then firms that finance their assets with 35% and 
above with debt capital are more likely to replace their CEOs than those that use less than 
35percent of debt capital in financing their assets. The conclusion then is that on the NSE debt 
could be playing a monitoring role, but only if the amount of debt in capital structure is 
substantial that is, above 35 percent of capital used to finance assets. 
Though high levels of debt are associated with high levels of default probability, the 
propensity to replace CEO is higher in medium leveraged firms (TDtTAca=2) than high 
leveraged firms (TDtTAca=1), suggesting that by insisting on replacing non performing 
CEOs' debt holders in medium leverage firms could be more risk averse than those in high 
leveraged firms. It was possible that in high levered firms, debt holders have technically 
become owners, the manager is a mere figure head and there is no need replacing the CEO 
(Tirole, 2006). In all the effect of debt capital on CEO is not similar across distinct levels of 
debt capital (leverage). 
7.14 Changes in CEO, performance and debt capital 
This hypothesis was to test the interaction effect of performance and debt capital on change of 
CEO. The GGE result for this model did not add value, and the results are not reported.  
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7.15 Discussion and summary of findings 
The central idea (thesis or debate or contribution to finance theory) in this study is to examine 
departure from the Modigliani and Miller (1958) assertion that capital structure decisions have 
no impact on a firm's value; specifically assessing the role of debt capital in addressing agency 
conflicts within a firm. This is because not much is known about empirical relevance of such 
theories on the NSE in Kenya; and this is the gap in knowledge filled in this study. The 
relevancy of capital structure in this study is tested by examining the impact of levels of debt 
capital and levels of performance on replacement of CEOs. In using performance and debt 
levels the study went beyond using ordinary least square regression (OLS) by employing 
generalised estimating equation (GEE). 
 
Margaritis and Psillak (2010:631) writing on the relationship between capital structure and 
performance in France, recommend that ―In future research, it will be of interest to extend this 
analysis across different countries and across different industries as well as to examine further 
aspects of ownership and governance characteristics." Intuitively, replacing CEOs in non-
performing firms signify effective corporate governance; but failure to replace non performing 
managers exposed stakeholders to decline wealth, thus question the model in which board of 
directors is solely responsible for corporate governance. The idea in this study is to explore 
the contribution of debt capital to enhancement of corporate governance in firms listed on the 
NSE. 
 
From the data and resulting analysis, the evidence is that the propensity to replace non 
performing managers over the period of study is low, but this does not stop us from analysing 
the factors that influenced the changes in CEOs; the assumption is that the information in the 
replacements is still valuable. Major financial decisions within a firm, be it capital budgeting, 
financing and asset-management decision are influenced by internal and to some extent, 
external governors who include shareholder, suppliers of short-term and long-term capital, 
markets and products and services in those markets and regulators. However, the depth of 
influence the governors have over the firm varies, and their interests do not always align due 
to variations in their risk profiles and attitudes. As an example, there might be a conflict of 
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interest between debt holders and shareholders on a decision to replace a CEO. The findings 
of this study that shareholders are reluctant to replace non performing CEO on the face of 
poor performance suggest a failure in corporate governance and a potential conflict between 
debt holders and shareholders. 
 
In relation to ownership, the tendency on the NSE to replace CEO is higher in firms where 
there is dispersed ownership in contrast to concentrated ownership (that is, where one 
shareholder has a controlling interest). The low replacement of CEO in firms where one 
shareholder has a controlling interest, might be due to excessive influence that shareholders 
have over the CEO‘s appointment or existence of special relationship between the CEO and 
that major shareholder. Such a CEO might compromise minority shareholder's interest in the 
firm. In a country like Kenya where minority shareholders are not protected, minority 
shareholders might suffer losses if the CEO extends favors to the controlling shareholders 
responsible to his or her appointment. There is vast literature on large owners benefiting at the 
expense of small owners through arrangements such as dual-class equity, pyramid structures, 
and cross-ownership (Peng & Jiang, 2010; Hoskisson, Johnson, Tihanyi & White, 2005).  
 
In Fisman, Khuranaand Rhodes (2010) model, weak governance protects mediocre CEOs 
from dismissal.  The evidence in Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) andLaeven and Levine (2009) 
showed that shareholders give a priority to their interest at the expense of the other 
stakeholders when they suggested that the presence of institutional investors increases the 
riskiness of the bank. If shareholders fail to replace a non performing CEO, there is a strong 
case for reinforcing corporate governance, through other mechanisms. Other mechanisms 
would include allowing debt holders to participate at higher-level decision making or even 
encourage a corporate takeover. Failure to tame errand CEOs could also mean that governors‘ 
choice of performance indicators useful in evaluating CEOs is prone to systematic biases. 
 
Those studies suggesting a link between management turnovers and performance echo 
ineffectiveness or lack of corporate governance (Firth, Fung & Rui, 2005; DeFond & Mingyi, 
2004). Again, this study used two indicators of performance: namely book value to the market 
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value ratio and the asset turnover market ratio to test the effect of poor performance on CEO 
turnover. 
Using the book value to the market value ratio as a performance indicator, we interpret firms 
with the book value to market value ratio value of less than one (BtM is <1) as growth firms, 
and because such firms are well managed, they need not to replace their CEOs. However, the 
data analysis and finding above confirm that the change in CEO in this group is not different 
from those with the book value  to market value ratio value greater than one, negative growth 
(BtM is >1), classified as reporting pitiable performance. Change in CEOs is not sensitive to 
the book value to the market value ratio as the performance indicator; and to be assertive, this 
indicator suggests that on the NSE, CEOs with poor performance are not replaced as advanced 
by Dimopoulos and Wagner (2010:2). The data confirm that as far as this indicator is 
concerned the replacement of CEO is not performance driven, and the hypothesis that firm 
performance has a significant effect on change or retention of CEO is rejected. It is possible 
that those in command of disciplining managers do not look at this indicator or any other 
correct indicators in their evaluation of CEO. 
When asset turnover is used as a performance indicator, change in CEO is associated with 
poor performance (low asset turnover ratio). The findings confirmed that the propensity to 
change CEO is higher in firms with a low asset turnover than those with a high asset turnover. 
The data confirm that as far as this indicator is concerned the replacement of CEO is 
performance driven, and the hypothesis that firm performance has a significant effect on 
change of CEO is accepted. Specifically, the data supports the hypothesis that low asset 
turnover ratio is associated with change in CEOs on the NSE. 
The finding that low asset turnover ratio is associated with change in CEOs on the NSE is in 
line with match theory (interactions between firm and executive) that explains firm 
productivity and performance in terms of interactions between firm and CEO, in this case use 
of assets to generate sales or services, and interpreted to mean that firm failure is traced to 
manager‘s capability (Allgood & Farrell, 2003); and Ambrosini, Bowman and Collier (2009) 
argue that firm failure could be attributed to managers using the extant set of dynamic 
capabilities, when these are not appropriate for the new environment. Others interpret the 
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match theory to mean that it is a CEO‘s effort that shape firm performance, and conclude that 
non performing CEOs be replaced (Eisfeldt & Kuhnen, 2010). The power of asset turnover as 
a performance indicator to predict change in CEO found support in the argument by Wermers, 
Wu and Zechner (2008:26) that were corporate governance exist; poor performance preceded 
replacement of management. The specific finding is that CEO whose firm asset turnover ratio 
is low; that is, with a range between 0.073 times - 0.688 times are likely to be replaced. 
 
The final question is: Does debt capital mitigate the agency problem? Or Does debt capital 
plays a disciplinary influence replacement of non-performing CEOs? The findings based on 
the data support the hypothesis that debt capital plays a governance role as suggestedin 
Jensen (1986). Jorion, (2007) suggested that debt holders must monitor both shareholders and 
CEOs to tame shareholders and their CEOs appetite for excessive risk.  
The finding that firms with high debt had greater propensity to replace non performing 
managers empirically supported the assertion by Jorion (2007) and Harvey, Lins and Roper 
(2004) that debt capital alleviated agency costs and might propel replacement of non-
performing CEOs. The finding is that firms that financed 35 percent, and above of their assets 
with debt capital is more likely to replace their CEOs than those that finance their assets with 
less than 35 percent of debt capital. The conclusion is that firms with higher default risk as a 
result of substantial debt capital in the capital structure are distinctly possible to change their 
top management to avoid total collapse (Wei Ting, 2011). 
7.16 The theoretical and practical implication of the findings 
This study contributes to the debate on irrelevancy or relevancy of capital structure decision. 
The specific issue is about the extent to which debt capital mitigates agency cost. The data 
used in this study point out that (generate a theory), depending on the measure of 
performance,  and measure of usage of borrowed capital, and to the extent that replacing a non 
performing CEO signifies effective corporate governance; the emerging theory is that debt 
capital supplement equity capital in alleviating agency costs. The finding negates MM theory 
of capital structure irrelevancy and is in support of the alternative hypothesis that in the real 
world, frictions make capital structure decisions relevant. The practical orientation is that 
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firms should use debt capital to bring forces to bear on the operations and choices of firms and 
to protect the investment of shareholders and other stakeholders. 
The study also contributes to the debate on large owners‘ impact on firm performance and 
their role on replacing non performing CEOs, concluding that large owner‘s impact adversely 
on corporate governance because they fail to replace non-performing CEOs. The evidence is 
that on the NSE, we see more replacement of non-performing CEOs in firms with dispersed 
ownership, while replacing a CEO is an effective strategy to renew its resource base. The data 
tell us that large ownership is not beneficial to other stakeholders.  
From a practical perspective, the first challenge then is to include a regulation that firms 
employ a minimum amount of debt in their capital structure; second managers are made aware 
that debt capital combined with poor performance could see them replaced. The findings 
present a challenge to researchers‘ and regulators in the sense that compared to cases where 
performance was classified as average and below average, replacement of CEOs tended to be 
low on the NSE; a finding that point to prevalence of poor corporate governance on the NSE. 
It also confirms the theory that firms in which an individual shareholder has influence or 
controlling interest are reluctant replacing their CEO. 
Another important finding is the low-rate replacements of CEO despite poor performance in a 
number of firms, and this finding confirms the prevalence of the firm fixed effect in contrast 
to managerial effect, and that on the NSE, the manager characteristics are not well matched to 
firm characteristics. Low replacement despite poor performance put into question how 
effective the market and other firm controllers evaluate and control managers on the NSE. It is 
a challenge on factors that those responsible for replacing managers consider in CEO 
replacement decision and whether CEO replacement is proactive or not as discussed in 
Ertugruland Krishnan (2011). Finally and again from a practical perspective, managers of debt-
conservative firms who objectively read this study will consider using more debt. 
In terms of methodology, the researcher is not aware of any study that has employed grouped 
data from an emerging economy such as Kenya, and subjected the data to GEE technique to 
test the effect of debt capital and performance on change of CEO. Similar studies have 
employed OLS and were only able to state whether the relationship was significant or not, but 
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in this study using GEE, we are able to point out whether change of CEO is significantly 
attributable to low, medium or above-average  capital structure, in addition to whether the 
change depended on levels of performance. 
7.17 Summary of the chapter 
 
The objective in this chapter was to test the effect of performance and debt capital on change 
of CEO. The specific hypotheses being: 
H03:  Firm performance does not have a significant effect on change of CEO. 
H13: Firm performance has a significant effect on Change of CEO 
 
And 
H04: Leverage does not have a significant effect on change of CEO. 
H14: Leverage has a significant effect on change of CEO. 
 
And 
H05: Leverage and firm performance does not have a significant effect on Change of CEO 
H15:  Leverage and firm performance has a significant effect on Change of CEO. 
 
This chapter presented the findings on the relationship between debt capital, performance, and 
change in CEO. The core concept in the chapter is the role of debt capital in addressing 
agency conflicts. For debtto capital mitigates agency costs, there must be visible differences in 
change in CEOs in firms with more debt when compared to those with less debt in their 
capital structure in the face of poor performance; this is a test of theoretical construct derived 
from the relevancy or irrelevancy of capital structure as advanced by Modigliani and Miller 
(1958). 
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The data relied on contained repeated binary measures of the change in CEO in each sampled 
company, for the period 1990 through to 2012. The industry, along with a fixed recording of 
whether or not the level of debt capital was high, low or medium or categorised into quartiles, 
and whether or not the level of performance good, average or poor and a control variable, 
ownership structure (percentage of shareholding by large owners) is provided. GEE is used to 
fit a repeated measures logistic regression to study effects of performance with the capital 
structure, with ownership structure on change of CEO. GEE allowed for analysis of non-
normal data and repeated measurements or other correlated observations, such as clustered 
data (Lalonde, Nguyen, Yin, Irimata& Wilson, 2013; Diggle, Heagerty, Liang, & Zeger, 
2002; Hardin & Hilbe, 2003; Liang & Zeger, 1986). 
The book value to the market value ratio, asset turnover ratio and the total debt to the total 
asset ratio are used to test the effect of performance and capital structure on change of CEOs. 
The event (dependent) variable is the change in CEO and is a random variable. The 
probability distribution of the dependent variable is binomial. Theyear is the variable 
specifying the number of trial occurring in a subject.  The predictor variables, the total debt to 
total assets, levels of book value to market value ratio, asset turnover ratio and categorised 
ownership structure initially reported as covariate is converted into factors. 
The GEE model generated parameter estimates of goodness fit. There are four models to 
choose from: M-dependent, exchangeable, auto regressive of first order AR(1), independent  
and unstructured models; the results show that the smallest QIC is the unstructured structure; 
therefore, unstructured model is used to model the impact of performance and capital structure 
on change of CEO (see table 7.4 (a) and 7.4 (b)). 
In testing for model effect, the result of testing the global null hypothesis: beta = 0, and 
relying on the Wald Chi-Square test (see table 7.5) showed that at least one of the predictors' 
regression coefficient is not equal to zero in the model. Then we proceeded to establish the 
level and direction of predictor‘s regression, and that regression coefficients are not equal to 
zero. 
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The parameter estimates for all factors are calculated and presented in table 7.6; and 
interpreted and in summary, the findings are as presented. If you take the odds ratio related to 
this variable, it is apparent that firms in which an individual shareholder hold 20 percent to 50 
percent of equity capital, are less likely to change CEOs compared to those firms in which an 
individual shareholders hold of 20 percent and below, the same applies to firms in which one 
shareholder hold 51 percent to 100 percent, though this is not statistically significant. 
Therefore, the data confirms that group of shareholders captured in this study do not influence 
change in CEO.  
 
In relation to performance as a variable inducing change in CEO, the results varied depending 
on the indicator of performance. When the book to market ratio (BV/MV) is employed as a 
performance indicator, we did not see any influence and concluded no association between 
change in CEO and performance. The analysis confirmed that the change in CEO in all 
groups, that is, firms with positive growth, negative growth and no growth were not different. 
However, though not statistically significant, the no-growth firms‘ are1.892 times less likely 
to change CEO compared to firms in the reference group.When the asset turnover ratio is used 
as the performance indicator, we see positive association; and confirm that those firms with a 
low asset turnover are 3.045 times likely to change CEO compared to firms with the high 
asset turnover ratio, but the change in CEO in the firms with the medium asset turnover ratio 
is not different from the firms with the high asset turnover. Therefore, the data supported the 
hypothesis that low asset turnover ratio is associated with change in CEOs on the NSE; and 
this finding is important in the sense that it goes beyond merely stating that a relationship 
existed by specifying what is a low asset turnover ratio for this market is. The finding matches 
the level of performance to replacement of CEO. 
In relation to the influence of debt capital on change in CEO, a positive association is 
confirmed. The data confirmed that firms with high leverage (debt) are 3.430 times likely to 
change CEO when compared to firms inlow leverage.  The firms with a medium leverage are 
6.491 times likely to change CEO compared to firms in the reference group (low leverage). 
The data tells us that though high levels of debt are associated with high levels of default 
probability, the propensity to replace CEO is higher in a medium leveraged than high 
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leveraged. The finding was that replacement non performing CEOs by debt holders in 
medium leverage firms is higher than those in high levered firms suggests that debt holders in 
a medium levered firm are more risk averse than those in high leveraged firms. 
In conclusion the three hypotheses:  
H03 Firm performance does not have a significant effect on change of CEO. 
H13: Firm performance has a significant effect on Change of CEO 
 
And 
H04 Leverage does not have a significant effect on change of CEO. 
H14: Leverage has a significant effect on change of CEO. 
 
H05: Leverage and firm performance does not have a significant effect on Change of CEO 
H15:  Leverage and firm performance has a significant effect on Change of CEO. 
 
The three are supported by the data. However, the relationship is significant only if the asset 
turnover ratio is used as a measure of performance. In the next, final chapter, is presented the 
summary; conclusion; evaluation of research contribution; limitations of this research; and 
suggested areas for further studies. 
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CHAPTER 8 
SUMMARIES, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 Introduction 
This study provided evidence on the effect of performance on leverage; effect of leverage on 
performance; and debt capital levels, performance levels and ownership structure levels on 
change in CEO at the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) in Kenya. This study emphasized 
role that management of performance and debt capital play in enhancing the value of firms 
listed at NSE. The significance of the debt monitoring role is traced to Tung (2009).Tung 
(2009:117 - 123) referred to leverage in the board room as the unsung influence of private 
lenders in corporate governance, ‗The dearth (lack) of attention to lender governance is ironic 
given the dominance of the contractualist view of the corporation within the legal academy 
and the thick web of contractual commitments that bind the public company. Despite the 
ascendancy of the contractualist view of the corporation within the legal academy, legal 
scholars have not generally noticed the extent of lender governance or discussed its contours 
or potential effects.‘ 
The use of debt by business firms is an unresolved issue, that is, researchers are not yet 
definite on the role of debt capital in businesses. Managers do not always adopt leverage 
choices that maximises shareholders‘ value (Jiraporn, Chintrakarn&Liu, 2012). In that sense 
managers might be inefficient in their capital structure decisions.In addition, firms with 
dominant CEO are likely to adopt significantly lower leverage to circumvent disciplinary 
mechanisms that accompany debt financing (Jiraporn, Chintrakarn & Liu, 2012). Shareholders 
might be reluctant replacing non performing CEO even when the CEO‘s continued stay is 
harmful to other stakeholders.  
The primary objective of this study is to investigate the relationship between capital structure, 
performance and replacement of CEO in firms listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange. The 
secondary objectives of the study were: 
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 To establish if firm performance has an effect on leverage. 
 To establish if leverage has an effect on firm performance. 
 To establish if firm performance causes changes of CEO. 
 To establish if leverage cause change of CEO. 
 To establish if leverage and firm performance (interaction effect) causes change of 
CEO. 
 
The resulting five (5) hypotheses were: 
H01: Firm performance does not have a significant effect on leverage, and alternative  
H11: Firm performance has a significant effect on leverage. 
 
H02: Leverage does not have a significant effect on firm performance; the alternative 
hypothesis:  
H12: Leverage has a significant effect on firm performance. 
 
H03: Firm performance does not have a significant effect on Change of CEOthe alternative 
hypothesis: 
H13:  Firm performance has a significant effect on Change of CEO. 
 
H04: Leverage does not have a significant effect on change of CEO, the alternative hypothesis: 
H14:  Leverage has a significant effect on change of CEO. 
 
H05: Leverage and firm performance does not have a significant effect on Change of CEO, the 
alternative hypothesis: 
H15:  Leverage and performance has a significant effect on Change of CEO. 
 
The data collected was subjected to three statistical techniques (methods) as a step to 
achieving the research objectives. The statistical methods that were employed in this study 
were canonical correlation, general linear model (GLM) and generalised estimating equation 
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(GEE). The result to be generated by these three statistical models was to confirma bi-
directional relationship between capital structure and performance; in addition to confirming 
that firm performance and debt capital influenced the changeof CEO.  
This chapter presents a summary of the study in this research: where it started, the distance 
covered and its destination.  The rest of the chapter is presented as follows: in section, 8.1 is 
the introduction; section 8.2 is the summary of the chapters; section 8.3 is the conclusion; 
section 8.4 is the contribution of this research; section 8.5 is limitations of this research; and 
section 8.6 is further research. 
 
8.2 Summary 
 
Chapter one (1) is the background of the study, statement of the problem, objectives of the 
study, justification of the study and limitations of this study. In chapter one, the key concepts 
in the study, namely corporate governance, performance, debt capital and change in CEO are 
introduced. The key section is the statement of the problem, specifically the research gap. The 
key observation that a firm‘s choice of capital structure is inconsequential is inconsistent with 
the observation that firms invest significant resources both in terms of managerial time and 
effort, legal fee and investment banking fees, in managing their capital structures anchored 
this research. The justification of the deployment of such resources is that the choice of 
leverage is of critical importance to a firm‘s value and that individual firms have an optimum 
capital structure, such that a firm‘s choice of capital structure is relevant. Yet in addressing the 
relevancy or irrelevancy of capital structure choices, researchers are not in consensus, whether 
it is the capital structure that influences performance or performance that influences capital 
structure or both, and that ‗debt capital, one would argue  reduces agency costs and induce 
agency benefits, if there are visible differences in performance across distinct levels of capital 
structure; and visible differences in capital structure across different levels of performance‘, 
finally ‗that debt capital becomes a relevant corporate governance mechanism, only  if it has a 
noticeable effect on corporate governance, namely replacement of CEO‘s in poorly 
performing firms. 
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Chapter two (2) is contemporary literature on key concepts of the study, namely, 
performance, capital structure and corporate governance. On capital structure theories, the 
literature reviewed showed a lack of agreement, thus creating a research gap. In relation to 
corporate governance, there is evidence consistent with a causal relationship between an 
overall governance index and higher share prices in emerging markets. Better firm-level 
corporate governance practices are linked to higher valuations, better performance and more 
dividends become available investors. Durnev and Kim (2005) point out that it is hard to 
predict firm-level governance choices and related it to performance. The chapter discussed 
those responsible for corporate governance in firms and the role of debt capital in corporate 
governance.  The chapter presented literature and showed a lack of agreement as to whether it 
usage of debt capital that influences performance, or it is performance that influences usage of 
debt. In addition, measures of capital structure and performance are presented. The core 
theories that emerged and anchored this study are: agency theories- under investment, debt 
overhang and capital structure-related theories that include irrelevancy and relevancy of 
capital structure decisions, efficiency hypothesis and franchise value hypothesis. 
 
In Chapter three (3) ispresented contemporary literature required to understand the 
contribution of debt capital to corporate governance. The literature on the role that debt 
CapitaLand firm performance plays in forcing top management to quit is presented. 
Evaluation ofcorporate governance is operationalised by assessing the extent to which 
inefficient managers are replaced due to poor firm performance. There was no consensus on 
the extent to which performance and leverage influence change in CEOs. In the review, there 
was agreement that non performing managers should be replaced to reverse the decline. 
However, under some circumstances, shareholders are reluctant replacing non-performing 
managers; and there is a need to reinforce corporate governance to propel replacement of non-
performing managers. In one study, it is reported that ‗the change in turnover in response to a 
decline in performance is insignificant or even goes against firing underperforming managers‘ 
(Dimopoulos & Wagner, 2010:2). In an emerging economy perspective, is possible that, the 
link between firm performance and management turnover is fuzzy due to weak laws, weak 
regulation and underdeveloped capital markets (Strenger, Kleindiek, Schmelzle, & Volynets, 
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2012) and this need confirming. Leverage in the board room is the unsung influence of private 
lenders in corporate governance (Tung, 2009:117–123). The conclusion from the review is 
that a research gap exists, and the focus then shifted to the relevant theories. 
The resulting theories useful in interpreting the findings in this study are strategic choice and 
the microeconomic theories and agency theory. The match theory explains firm productivity 
and performance in terms of the match between CEO and the firm. The other theories 
included contractualist view of the corporation; that is, debt holders have a contact with the 
firm; common sense theory assumes that sound and prudent judgment based on a simple 
perception of the situation or facts and that a new CEO has the capacity to enhance 
performance. Echelon theory hypothesizes that demographic diversity of senior management 
is positively associated with the diversity of the workforce and recall that management is 
achieving results through others. In addition are the dependency theory - characterises 
organization behaviour and managers as critical resources to the success of corporations; 
exchange-based power - potential of debt capital as a resource that would influence behavior 
and replacement of top management; risk theory- adverse changes in risk acts as a signal to 
shareholders and regulators to take corrective action that include replacement of topmost 
management. Finally, concepts and measures about firm performance change in CEO and 
capital structure were presented. 
 
Chapter four (4) explained the research philosophy, approach, design, population, sample of 
the study; and methods used to address the research problem and research objectives. It 
explained how the bi-directional relationship between capital structure and performance is to 
be examined and reported; and how the extent to which poor performance and capital 
structure influence change in CEO is to be established. In this, chapter is a planned and 
deliberate approach that controls the collection, analysis and interpretation of data to report 
credible findings and conclusions. In this chapter, the researcher sets the standard for data 
collection and data analysis that must be adhered to whether the findings are to be believable. 
 
The study is based on listed firms on the NSE and covered the period 1990 to 2012. 
Compared to major world markets in Europe, USA and Japan, NSE is a small capital market, 
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with only 62 listed firms, in a growing economy which was constituted in 1954 as a voluntary 
association of stockbrokers registered under the Societies Act. Therefore, it is important 
informing the outside world, particularly potential foreign investors, about the activities at 
NSE. The variables used in this study are identified and reported in this chapter. The capital 
structure indicators used are the interest cover ratios, the long-term debt to equity market 
value, long-term debt to equity book value, long-term debt to equity market value, equity 
book value to total debt, and equity market value to total debt; while the performance 
indicators used are return on total assets, earnings before tax and interest to total assets, return 
on the market value of equity, return on book value of equity, book value to market value 
ratio, growth in sales, and the asset turnover ratio; and the control variable is the largest 
individual shareholder (ownership structure). The data on these variables cover the period 
1990 to 2012. 
Literature has been used to inform the study, and the study tested the pre-existing theory, 
through the use of a hypothesis. It relied on quantitative data, to discover and understand the 
role of debt capital at this market and how performance influences capital structure decision 
and in addition large data set are available. Therefore, in terms of research philosophy, this 
study adopted a positivist position to address the research problem and research objectives. 
The data on the variables of the study collected from authoritative sources was subjected to 
three statistical techniques (methods): canonical correlation, general linear model (GLM), and 
generalised estimating equation (GEE) to generate specific results. In addition, in the chapter 
is presented the expected outputfrom each model and how to interpret the results. 
 
Chapter five (5) presentedthe results from the evaluation of bi-directional relationship 
between capital structure and performance on subjecting the data to canonical correlation 
analysis. In addition, specific performance and capital structure indicators subjected to GLM, 
and GEE models to evaluate bi-directional relationship between capital structure in chapter 
six; and the impacts of performance and capital structure on change in CEO in chapter seven 
were identified. For the second time in this study, the first and second hypotheses are 
examined in this chapter. The presentation in this chapter is in line with the commitment made 
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by the researcher in chapter four (4). The highlights of the chapter are: the data structure, the 
canonical correlation model and equation, results of the analysis, conclusion and discussion.  
The findings and conclusion on the bi-directional relationship between capital structure and 
specific variables useful in building further relationship are presented. The discussions 
incorporated the research contribution and practical implication of this study. From the list of 
variables presented in chapter four (4), the finding is that the variables that contribute most to 
the bi-directional relationship between performance and capital structure are the asset turnover 
ratio, the book value to the market value ratio and the total debt to the total asset ratio. The 
degree to which the canonical variate of capital structure explained the variability in 
performance indicators and the degree to which canonical variate of performance measure 
explained the variability in capital structure variables help in the understanding of  the 
relationship between capital structure and performance and are therefore reported. The 
findings showed that the first canonical variate for the capital structure explained 0.065 
percent of the variability in performance, but the cumulative or proportion explained by all (6) 
canonical variates was 15.2 percent. In terms of performance measurement, we found that the 
first canonical variate explained 9.13 percent of the variability in capital structure; however, 
the cumulative proportion of measure explained by all the six canonical variates was 19.96 
percent. The degree at which performance influenced the capital structure was higher than the 
degree at which capital structure influenced on performance. However, the canonical model 
failed to tell us, which level of performance is matched with which level of debt capital; and 
this is addressed in chapter six (6). 
 
Chapter six (6) extended the analysis in chapter five in the sense that it tested the robustness 
of the findings on the bi-directional relationship between capital structure, and performance 
reported in chapter five (5). The first and second hypotheses were tested in this chapter. 
Robustness ensures that the research conclusions are independent of the research tool. Chapter 
six looked at each case independent of the company. The bi-directional is examined in stages 
by subjecting the data to the general linear model (GLM) procedure; and the indicators 
identified in chapter five (5) namely asset turnover ratio, book value to market value ratio and 
the total debt to the total asset ratio are employed each at a time to confirm the bi-directional 
238 
 
relationship between capital structure and performance. The strength in GLM is that it 
provides regression analysis and analysis of variance for one dependent variable by one or 
more factors and/or variables. The factor variables divide the population into groups, which 
are then subjected to GLM procedure, to test null hypotheses about the effects of other 
variables on the means of various groupings of a single dependent variable. The variables 
(asset turnover ratio, book value to market value ratio and total debt to total assets) are 
employed as covariates at one stage of analysis and the same variables are then grouped to 
create factors at a subsequent stage of analysis. Creating factors by grouping the variables 
allowed for association of levels' performance and levels of capital structure and subsequent 
determination of whether poor performance is associated with more usage of debt and whether 
an optimum capital structure exists. In relation to findings, the data supports the hypothesis 
that efficient and profitable firms employ more debt than comparable firms that are less 
profitable, possibly because their exposure financial risk is low (propensity to be bankrupt is 
low); there is no evidence to support the franchise hypothesis that more efficient firms use less 
debt. However, the data only show statistically significant relationship between performance 
and capital structure (usage of debt), after controlling for ownership structure, if asset turnover 
ratio and not the book value to the market value ratio is used as a performance indicator. At 
the same time, the data on the NSE support the hypothesis that the use of debt capital 
alleviates agency costs to improve firm performance, and that managers and possibly 
investors look at performance in determining the debt capacity of a firm. 
 
In chapter seven (7) findings on the influence of performance and capital structure variables 
on change of CEO are presented. The third and fourth hypotheses were tested in this chapter. 
The performance and capital structure variables employed to predict CEO‘s replacements are 
asset turnover, book to market value and total debt to total asset ratios. At this stage of the 
study interest shift from individual cases to CEO replacement in firms over a period of time, 
and the longitudinal nature of data is taken into account. Therefore, the data contains repeated 
binary measures of the change in CEO status, in addition to capital structure and performance 
indicators for each sampled company, for each year from 1990 through to 2012, the industry 
the firm belonged to, and a fixed recording of whether or not the level of debt capital was 
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high, low or medium or categorised into quartiles, and whether or not the level of performance 
good, average or poor and a control variable, capital structure, resulting into panel data. Given 
that the panel data employed at this stage contains repeated measures, GEE is employed to 
allow for analysis of repeated measurements or other correlated observations, such as 
clustered data. In the GEE model, the event (dependent) variable change in CEO is a random 
variable. The probability distribution of the dependent variable is binomial and year is the 
variable specifying the number of trial occurring in a subject. The relevant statistics were 
computed, interpreted and informed the conclusion. The resulting empirical model for CEO 
turnover on the NSE is: 
                         = 𝞓CEO= -9.627 - 2.072 Shareholdings 20% to 50% - 0.631Shareholdings 
51% to 100% + 1.233High Leverage   + 1.870Medium Leverage + 0.001Positive Growth 
<1(BtM) + 0.637No Growth =1(BtM) + 1.114Low 0.073 to 0.6882(Asset Turnover Ratio) - 
0.216 Medium 0.6926 to 1.1073 (Asset Turnover 
Ratio)……………………………………………..Equation 8.1 
In relation to performance as a variable inducing change in CEO, the results were sensitive to 
the indicator of performance. When the book to market ratio (BV/MV) was employed as a 
performance indicator, we concluded no association; and that the change in CEO in all 
groups, that is, firms with positive growth, negative growth and no growth are not different. 
However, when the asset turnover ratio is used as the performance indicator, we see positive 
association; and confirmed that those firms with a low asset turnover are 3.045 times likely to 
change CEO compared to firms with a high asset turnover. However, the change in CEO in 
the firms with a medium asset turnover this group is not different from the firms with a high 
asset turnover. Therefore, the data support the hypothesis that low asset turnover ratio is 
associated with change in CEOs on the NSE. In relation to the influence of debt capital on 
change in CEO, a positive association was visible and the data confirmed that firms with high 
leverage (debt) are 3.430 times likely to change CEO compared to firms in low leverage; butte 
firms with medium leverage are 6.491 times likely to change CEO compared to firms in the 
reference group (low leverage). The data tells us that though high levels of debt are associated 
with high levels of default probability, the propensity to replace CEO is higher in a medium 
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leveraged than high leveraged, suggesting that by insisting on replacing non performing 
CEOs' debt holders in medium leverage firms could be more risk averse than those in high 
leveraged firms. 
 
In next section of this chapter are conclusions on each objective in this study, stating clearly 
whether the null hypothesis was rejected or accepted; some proposed recommendations based 
on the research findings; present the contributions, suggests potential areas for further 
research and the study limitations.  
8.3 Conclusion of each objective 
The primary objective of this study was to investigate the relationship between capital 
structure, performance and replacement of CEO in firms listed on the Nairobi Securities 
Exchange. The primary objective was sub-divided into five secondary objectives, which were 
as follows: 
Secondary objective one (1): To find out if performance affects leverage. The null and 
alternate hypothesis tested was stated as follows: 
H01: Firm performances do not have a significant effect on leverage, and alternative  
H11: Firm performancehas a significant effect on leverage. 
This objective was tested by subjecting the data collected on the performance and capital 
structure variables to canonical and general linear model procedures. In relation to canonical 
correlation analysis, the first canonical variate explained the 9.13 percent of the variability in 
capital structure while the cumulative proportion of measure explained by all the six canonical 
variates is 19.96 percent; therefore, the data support the hypothesis that performance has a 
significant effect on leverage. Using GLM the data support the hypothesis that performance 
has a significant effect on leverage; however, the relationship is conditional on measure of 
performance. In summary, the null hypothesis that company performances do not have a 
significant effect on leverage is rejected, and the alternative hypothesis that company 
performance has a significant effect on leverage was held. 
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Secondary objective two (2): To find out if leverage affects firm performance. The null and 
alternate hypothesis tested was stated as follows: 
H02: Leverage does not have a significant effect on performance; the alternative hypothesis: 
H12: Leverage has a significant effect on firm performance. 
This hypothesis was tested by subjecting the competing measures of performance and capital 
structure to both canonical correlation and general linear model procedures. From the result of 
canonical correlation analysis, we found out that the first canonical variate for the capital 
structure explained 0.065percent of the variability in performance, but the cumulative or 
proportion explained by all (6) canonical variates was 15.2 percent. This implies a minimal 
impact of capital structure on performance. Using GLM, we found out that capital structure 
influenced firm performance; even so, that the influence was conditioned to the measure of 
performance employed. In summary, the null hypothesis that leverage does not have a 
significant effect on performance was rejected, and the alternative hypothesis that leverage 
has a significant effect on performance was held. 
The conclusion on both secondary objective one and two is that bidirectional relationships 
between capital structures and performance exist. However, the influence of capital structure 
on performance or the influence of performance on capital structure depends on measure of 
performance employed. Finally, the influence of performance through the use of debt capital 
was more pronounced than the use of debt capital on performance. 
Secondary objective three (3): To find out if performance causes changes of CEO. The null 
and alternate hypothesis tested was stated as follows: 
H03: Firm performance does not have a significant effect on Change of CEO 
H13:  Firm performance has a significant effect on Change of CEO. 
 
In this objective, the measures of performance are book value to market value ratio and asset 
turnover ratio. The event (dependent) variable change in CEO is a random variable. The data 
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is subjected to GEE. When the book to market ratio is employed as a performance indicator, 
we conclude no association; however, when the asset turnover ratio is used as the performance 
indicator, we see positive association; and confirm that those firms with a low asset turnover 
are 3.045 times likely to change CEO compared to firms with a high asset turnover while the 
change in CEO in the firms with a medium asset turnover this group is not different from the 
firms with a high asset turnover. Therefore, the data support the hypothesis that low asset 
turnover ratio is associated with change in CEOs on the NSE. The hypothesis that firm 
performance has a significant effect on change of CEO is accepted if the asset turnover ratio is 
used as a performance indicator. In summary, the null hypothesis that firm performance does 
not have a significant effect on change of CEO was rejected, and the alternative hypothesis 
that firm performance has a significant effect on change of CEO was held.                                                                
Secondary objective four (4): To find out if leverage causes changes in CEO. The null and 
alternate hypothesis tested was stated as follows: 
H04: Leverage does not have a significant effect on change of CEO. 
H14:  Leveragehas a significant effect on change of CEO. 
 
In this objective, the measure of capital structure is the total debt to the total asset ratio. The 
event (dependent) variable change in CEO is a random variable. The data is subjected to GEE. 
A positive association was visible, and the data confirmed that firms with high leverage (debt) 
are 3.430 times likely to change CEO compared to firms in low leverage, while the firms with 
medium leverage are 6.491 times likely to change CEO compared to firms in the reference 
group (low leverage). In summary, summary, the null hypothesis that leverage does not have a 
significant effect on change of CEO was rejected, and the alternative hypothesis that leverage 
has a significant effect on change of CEO was held. 
Secondary objective five (5): To find out if leverage and performance (interaction effect) 
cause change of CEO. The null and alternate hypothesis tested was stated as follows: 
H05: Leverage and firm performance has a significant effect on Change of CEO 
H15:  Leverage and firm performance do not have significant effect on Change of CEO. 
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This hypothesis was to test the interaction effect of performance and debt capital on change of 
CEO. The GGE result for this model did not add value, and the results are not reported.  
 
For quick reference, the summary of all the hypotheses indicating the relevant chapter and 
whether the hypothesis is accepted or rejected are presented in table 8.1. In the first column, 
we find the relevant chapter in which the hypothesis is tested; the second column is the null 
hypothesis; the third column is the variables employed to establish the relationship, and the 
last columns are the results. 
 
Table 8.1 Summary of Hypotheses 
Chapter Hypothesis Variable Tested Result 
Chapter Five H01: Firm 
performance does not 
have a significant 
effect on leverage 
Independent variable 
is performance; 
dependent variable is 
leverage (capital 
structure) Method: 
Canonical correlation 
analysis. 
Reject the null 
hypothesis. 
Performance 
measured as asset 
turnover ratio is 
influence usage of 
debt capital 
Chapter Five H02: Leverage does 
not have a significant 
effect on firm 
performance. 
Independent variable 
is leverage (capital 
structure); dependent 
variable – 
performance. 
 Method: Canonical 
correlation analysis. 
Reject the null 
hypothesis. 
Performance is 
measured as asset 
turnover ratio is 
influence usage of 
debt capital 
Chapter Six H01: Firm 
performance does not 
have a significant 
effect on leverage. 
Independent variables 
is Performance 
(factor) and is 
measured as either 
book value to market 
value ratio, and 
ownership structure; 
dependent variable is 
leverage (capital 
structure) (covariate) 
Method: General 
Linear Model (GLM) 
Reject the null 
hypothesis. 
Performance 
measured as asset 
turnover ratio is 
influence usage of 
debt capital. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
244 
 
Chapter Hypothesis Variable Tested Result 
 H02: Leverage does 
not have a significant 
effect on firm 
performance 
Independent variable 
is performance 
(factor) and 
ownership structure; 
dependent variable is 
Performance 
measured as either 
book to market value 
or asset turnover ratio 
(covariate) Method: 
General Linear 
Model (GLM) 
Reject the null 
hypothesis that usage 
of debt capital has 
influence on 
performance - 
measured as asset 
turnover ratio 
Chapter 7 H03: Firm 
performance does not 
have a significant 
effect on Change of 
CEO 
 
Independent 
Variables are 
performance (factor), 
measured as either 
book to market value 
or asset turnover ratio 
and ownership 
structure The 
dependent variable is 
Change of CEO. 
Method Generalised 
Estimating Equation 
(GEE) 
Reject the null 
hypothesis 
performance, 
measured as asset 
turnover ratio, has 
effect on Change of 
CEO 
 
Chapter 7 H04: Leverage (debt 
usage) does not have 
a significant effect on 
change of CEO. 
 
Independent 
Variables are 
leverage or debt 
usage measured as 
total debt to total 
assets ratio and 
ownership structure. 
The dependent 
variable is Change of 
CEO. Method 
Generalised 
Estimating Equation 
(GEE) 
Reject the null 
hypothesis leverage, 
measured as total 
debt to total assets, 
has effect on Change 
of CEO 
 
Chapter 7 H05: Leverage and 
performance has a 
significant effect on 
Change of CEO 
 
This hypothesis was to test the interaction 
effect of performance and debt capital on 
change of CEO. The GGE result for this 
model did not add value and the result are not 
reported.  
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8.4 Contribution of the study 
The contribution of this study is at methodological, theoretical and practical levels. By 
subjecting the data to canonical correlation analysis, the study identified the asset turnover 
ratio and the book value to the market value ratio and not return on assets (ROA)or return on 
equity (ROE)as the relevant measures of performance for this research; and total debt to total 
asset as a relevant measure of capital structure for this study. The three measures were used to 
establish the association between performance and leverage; and to predict the change in 
CEO. The analysis provided insights into the structure of the different variable sets (capital 
structure and performance) as they relate to their dependence in relationship; and this is of 
practical and conceptual significance and opens a window for further studies. It employed 
multiple variables instead of examining each variable independently and introduces levels 
within performance and levels within the capital structure in the analysis. In terms of theory, 
the first part in this study contributes to the debate and therefore, literature on bi-directional 
relationship between capital structure and performance and specifically refutes MM 
irrelevance proposition. 
 
This study demonstrated how by subjecting grouped variables to GLM, competing 
hypotheses, in this case performance- risk hypothesis, franchise- value hypothesis and 
efficiency hypothesis (agency cost hypothesis) dominate each other. GLM allowed for the 
analysis of groups extracted from performance and capital structure indicators. In addition, it 
provided new empirical evidence, based on data in an emerging economy, on the bi-
directional relationship between performance and capital structure. A number of similar 
studies at this level used large firm data in Europe, US and some parts of Asia, that might not 
be representative of  countries classified as emerging economies in which the supporting 
institutions are yet to be developed (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 1999). Investors 
in these emerging economies are interested in how these businesses are managed, and it is 
important understanding how financial decisions are made in these economies. This study 
informed us about capital structure decisions in emerging economies. In addition from this 
research, the advice to managers would be that the range of optimum capital structure is 
medium debt ratio 0.3515 to 0.44781 or in percentage terms from 35.15 percent to 44.781 
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percent, in any case the existence of an optimum capital structure suggests managers concern 
that levered firms incurring financial distress cost reduce shareholder's wealth in the firm. In 
addition financial managers can use this finding to evaluate their capital structure policy. 
The final contribution is to the debate on irrelevancy or relevancy of capital structure decision. 
The specific issue was on the extent to which debt capital mitigated agency cost. The data 
used in this study point out that, depending on the measure of performance and measure of 
usage of borrowed capital, and to the extent that replacing a non performing CEO signified 
effective corporate governance, debt capital supplement equity capital in alleviating agency 
costs; and that is the emerging theory. Therefore, firms should use debt capital to bring market 
forces to bear on the operations of firms to protect the investment of shareholders. 
8.5 Recommendations 
The practical conclusion from this study is that finance managers cannot be passive when it 
comes to choosing between equity and debt capital, that capital structure choices matter. The 
role of debt capital in capital markets that came out clear in this study is that debt capital 
played a disciplinary role on the NSE; and this would imply that requiring firms to issue debt 
would solve all safety and soundness-related concerns within those firms. A similar argument 
on bank safety is that sub-debt in the bank capital structure can reinforce market and 
supervisory discipline over bank risk-taking activities (Alexandre, Bouaiss &Refait-
Alexandre, 2010; Evanoff & Wall, 2000:1).  The same argument can be advanced for non-
banking institutions. Therefore, regulators, such as capital market's authority, central bank and 
economic planning ministry in Kenya should come up with a frame work that relied on 
financing policies that cultivate effective corporate governance in firms where public interest 
is substantial. The data in this study support the use of debt to enhance performance by 
checking managerial excesses. To be specific a total debt to the total asset ratio is the medium 
debt ratio from 0.35 to 0.45 or in percentage terms from 35percent to 45 percent is 
recommended because at the level, best performance (asset turnover ratio) is posted. The other 
recommendation is that in making major financial decision managers should examine the rate 
at which they generate sales from the resources at their disposal (asset turnover ratio) that 
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is,managers on the NSE should critically examine the performance level before deciding on 
the amount of debt to employ in their firms. 
8.6 Limitations of the study 
This study was limited to non-financial firms on the NSE as a practical approach to 
strengthening the corporate governance mechanisms within such firms in order to enhance the 
firm value. This study is a baseline study that other researchers can improve on; and inclusion 
of financials would allow for generalization of findings on the relationship between capital 
structure and performance and on the impact of poor performance and debt capital on 
replacement of CEO. The study did not take into account specific economic and financial 
structure as control variables and suggest this as the next study. 
 
Though the study covered a relatively long period of time (1990 to 2012) which includes 
periods of financial reforms in Kenya, the use GEE model and use of repeated data made it 
difficult  controlling for structural breaks in the data because the breaks are repeated within 
each company that result into almost zero variance. 
 
The other limitation is capturing the intention and the reasons why the shareholders force a 
CEO to leave by sacking or refusing to renew contract or even the reason why a CEO leaves 
voluntarily. The other limitations are deduced from the short comings inherent in the 
accounting data, derived from annual reports that from the core of data that will be used in 
this study. Accounting numbers contained in annual reports are affected by a number of firm 
oriented factors; industry and economy factors that make it difficult for the analyst to make 
intra and inter firm comparisons. The assumption in this study is that annual reports contain 
useful information.  
8.7 Areas for further research 
The first suggestion is that a similar study using primary data collected from managers 
andinvestors that capture perceptions about the relationship between capital structure and 
performance; and on the impact of performance and debt capital on replacement of CEO is 
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required to test the robustness of the conclusions in this study. Second this study predicted 
change in CEO using capital structure and performance indicators; however, it is also 
important examining changes in both performance and capital structure after changing CEO. 
In this study after subjecting the data to canonical correlation analysis, two measures of 
performance, the book value to the market value ratio and the asset turnover are relevant 
measures of performance. The study can be extended by subjecting other indicators of 
performance such as the return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) to both GLM and 
GEE procedures and the results compared to findings in this study as a way of validating the 
conclusions in this study. 
There are methodologies that may be used to validate the study, that were not employed here. 
An example is for those companies that replace CEOs, how long do they take to recognize 
that the CEO should be replaced? Such analysis uses duration data analysis often called 
hazard models. The other alternative is to look at the duration (23 years) and examine what 
influences the number of CEOs at each companies that is, CEO turnover per company.   
The strategic choice and the microeconomic theory theories stipulate that a firm‘s 
performance reflects management perceptions and abilities. The proposition is that a new 
CEO, with new cognitive perceptions will have a positive impact on performance. However, 
the population ecology theory is that due to structural inertia, change in CEO‘s cannot 
significantly affect firm performance. Therefore, there is a need to examine the effect of 
change of CEO on a firm‘s performance and financial policy. 
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APPENDIX1:  CLASSES OF FIRMS ON THE NSE 
 
A. AGRICULTURAL 
1. Eaagads Ltd      
2. Kapchorua Tea Co. Ltd 
3. Kakuzi                
4. Limuru Tea Co. Ltd 
5. Rea Vipingo Plantations Ltd 
6. Sasini Ltd 
7. Williamson Tea Kenya Ltd 
B. COMMERCIAL AND SERVICES 
8. Express Ltd 
9. Kenya Airways Ltd 
10. Nation Media Group 
11. Standard Group Ltd 
12. TPS Eastern Africa (Serena) Ltd 
13. Scangroup Ltd 
14. Uchumi Supermarket Ltd 
15. Hutchings Biemer Ltd 
16. Longhorn Kenya Ltd 
C. TELECOMMUNICATION AND TECHNOLOGY 
17. AccessKenya Group Ltd 
18. Safaricom Ltd 
D. AUTOMOBILES AND ACCESSORIES 
19. Car and General (K) Ltd 
20. CMC Holdings Ltd 
21. Sameer Africa Ltd 
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22. Marshalls (E.A.) Ltd 
E. BANKING 
23. Barclays Bank Ltd Ord 0.50 
24. CFC Stanbic Holdings Ltd 
25. I&M Holdings Ltd 
26. Diamond Trust Bank Kenya Ltd 
27. Housing Finance Co Ltd 
26. Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd 
28. National Bank of Kenya Ltd 
29. NIC Bank Ltd 
30. Standard Chartered Bank Ltd 
31. Equity Bank Ltd 
32. The Co-operative Bank of Kenya Ltd 
F. INSURANCE 
33. Jubilee Holdings Ltd 
34. Pan Africa Insurance Holdings Ltd 
35. Kenya Re-Insurance Corporation Ltd 
36. Liberty Kenya Holdings Ltd 
37. British-American Investments Company ( Kenya) Ltd 
38. CIC Insurance Group Ltd 
G. INVESTMENT 
39. Olympia Capital Holdings ltd 
40. Centum Investment Co Ltd 
41. Trans-Century Ltd 
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H. MANUFACTURING AND ALLIED 
42. B.O.C Kenya Ltd 
43. British American Tobacco Kenya Ltd 
44. Carbacid Investments Ltd 
45. East African Breweries Ltd 
46. Mumias Sugar Co. Ltd 
47. Unga Group Ltd 
48. Eveready East Africa Ltd 
49. Kenya Orchards Ltd 
50. A.Baumann CO Ltd 
I. CONSTRUCTION AND ALLIED 
51. Athi River Mining 
53. Bamburi Cement Ltd 
54. Crown Berger Ltd 
55. E.A.Cables Ltd 
56 E.A.Portland Cement Ltd 
J.  ENERGY AND PETROLEUM 
57. KenolKobil Ltd 
58. Total Kenya Ltd 
59. KenGen Ltd 
60. Kenya Power & Lighting Co Ltd 
61. Umeme Ltd 
